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The Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, bringing an end to four decades of 
the Cold War. A system of tight (;entralized controls has given way to chaotic freedom 
and un-managed, entrepreneurial capitalism. Of immediate concern to most world leaders 
has been the control and safety of over .10,000 Soviet nuclear weapons After ]991, the 
Soviet, centralized system of management los\ one key structural clement: a reliable 
"human factor" for nuclear material control. The Soviet systems for physical security and 
material control are still in place in the nuclear inheritor states - Russia, Ukraine, 
Khazakhstan, and Belarus - but they do not restrain or regulate their nuclear industry In 
the chaos created by the Soviet collapse, the nonproliferation regime may not adequately 
temper the supply of the nuclear materials of the new inheritor states. This could permit 
organizations or states seeking nuclear weapons easier access to fissile materials. New 
initiatives such as the United States Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which draws 
upon U.s. technology and expertise to help the NIS solve these complex problems, are 
short-term tactics. At present there are no strategies which address the long-term root 
problems caused by the Soviet collapse This thesis demonstrates the extent of the nuclear 
control problems in Russia. Specifically, we examine physical security, material control 
and accounting, reb'lllation and enforcement, and criminal actions. It reveals that the 
current lack of internal controls make access to nuclear materials easier for aspiring 
nuclear weapons states 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
rille: Entrepreneurial Proliferation: Russia's Nuclear Industry Suits the Buyer's Market 
1. Background: The collapse of the Soviet Union has left Russia and the other nuclear 
inheritor states with the formidable challenge of managing a vast nuclear industry that is 
ailing from neglect and outdated control methods_ There are more than 950 nuclear sites 
throughout Russia and the other nuclear inheritor states, ranging from power plams to 
weapons dismantlement facilities, that are in questionable physical and administrative 
order. Poor economic conditions in Russia, breakdown of Soviet nuclear controls, rise of 
entrepreneurial criminal elements coupled with high international demand for nuclear 
materials have stimulated an illegal nuclear trade_ There have been instances of weapons 
grade plutonium and uranium being smuggled out of the country_ The quantity and quality 
(more weapons grade plutonium and uranium) of smuggled nuclear material have 
increased steadily over the past four years. International attention focused on the 1994 
arrests in Gennany involving materials ranging from weapons grade plutonium and 
uranium down to rare strategic nuclear related minerals and infonnation whose origins are 
believed to be from within the Newly Independent States (NlS). There have been 
numerous documented cases of nuclear smuggling, and so it is important to realize that the 
new threat posed by entrepreneurial proliferation is not and can not be restrained using 
current nonproliferation regimes 
Given the Soviet collapse, our basic research question asks: What is the scope of 
the international nuclear proliferation threat created by the decaying nuclear industry 
within the NlS? To answer this we first examine the nature of the Soviet collapse and the 
absence of order that followed The nuclear programs and institutions that existed under 
Sovit..1: rule are still present, though some of their names have changed. Corruption runs 
rampam throughout the system, it weakens efforts to control the nuclear industry, this will 
be demonstrated in Chapter II 
The chaotic environment following Soviet rule was filled with corruption, criminal 
activity, and raw entrepreneurial spirit. Though emphasized throughout the thesis, 
Chapters 111 and IV concentrate on the internal and external criminal elements, including 
vi] 
organized crime, corruption of officials, border control problems, and market demands for 
fissile materials. The international demand for nuclear materials has been and is being met 
by criminal elements operating within a corrupt social milieu 
Chapter V discusses some of the major assumptions of past and present 
nonproliferation programs. This is done to demonstrate the intended mission of these 
policies and how this role has often failed to prevent nuclear proliferation by determined 
actors. Through study of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International case, we will 
show how nonproliferation programs have been circumvented to meet the nuclear desires 
of determined nations seeking nuclear weapons. Second, we will demonstrate how these 
international regimes are ill equipped to handle the new proliferation threat posed by the 
collapse of the Soviet nuclear empire, The threat from the NIS today is one of non-state 
criminal actors attempting to obtain nuclear materials for resale internationally. Current 
nonproliferation programs and policies do not adequately address this aspect of the new 
proliferation threat 
The internal regulation of Russia's nuclear indust!), is outlined in Chapter VI 
President Yeltsin's directives that establish specific authority over Russia's civil and 
military nuclear institutions will be examined to study Russia's efforts at preventing 
unauthorized nuclear exports from within its borders. Flaws in these directives and 
corruption within institutions, such as Minatom, will be analyzed to illustrated the internal 
obstacles facing resolution to Russia's nuclear problem. Chapter VI also details the 
background and effectiveness of current Russian security measures and material control 
and accounting programs. The results of this show that the safety aspects of the nuclear 
industry, based mostly on the "human factor," arc being undermined by the systemic chaos 
existing throughout present-day Russia 
Chapter VII introduces the Cooperative Threat Rc<luction (CTR) program, also 
known as the Nunn-I.ugar Act, which was designed to reduce the threat of weapons of 
mass de~truction from the NIS. We outline specific spending programs supported under 
the CTR and demonstrate that these measures often faH short of anticipated results. The 
reasons the CTR generally fail are that most programs offered are mild, short-term tactics 
that provide treatment to symptoms of a larger, systemic problem As a result, the major 
viiI 
problems associated with societal decay persist and remain largely unattended by policy 
makers 
The concluding chapter offers mostly long-Ienn solutions designed to address 
Russia's problems frolll different angles_ Short-term solutions are limited to enhancement 
of the current nonproliferation regime and other quick fixes _ However, we, as two Naval 
Lieutenants who face the operational reaEty as it exists today and will exist tomorrow, are 
concerned about providing solid evidence of the new proliferation threat posed by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union It is believe<! that this evidence will stimulate 

III 
IV 
y 
VI 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
A. MAIN THEMES 
B . CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
C KEY FINDINGS ... 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOVIET COLLAPSE . 
B. I'HE SOVlliT LEGACY 
TABLE 2.1 
TABLE 2 .2 
... 1 
... 2 
.. 6 
A CRIME IN TIlE WAKE OF THE SOVIET COLLAPSE I I 
B. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS... 13 
C RUSSIA'S CRIME SITUATION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, PRESENT 
SIGNlFICA .. "N"CE . .. 14 
Brain Drain: US. Assessment. . 16 
Brain Drain: Russian Assessment . 17 
3 Rebuttals ... 
4 Organized Crime in Russia and the NlS Regions .. 20 
Supply and Demand in Entrepreneurial Proliferation 22 
The Death of Michael Desaro .. .. ....... ... .... .. . 
D ARE NUCLEARMATERJALS TOO EXPENSIVE IN TODA Y'S NEW 
WORLD ORDER? . 26 
E WHAT IS TI-IE TRUE NATURE OF TI-IE DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR 
.MATERIALS? 
A. BORDERS AND S/I.illGGLING 
R. THE STANS ... 
C SPACE PROGRANf 
JJ 
. ]4 
J7 
A. THE NONPROLIFERATION REG.I:\.1E 39 
B ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BY NON-STATE ACTORS ~""DER 
THE NPT ANTI IAEA SAFEGUARD REGIME 
I . The Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
A. REGULATION OF THE N"1JCLEARINDUSTRY 47 
B PHYSICAL SECURITY OF RUSSIAN I\"UCLEAR FAClLITIES 
2. 
a Evaluation 63 
,; 
VII 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
3 Material Control & Accounting and Cooperative Threat Reduction 65 
a. Project Sapphire 67 
A COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION, Nl""N1\l-LUGAR 
TABLE 7.1... 
B DIVISIONS OF FUNDING AND PURPOSE 
I, Oefense Conversion 
2. Dismantlement 
.. 74 
\t1TI. CONCLUSIO'\[ R5 
85 A SUMNiARY: THJ::;REAL PROLIFERATION THREAT ... 
B RECOMMENDATIONS 
Carl von Clausewi[z on Chess. 
Sun Tzu and the Art of Go 
4 One Billion Dollars for Sixteen Satellite Launches 
5. 
b. Long-Term Recommendations 
APPENDIX A ILUCIT TRANSACTlO)JS INVOLVING 'fUCLFAR 
87 
88 
39 
91 
92 
92 
92 
11ATERIALS FROMS THE FSU 95 
B 11APS OF RUSSIAK NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND 
Sfv1UGGLJ]\;G ROUTES 
BCCI COKGRESSIONAL TESTThfO}",{ 
J9J 
199 
D FY 1994 SEMI ANNUAL REPORT 229 
E. FEBRUARY 1995 CTR ANNUAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT .. 279 
F 
G 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
NEWS RELEASE, ASST. SEC OF DEFENSE 
TRWrrRADE AGREEMENTS 
DISTRIBUTION LIST 
285 
289 
303 
311 
L rNTRODUCTION 
A. MAIN THEMES 
J'he sudden and catastrophic collapse of the Soviet Union left behind a legacy of 
over 30,000 nuckar warheads and hundn::ds of ill-protected nuclear storage and 
production facilities The demise of the Soviet Union e~tablished four new nuclear states, 
Russia, Ukraine, Khazakhstan, and Belarus, spanning eleven times zones_ The absence of 
Soviet central authority has cr~ed economic, social, and political chaos with rapidly 
increasing criminal activity Diversions of nuclear materials are reported in the 
international press several times per week. Thousands of miles of loosely controlled 
borders arc allowing entrepreneurs to smuggle extremely valuable nuclear and strategic 
commodities to eager buyers throughout Ihe world. Simply stated, we face a new and 
potentially less predictable nuclear prolii(::ration threat 
Imagine the foUowing; Iraq subsequent to the Gulf War was operating a significant 
covert nuclear weapons program. It included 7,000 scientists, 20,000 workers, and an 
estimated cost of $5-10 billion dollars. They used multiple techniques to obtain weapons 
quality fissile materials, Electromagnetic Isotopes (EMIS), Chemical separation, 
P]ulOnium reprocessing, and Spinning centrifuges. Secret nuclear weapons program this 
size required an enormous clandestine logistical support system_ Highly specialized 
equipment, such as nuclear triggers, computers, high-temperature furnaces, and 
electron-beam welders, needed to be imponed overtly or otherwise. Hundreds of 
specialized buildings were constructed with massive amounts of energy available to the 
labs. 
Much of the technical assistance that was imponed from the West were dual-use in 
nature, but after the program was closely examined by UN inspectors, it was shown that 
these technologies had only one purpose, to build nuclear weapons. The UN inspectors 
have also estimated that the Iraqi program was 8 to 24 months away from nuclear 
weapons completion at the start of the Gulf War Traq faced numerous hurdles and great 
hardships in running its succes~ful program, What needs to imagined here is the Iraqi case 
when the materials needed for nuclear weapons may now be readily accessible in Russia 
and the other inheritor states. Certainly the Gulf War would have been a completely 
different situation 
in the following chapters we discuss the environment that led to (and the 
magnitude of) the systemic collapse of the Soviet Union_ The criminal influence within 
society, government, and the military industrial complex outlines the foundation of 
discussion on the diversion of nuclear materials. The nonproliferation regime targets 
nation-state actors as the entities spreading nuclear materiak The regime as a whole, 
expects nation-state actors to be the primary enforcement mechanisms. Russia is not able 
to effectively deliver this service, and so, the current nonproliferation regime cannot be 
expected to stem this new proliferation problem 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARIES 
Chapter n provides a brief description of the major system-wide problems the 
Soviet Union faced prior to its collapse. It will be seen that the extent of confusion is 
greater than that experienced by any nuclear power in histol)' The collapse was not 
merely an economic depression, but a society wide, systemic breakdown. This point is 
very important to our discussion because much of what the world assumes a society can 
accomplish depends upon an infrastructure that functions "reasonahly well" We show 
that this infrastructure does not perform adequately and that the lack of administrative 
control and order are making nuclear diversions more possible 
Chapter III discusses the manner in which criminal and corrupt elements have been 
ahle to move into the power void furnished hy the collapse. It will discuss in detail criminal 
access to fissile materials, as well as the criminal and corrupt elements operating within 
Russia and the other nuclear successor states_ Appendix A is a compilation of four years 
of open-source accounts concerning criminal diversions of nuclear materials and it 
illustrates the scope of criminal activity in nuclear proliferation 
Chapter IV compliments Chapter III by illustrating the ease of which smugglers 
can and do move any materials internationally_ Specifically, it shows how nuclear 
materials smugglers are able to transport their cargo through Europe, the \fiddle and Far 
East, without being detected Appendix 13 consisits of four maps that illustrate both the 
actual routes that these smugglers frequently use, and the access that these smuggling 
routes provide to numerous nuclear test, research, and weapons facilities 
Chapll:r V summarizes the international mind set behind the specific programs and 
[rea ties as they went into effect It is shown that the assumptions the international 
community uses as a frame-work for nonproliferation programs are the nation-state as 
"actor" in origin. While these are not bad assumptions since the actors have generally 
been nation-states in the past, if the nation-stale no-longer functions effectively, these 
nonproliferation programs may also not function effectively. A brief case study is included 
in Chapter V to discuss the overall effectiveness of nonproliferation programs, illustrate 
the current demand for these materials, and show that those with the desire to obtain these 
materials will be difficult to deter. Appendix C contains excerpts from congressional 
testimony discussing the ease that non-government organizations (NGOs) are able to 
move contraband including nuclear materials, internationally 
In Chapter VI the regulation and physical security aspects of the nuclear industry 
within Russia and the nuclear inheritor states are examined. The purpose here is to 
address the possible short-comings present in these programs and detennine if they 
currently possess the cohesion necessary to answer the security issues raised in the first 
four chapters Material Control & Accounting (MC&A) practices are also evaluated and 
examined in light of the assistance Nunn-Lugar is attempting to supply to this region 
Appendices D and E provide detailed explanations of MC&A and defense CDnversion 
programs and their specific focus of aid shall be 
Chapter VII deals directly v.ith Nunn-Lugar, now known as the Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) program We will discuss the use of CTR funds and the effect 
this aid has had on programs such as defense conversion and weapons dismantlement, in 
light of this new source of prolift::ration possibilities. Appendix F, describes the 
Department of Defense's position on all the programs discussed in Chapters VI and VII 
The conclusion section is titled "Recommendations" because many problems in 
IOday's dynamic world do not have simple answers. Physicists call simple equations linear 
and unanswerable questions "nonlinear." We believe the Soviet collapse represents a 
non-linear problem The case study in this chapter, concerning drug smuggling, is an 
example of what happens when a linear solution is applied to a non-linear problem. Care 
must be taken to avoid this mistake in the case of the Soviet Collapse. Our answers deal 
with possible long-term solutions that may have a chance of solving these great systemic 
problems Russia and the inheritor states now faceing. Appendix G is a trade agreement 
between the United States and Russia that we feel represents a legitimate long-term 
solution the concerns discussed in this thesis 
C. KEY FINDINGS 
The first finding of this thesis is that criminal, mi litary, and civilian entities within 
Russia and other new nuelear inheritor states possess access to nuclear facilities 
throughout the region. Second, individuals and organizations can, with relative ease, 
remove, transport, and smuggle various types of nuclear materials, technology and 
information to destinations in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and the Americas. Third, 
we believe this smuggling is made possible by the chaotic conditions resulting from the 
collapse of the Soviet infrastructure. The physical security, police forces, and the political 
leadership are currently incapable of addressing these problems. Forth, since present 
nonproliferation arrangements and policies assume that a functioning government and 
orderly social infrastructure are necessary to facilitate nonproliferation policy 
implementation, this same nonproliferation regime may not be effective in the NIS. Until 
Russia and the inheritor states regain control and order, these nonproliferation programs 
will likely produce marginal results. Fifth, U.S. efforts to assist the nuclear NIS under the 
Cooperative Threat Reduction Act offers some short-term solutions, but may not address 
the long-term, systemic problems plaguing the NTS societies 
These five key findings lead us to believe that since nuclear materials, technologies 
and information are now readily available internationally, nations and non-state actors will, 
if they desire, be able to obtain these materials from this new and accessible fissile 
materials source 
II 
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOVIET COLLAPSE 
Mikhail Gorbachev, 1987 1 
"Workers of the world ... WE'RE SORRY!" 
1989.' 
To understand properly the new proliferation th reat, one must first comprehend 
the systemic problems that the Soviet Union faced prior to its collapse. ft was a 
society-wide infection that brought about the collapse and is responsible for the magnitude 
of depth of the cra~h. The various programs of the nonproliferation regime that were 
negotiated hy nation-states, signed by nation-states, and implemented by nation-states, 
assumes in part, that nations are lll!lctioning reasonably well and can control their internal 
institutions. l'or a nation 10 fulfil l its international treaty obligations it must have 
functioning institutions, this is a reasonable assumption. \),,'hat will be shown here is that 
Russia and the other nuclear inheritor states are not functioning adequately in most areas, 
legal system, police and security forces, hanking systems and many other areas. This leads 
us to question whether nonproliferation programs based on these assumptions can work 
Lastly, to understand why the criminal elements and porous borders are so dangerous, we 
will present a picture of the environment from which these threats arose 
\Vhen Gorbachev came to powcr in 1985, hc intended to create a kimiCI and 
gentler Sovict Union . He envisioned Jess corruption, more openness, and sustained 
Michael Kart, The Soviet Colossus The Rise and Fall of the USSR (Armonk, 
New York, ME Sharp, 1993),289-2 91 
Ibid 
economic growth. Instituted was some of the greatest political, social, and economic 
reforms attempted in recent Russian history. These reforms were in no way intended to 
undermine party influence or destroy the CSSR as an entity. It was an effort to streamline 
an inefficient machine and get the Soviet Union back on track economically, socially, and 
in the sense of Lenin, spiritually. Gorbachev however, faced too much internal opposition 
from too many sectors, political, economic, and militarily to adueve success. The reform 
attempt failed , because of the many fissures within the Government and society. Many 
powerful factions did not want change and effectively stalled it. Nonproliferation regimes 
assume and require reasonable cohesion in governments to facilitate these nonproliferation 
programs. The Soviet Union did not possess the cohesion required in its institutions to 
save the Federation under Gorbachev's leadership_ Russia and the other inheritor states do 
not currently possess the level of oohesion necessary to operate compl e:>; and highly 
technical programs to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear materials from their nuclear 
programs 
B. THE SOVIET LEGACY 
The Soviet Union was built upon the graves of her people, from the Bolshevik 
Revolution, to the collectivization of Stalin, to Hitler's Panzer Divisions and a se1f~initiated 
Cold War. For seventy years it was the fear of the whip and bayonet that pushed the 
Soviet peoples forward. The oombined of the horrors of Collectivization, the Great 
ferror, World War II and the threat of nuclear war during the Cold War, are what 
supported the Soviet economy. This was and the succesor states still possess the 
institutions of a highly industrialized nation, ... 1th a skilled and educated work force. Yet it 
was and is unable to adequately feed its people, The the Soviet Lnion was a nation that at 
one time was the world's leading producer of oil, gas, cast iron, steel, and tractors. The 
USSR pioneered spa(;e exploration, had the largest natural gas distribution network, and 
the worlds deepest oil wells 1 The Soviets maintained the largest merchant marines, and 
deployed one of the worlds largest and technically advance military forces in history. Most 
Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
103-148 
significantly, the USSR built and maintained a nuclear arsenal that was only rivaled and 
held in check by the American nuclear "TRJAD " 
However by the late 1970's, it was evident that deep seated problems were 
growing and needed to be solved. The greatest of these problems was the rate of 
economic growth, which had fallen consistently from the 1950's to the early 1980's as 
illustrated in the following graph 
~ 
Soviet economic growth, 1951 -1 985(average annual rates of gro'NIh, oflicial data in 
percent, %) 
Product!d Gross Gross Labor Real 
national indus! 'gno prod'y incomes 
income prodn prodn in indus per head 
(GNP) 
YEAR 
1951-56 11A 13.2 4 .2 8.2 7.3 
1956-60 9.2 lOA 60 6.5 5.7 
1961 -65 65 8.6 7.2 4.6 36 
1966-70 7.8 85 39 58 5.9 
1971-75 57 7.4 2.5 6.8 44 
1976-80 4.3 4.4 17 44 3.4 
1981-85 3.6 3.7 1.0 34 2 I 
(Gorbachev takes power) 
This graph is based upon Narodnot! khozyaistvo SSSR 1922-1972 gg.(Moscow 
Statisika, 1972), p.S6, Narodnoe khozyaistvo S$SR za 70 let (Moscow: Finansy i 
statisika, 1987), pp 58-59.' 
H should be noted that these figures project a stronger picture then what may have 
bet!n true. The figures failed to account for tht! increase in the population of about 0 .9 
annually during this time' They also excluded the steady increase in "over reponing."6 
which equaled a full three percent of tot a! production by the 1980s or up to a third in the 
----------------------------------
Ibid 
Ibid 
Kort, The Soviet Colosus' The Rist< and FaI! of I he USSR, 151 -289. 
cases of cotton and road transportation. 7 These figures did not allow for price increases or 
a change in specifications. This practice of inflated bookkeeping led to the serious hidden 
problems that began surfacing in the late 1970s. By 1985 Gorbachev's administration had 
serious problems throughout their entire political, social, and econonUc institutions 
The real fact is that most Soviet production only exacerbated the crises as it did 
not produce legitimate, or real wealth. For instance, more tractors were made than there 
were workers to use them. The surplus tractors were too inferior in quality to world 
market standards to export. This inferior production quality is illustrated by the fact that 
more people were employed fixing and repairing farm equipment than were employed in 
producing fann equipment. The USSR produced twice as much steel as the Cnited States, 
yet produced only a fraction of the finished goods ' In addition, while the Soviet industrial 
machine used 2 to 2.5 times as much energy, natural resources, and materials as the West 
in production, it still produced inferior goods.9 
Compared to thc rest ofthe world, the per capita standard of living fell from 56th 
place in 1976 to 70th place in 1982. They suffered from chronic declines in returns on 
investment, low labor productivity, and by the early 1980s, a relatively low and backward 
level of science and technology, placing the Soviets 10 to 15 years behind most western 
countries Ie The Stalinist command economy had failed to produce a sustainable pattern of 
growth and the initial apparent prosperity (some 30 years worth), was to a large degree 
caused by poor book keeping practices, and excessive diversion of resources into military 
expenditures. The West is now approaching a post-industrial society, in which service 
industries and knowledge are key indicators of econonUc stability and modernity. Russia 
is being left behind. Seventy years of trying to inst ill socialism failed to create a just and 
eftective society. When the society collapsed, so did the assumptions that nonproliferation 
White, After Gorbacbev, 101-127 
Ibid 
Richard Sakwa, CTOrbachev and His Refonns (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1990), 
268-295 
Ibid., p. 26-57 
programs base effective controls upon, those being a well organized, orderly and 
controlled society 
Due 10 the huge Soviet bureaucracy, corrupt politicians, poor managers, and 
communist hard-l iners who refused 10 assist the reforms, Gorbachev's goal of a more 
compassionate socialism and Soviet Union was destined 10 fai l almost from the beginning 
The following graph illustrates the severity of the Soviet collapse during Gorbachev's tive 
effective years of governing 
TABLE 2.2 
Soviet economic gro'.Vth, 1986-1991 (official data in percent, %) 
1986-90 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(average) 
National income 
produced 4.2 2.3 1.6 4.4 24 -4.0 -15 .0 
Industrial 
output 4 6 4.4 38 39 17 - 1.2 -7,8 
Agricultural 
output 27 5.3 -0.6 17 L3 -2 .3 -7.0 
Sources: Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1989 g. (Moscow Finansy i statistika, 1990), 
pp.8-9; Ekonomika i zhizn', 1991 , no. 5, p.9, and 1992, no.6, pp.13_16. 1; 
The collapse in the Soviet economy was the overall result of many simultaneous 
factors. The crash, when it came, was greater in magnitude than the (',-reat Depression's 
effect on America 11 It was also something Gorbachev, the Soviet bloc, and Russian 
society as a whole could not experience and remain intact. The inrrastructure of the 
military as well as the economy and body politic were severely shaken. The people had no 
corporate wisdom to tall back upon. All truth had been framed and supplied by the Party, 
The Great Depression in America forced unemployment rates up 10 between 30'% 
and 50%, the stockmarket crashed, but the nation still worked 
so when the Party fell from legitimacy so did an entire belief system, based upon the 
Marxist-Leninist myth of socialism The Russian state still has the parts needed for the 
machine to work, but cannot enforce effective nonproliferation policies and programs 
Export controls will likely never be effective if a nation has little or no control over its 
borders, as is discussed in Chapter IV. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to explain in depth how or why Gorbachev·s 
reforms failed and caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. The real issue here is the new 
proliferation threat that is facilitated by that collapse. ;.juclear proliferation for profit by 
those who have no political or moral agenda, is what is occurring in Russia today due 
directly to this collapse. This very brief synopsis explains how vast and rapid the crash was 
and still is. It is this current chaos thaI increases the likelihood of this proliferation threat 
The Russian people and those in the nuclear successor states, have lost all that they 
believed in, and expected from their system. Their people will do what is necessaI)' to 
survive This thesis does not presume to pass judgment on these people nor their actions, 
its purpose is merely to delineate Ihis very real threat, and described the chaos from which 
It is now arising 
~ 
A nation must have the functioning institutions necessary, such as police forces, 
intelligence networks, science and technology industries, and leadership, to operate and 
execute its day to day functions. These are the basic "house-keeping" programs that keep 
the nation working, garbage collection, mail delivery, highway repair, and providing safety 
for its citizens. To operate the complex and technical programs that are proscribed under 
the nonproliferation regime requires another level of effeciancy that these nations do not 
currently possess. Russia and the NTS basic infrastructures are in disarry. Russia, due to 
the massive collapse, docs not possess the capability to feed her people, and now we want 
her to insure the security of a massive nuclear industry. Export controls, CTR., Laboratory 
to 1.aboratory, and defense conversion may be effective programs for the United States 
but do little to address Soviet Unions systemic collapse. And as a result little can be done 
to stop individuals and criminal groups from diverting, transporting and selling fissile 
materials 
]0 
ill 
The collapse of the Soviet Union has left the sociaL political, and economic arenas 
open to any entity to step in and fill the power vacuum. In the polilical arena in all oflhe 
successor states, ethnic nationalism has risen to prominence in many new political parties 
In many other areas such as banking, produce, clothing, and weapons exportation, it has 
been criminal elements that move into the power vacuums left by the communist collapse 
These criminal elements have penneatcd the society so completely, the legitimate 
governments of the NIS are unable to prosecute them effectively. As a result these 
organizations have de facto control over many of these nations industries, including 
possible access to the inheritor states nuclear materials. We reveal the extent of control 
organized crime groups hold within the N1S, and described the serious threat generated by 
criminal s obtaining fissile materials for resale abroad 
A. CRIME IN THE WAKE OF THE SOVlF.T COLLAPSE 
Accounting to a U.S. Departmcnt of Justice study, there were 245,652 violent 
criminals serving lime in state prisons in 1986. These criminals had victimized 
approximately 409,000 persons: about 79,300 had been murdered, 51 ,000 had been 
assaulted, and an additional 20,400 "other" types of violence were committed. Those 
criminals in prison in ! 986 alone had kiUed nearly fifty percent more Americans than bad 
died in the ten plus ycars in the Vietnam War, 11 
Violent crime is not the only criminal threat facing America today It has been 
estimated that world wide trade in smuggled goods exceeded $200 billion doUars in 1994 
Oftbat, more than $100 billion was illegal narcotics, and 90 percent of this total came into 
the United States that same year. To put these figures and the total volume into 
perspective, for the same year of 1994, intemationally tntded oil totaled $200 billion, and 
automOlive products equaled $250 bill ion 
Wayne LaPierre, Guns Crime and Freedom (Washington, Regnery Publishing, 
Inc., 1994), 101 
II 
The United States Justice Department estimates that various law enforcement 
bureaus stop about ten percent of the total drugs smuggled into the United States_ When 
successful, these investigations lead to more than 100 cases a year where law enforcement 
officers are implicated or charged with corruption and corroboration 14 This in light of the 
fact that the United States has been fighting a massive "war on drugs" for years 
These are just a couple of examples of the criminal problems and corruption a 
large nation faces on a daily basis. The United States is financially, socially, and 
economically sound, govemed by a "rule of law." It has massive police forces, national 
guards, and military forces to deal with these threats directly, and it still cannot gain 
adequate control of its drug and violence problems Given this, how much more difficult 
would it be tor Russia and the other Newly Independent States (1\'1S) to maintain law and 
order after their economic, political, and social order has collapsed? As seen from the 
American example, crime in today's world is inevitable_ In the Russian case we show that 
"inevitable" criminal activity when combined with access to fissile materials poses a threat 
of intemational significance 
Is the Russian state security system able to manage the criminal threat? If not, are 
the organized and unorganized criminal elements inside the nuclear inheritor states even 
interested in the nuclear materials? Is there a criminal clement within the nuclear inheritor 
states that has the influence and financing to either purchase or take by force, nuclear 
weapons materials and technologies and then resell them on the open or black markets? 
Initial evidence fou nd in open sources indicates that there are very strong criminal 
factions and corrupt governmental elements within these states. It is evident that these 
elements not only desire to sell but arc currently and actively involved in obtaimng nuclear 
material, if they have not already done so. The significance to the discussion here is that 
these acquisitions and sales occur illegaHy. Are there currently nonproliferation programs 
that address this illegal activity by non-state actors. The answer is no. Internally, since the 
collapse of the Soviet Umon there are effectively no intemal enforcement agencies with 
enough resources to stop this either 
Berkeley Rice, ILaffi£king (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons), 191 . 
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.B. COUNTER-ARGUMENTS 
Critics tend to attack the above argument from several different directions rhis 
chapter counters those arguments and delineates in a clear manner exactly how much 
control or innuence criminal elements bring to bear over the military and governmental 
infrastructure. It wi!1 demonstrate to what extent these factors can or could adversely 
effect international stability and exhibit a serious international threat. Most major 
arguments fan into the following categories we will demon~1rate that they are incorrect 
J. There are no Russian organized crime groups of any significance, influence, or 
power There arc only small time regional thugS.15 
2. The crime groups that do exist, as well as any other non-state actors and 
organizations (such as terrorists or political blackmailers), do not have, and cannot raise 
the capital necessary to purchase these types of materials [6 
3. Crime groups do not possess the tt:chnical expertise to ascertain authenticity or 
tum any acquired materials into useful devices, ' 1 
4 , There is no credible evidence that there is a market for nuclear materials, most 
purchases have been made by Gennan secret police, It is their sting operations that are 
creating the perceived demand. ,. 
5. There is no physical evidence that weapons grade materials have ever left or 
been successfidly smuggled out of Russia, By July and August of 1994 this argument had 
been disproved "'1lh the discovery of weapons grade plutonium in Baden-Wuerttemberg 
Dieter Schroder, "BND Official Denies Existence of Nuclear .1I.1afia," from 
SUEDDEUTSCflE ZEHVNG, in Daily Report Western Europe, FBIS-WEU-94-163, 21 
August 1994, p. 8 
Ibid 
Peter Zinunennan, ''Technical Barriers to Nuclear Proliferation," in Zachery S. 
Davis and Benjamin Frankel eds. , The Prolif.lli:M!~~---Y.Nuclear Weapons Spread 
and What Results (Frank Cass, 1993): 345-355 
Dieter Schroder. "The Situation is Not Yet Dramatic Enough," from 
SUEDDEUlSCHE ZEITUNG, in J&!l~port International AfI~, FBIS-WEU-94-164, 
24 August 1994, p. 4 
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Germany's BKA (Federal Office of Criminal Investigations), and the United States 
Department of Energy (DOE), maintain that the plutonium is of Russian origin" In light 
ofthis and numerous other discoveries this argument is no longer seriously considered 
6. The last major argument still within the scope of the following addresses the 
possibility that the Russians are creating this threat themselves to receive aid from the 
United States and Western Europe. This is aid that many believe they neither need or 
de~rve.2C This argument is supported by the fact that Moscow is currently producing new 
fourth generation fighter and attack aircraft to rival U.s front line forces (as seen at the 
Paris Air Show this past year). Also in production are new light and heavy tanks, ships, 
and submarines 1L Giving Russia more fi nancial aid according to this scenario, will only 
allow them to spend more in areas they believe important. 11 is noted here that these 
arguments are proposed by a large range of experts; the intelligence community, law 
enforcement community, and nuclear science community.>l 
C. RUSSIA'S CruME SITUATION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 
PRESENT SIGNIFICANCE 
Russia for the past 500 years operated a shadow economy, or black-market, that 
grew into its own after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.>1 Experts note that this type of 
criminal element is present in any country with a strong repressive regime These criminal 
groups will play an important role in the average citizen's day to day life, but ultimately 
Initialed report, "Nuclear Flea Market," from DIE ZlET, in ~ 
International Affairs. JPRS-TND-94-0006-L, 29 July 1994, p. 1 
Schroder, "The Situation is Not Yet Dramatic Enough: FBIS, p_ 4 
Steve Gallant, "The Failure of Russia's Defense Conversion," Jane's Intelligence 
~ 6, no,7 (July 1994): 304 
The open source materials will be found in Appendix A at the end of this text 
This information will be referred to throughout the text and includes a substantial listing of 
most known cases of nuclear proliferation at this sub-state, entreprenurial level 
Mikhail l-leller and Aleksandr M, Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York, 
Touchstone Books, 1992), 13-50 
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hold little financial and militant power when compared to the state. This could be said of 
Russia prior to the collapse in 1991 and to an even larger extent today.24 Extorting money 
flom business-persons is not on the same level of sophistication as acquiring and moving 
nuclear materials internationally 
Organized criminals in the N1S, like their counterparts in other countries control, 
specific spheres of influence such as prostitution, burglary, extortion, and drugs. This 
though, is the only real power that criminal groups can obtain and use I5 This is not to say 
that there are not many of these groups to contend with, some 4,000 separate crimina! 
groups have been identifie<l as operating within Russia and the NIS by 1992.2<; Quantity 
does not necessarily reflect quality, or even a significant power and fmancial base 
Realistically as far as criminal organi7.3tions go only the Colombian drug cartels, with 
income estimated in the billions of dollars, can afford the nuclear materials in quest ion. n 
Few would argue that Russian criminal organizations control that amount of capital 
The cases reported have been brushed aside as a few disillusioned employees 
among the millions of employees still within the Russian nuclear weapons and r~search 
facilities, whose loyalty can be questioned'! As Mr. Shaposhnikov, the last defense 
minister of the USSR stated in late 1991 , that due to the loyalty problem, one hundred 
percent of nuclear weapons and materials, plus or minus five percent, were under control 
Charles Gati, The Block That Failed (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 1990), 191-22 1 
Melinda Liu, "The FDl vs. Russia's Mafia," ~~, 25 July 1994, p. 28 
This number reflects a major and dramatic increase in the overall total of criminal 
organizations operating in Russia and the NIS.'ndependant experts from the Russian 
research corporation, (RAU), published the 4,000 group figure. Abo included in the study 
was the fae! that more than 1,000 of these groups had inter-regional or international 
connections. displaying quite high levels of sophistication. This study is found in ~ 
Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press 10 March 1993, p. 12 
Rice, Trafficking, 155-161 
Schroder, "BND Official Denies Existence of Russian Mafia,' FBIS, p. 9-10. 
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It should be noted that this figure corresponds to a minimum of 1,500 weapons that may 
or may not be under any control at all. 
1. Brain Drain: U.S. Assessment 
The possible brain drain is also a legitimate threat or concern, especial ly since 
anyone of th~se capable Russian experts, can with little effort walk out of the country 
These scientists and technicians may not be the best in the world when compared to what 
the West has to offer, but to a third world or developing nation, they could represent a 
"quantum leap'· in technologically expertise. It now appears evident that these 
professionals can and will seek employment in areas other than Russia and the NIS . Their 
best marketable skill is knowledge that most international leaders do not want 10 see 
spread. North Korea was accused, in 1993, by the Russian press of a!lempting to recruit 
sixty-four Ru ssian missile experts . The men in question were stopped from boarding a 
plane in Moscow, whose destination was Pyongyang. They indicated that their salaries 
were to be $3,000 a month. Their current pay is less than $20 do llars a month,V CTA 
repom released to the Chicago Tribune in October of 1993 quoted CIA officials as saying 
that China, Iran, and Iraq had followed the North Korean example by actively and 
successfully recruiti ng Russian nudear scientists and engineers The CIA went on to say 
that it appears thai the Russian attempt to stop the exodus of scientists has basically 
collapsed, it is just far too easy to leave, and to take your notes wi th you;(l National 
Security aids under the Bush administration indicated their findings led them to believe 
that many of these departing scientists were able to smuggle out high-tech weapons 
components, selling them to the highest bidder. The State Department concurs with this 
assessment," 
Seymour Hersh, "The Wild East," Atlantic Monthly (June 1994): 61 -86 
Editorial, "Russian Technoloh'Y For Sale," Chicago Tribu ne, (October 1993) 
Currently Iran is still act ively seeking nuclear power technolob'Y from Russia and China 
The Clinton administration had hoped to stop sales of this nature to Iran when President 
Clinton visited Russia in :\1ay 1995. At this time it appears that the mission failed if not 
totally at least part ially 
Ronald Kessler, The FBI (New York, Pocket Books, 1993), 12-20, 71 -75 
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2. Bntin Drain: R uss i:! n Assessm ent 
Oflicia; statistics from the Counterintelligence Service of the Russian Republic 
show that there is an ongoing 'brain drain' of lOp scientists. The data demonstrates, just in 
pure numbers, that fony percent of the top theoretical physicists are working abroad, as 
are twelve percent of experimental physicists.n The demographic breakout of the data is 
more revealing. Oflhe remaining scientists in Russia, 13 percent would leave immediately, 
40 percent would not ru le out leaving, and 15.4 percent are firmly against leaving 
Additionally, the age breakdown demonstrates that those willing to leave more read ily are 
quite young, Willing emigrants scient ists include 25 percent of those under age:;O and 67 
percent of those under age 40_ All totaled, "Almost 80 percent of young scientists are 
thinking of emigrating._." while 93 percent of those over age 50 wish to stay in Russian 
The decline of personnel engaged in the sciences began as far back as 1986, where 
there was a drop of fou r pcrcent. This trend is also seen in the number of graduate 
students engaged in science ' dropping from 97,400 in 1985 to 92,100 in j 990, In 1991 , 
with the Soviet collapse, the number of scientists suddenly dropped twenty percent. From 
1986- 1991,979,000 personnel dropped out of Russian science, a decline of over thirty 
percent . In fact, with the sudden Soviet collapse there developed a I.:hanl.:c for new 
scientifiC mobility_ Over 629,000 R&D scientists found themselves outside Russian 
territory, free to stay in the new statc or leave for fo reign employment. By January 1993, 
personnel working in Academic and industrial science dropped 24 percent and 30.4 
percent respectively," 
while many of the scientists are going abroad, a good share of them are moving 
from the scientific community to the industrial and entrepreneurial sectors within Russia 
"TV Program Underscorcs Probkm of Brain Drain," from MOSCOW RUSSIAt{ 
TELEVISION l\T£TWORK: 'PLAJ\T£RKA,' in ITIiL~ort Central EUrasia, 
JPRS-UST-95·008, 15 Fehruary 1995, p 1 
Ibid 
"Statistical Information on Russian Brain Drain," Khimiya I Zhlm. in ,[FRS Report 
Central Eurasia, JPRS-UST-94-025, 21 October 1994, p_ 1-2 
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Evt..>tl so, the emigration of scientists is increasing and is expected to remain steady for the 
next couple of years. One Russian official feels that since science employment trends lag 
behind economic trends by about three years, the decline will persist, with the youngest 
and most active leading the exit Additionally, the decline in the scientific community is 
not being managed hy the govenunent, but instead following "the laws of Darwinian 
natural selection.· lS There is no planning or management of the scientific resources, 
leaving the uncontrolled decline in the hands of market forces. The departure of the 
intellectual elite is depriving Russia of a resource badly needed, where economic recovery 
and political and social stability are intrinsically linked. Ifpresent declines are not checked, 
the Russian government will "[no J longer have to discuss preservation of the nation's 
scientific potential, but how to create it anew. ,,36 
One conclusion drawn from Russia's brain drain is that short-term collateral 
deficiencies due to decreased scientific inputs can be covered by the older and remaining 
scientists. However the medium and long-range implications for Russia are more serious 
Long-tenn research and development for civilian industry and more so military industry, 
will suffer from stifled innovation and foreign competition. Indigenous scientific 
capabilities, the backbone of long-term economic and intellectual grov.th, do not develop 
over night and must be maintained 
A second conclusion, and one that is directly applicable to this thesis, is the 
transfer of knowledge from Russia to other parts of the world. crR funds for the N1S in 
general help create thc International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) is each state 
However, only Russia has seen a marked investment in this enterprise. The overall, 
long-term nature of the rSTC program not clear. According to CTR directives, the length 
of the ISTC program is up to three years with no procedures or guarantees for 
continuation What happens when the ISTC funds dry up is anyone's guess, but the 
unemployment of hundreds or thousands of nuclear scientists seems highly likely 
Ibid, p. 3-4 
Ibid. , p. 5 
IS 
Based on the US, and Russian brain drain assessments, the arguments that 
di~gruntled employees incompetently selling material and technology are much less 
dangerous than a strong criminal organization doing the same is intuitively incorrect 
3. Rebuttals 
The argument that disgruntled employees incompetently selling material and 
technology are much less dangerous than a strong criminal organilation doing the sameH 
Georgiy Kaurov, lnfonnation Chief of the !vfinistry of Nuclear Energy, went as far as to 
claim that this "speculated" movement of nuclear materials has heen created completely by 
the press looking for a great story. Kaurov and Interior Minister Viktor Yerin state 
unequivocally that there have been no thefts of nuclear material, and most definitely one 
cannot prove that anything seized to date can he directly or positively identified as having 
been removed from Russia JI 
Paul Muenstermann, Vice President of the Gennan B!\'D (Federal Intelligence 
Service) has stated that his organization has no knowledge of a "nuclear Mafia" existing 
either inside or outside of Russian borders. Konrad Posner told a reporter of the 
Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung (March, 1994), that the "Russian Mafia" had no access 
10 nuclear facilities and that there was no evidence that other countries had access to or 
recruited Russian nuclear expens,l, The difficulty is how does one detennine reliable 
David M . Lowy, "Understanding Organized Crime Groups in Russia," 
(Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1994): 42-57 
It should be noted that Russian officials, and the Soviet officials before them 
denied, signing a non-aggression pact v,1th Nazi-Gennany, denied selling 1'-55 tanks and 
artillery to SerbsIBosnian Serbs, denied murdering entire villages and using nerve gas on 
Afghanistan rebels (combatants and non-combatants), as well as denying the dumping of 
spent nuclear reactor cores in the Baltic Sea and Arctic Ocean. Having misled in the past, 
their claims lack a semblance of veracity today. Christain Schmidt-Haeuer, "Isotopes From 
the Preserving Jar," from DIE ZIE7~ in JPRS Central Rep~, 
JPRS-TND-94-006-L, 29 July 1994, p. 9-11 
Ibid 
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estimates or indications of the existence of undetected nuclear smuggling and the groups 
participating in it? 
It has been argued that there is no legitimate international market for nuclear 
materials and technologies. First, 10.5 kgs of uranium (}fEU and LEU) should sell on the 
open market for as much as $825 million dollars, and in theory considerably more on the 
black market '>:) Prices such as this would seriously strain non-state actors' financial 
reserves, Second, in the German cases, three of the four samples of weapons grade 
materials that made it to the West were purchased by undercover agents conducting 
"sting" type operations. These operations were specifically designed to trap sellers and 
their couriers. In Bremen, Germany, the countries chief prosecutor feels there is no 
nuclear market in Germany and that the intelligence officials are onJy enticing criminals to 
bring extremely dangerous materials onto German soil",1 
The arguments against entrepreneurial nuclear proliferation, that have been briefly 
stated above ·may initially seem credible. But when viewed in light of the large body of 
evidence concerning nuclear material diversions, which is taking place internationally, the 
real significance of this legitimate danger will become overwhelming 
4. Organized Crime in Russia and the NIS Regions 
The Soviet black market and criminal elements were highly integrated into all 
aspects of Soviet society, including the upper echelons of government"';! As noted earlier, 
these groups reached their state-sponsored height under Brezhnev, and with the failure of 
Gorbachev's glasnost and peristroika were able to move into the powerful position they 
maintain today,4J This position is being sustained through brutal tactics and violence 
Zimmerman, "Technical Barriers to Nuclear Proliferation," 345-355 
In light of these sentiments the same officials all agree that these matl.'fials do 
indeed appear to be coming from facilities, research or otherwise, that are located inside 
Russia and the other Newly Independent States, It is their belief it is the odd disgruntled 
or rogue employee perpetuating the crime, not an organized syndicate Bruce W l\eJan, 
"Formula For Terror," Iin!i<, 29 August 1994, p. 46-51 
Heller and Nekrich, Utopia in Power 603-652 
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Combined with a shrinking police force and an inadequate legal system, rull of corruption 
and loopholes. has helped cement these criminal elements into society .... When added to 
the fact that government officials can be bribed, threatened, or murdered, prosecution is 
easily avoided') In this unique environment one cannot expect the international 
nonproliferation regime to work, no one is effectively in control 
Now these crime groups have gone international46 According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FRI), connections inside the United States alone for Russian and 
Eurasian organized crime groups include the cities of New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and 
Chicago." Total international connections are currently being traced, with unknoVvn 
resources in Israel, Belgium, Poland, and Austria, but it could be years before all 
international connections are disoovered.48 As these groups expand and grow, increased 
organizational size and complexity will point towards a greater level of sophistication and 
technical resources. These levels would not be approachable in the near future were it not 
for these international contacts and Russian societal collapse 
Another indication of increased sophistication and complexity according to the 
Russian Corporation RAU, larger groups are absorbing many of the smaller, less powerful 
groups similar to conglomerates taking over smaller businesses 49 This allows the crime 
Hersh, "The Wild East,' 61-67 
Ibid, 68-7 1 
The intimidation of government officials is not the only tactic these groups and 
others use, mosl recently several news personalities have been gunned down on Moscow 
streets. It is believed to be because of their vocal opposition to these gangs, as well as 
government and military corruption at all levels. These murders have even included 
American Embassy officials, this subject will be discussed in greater detail later in this 
same chapter 
Gati, The Block That FIDkQ, 191-221 
Kessler, The FBI, 73 -75 
Ibid 
Ibid ., 12-75 
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group to expand efficiently into other lucrative areas. However, the question still remains, 
do these criminal clements or individuals possess the financial power and coercive strength 
to broker international deals involving nuclear materials? 
5. Supply lind Demand in Entrepreneurial Proliferation 
I t has be~n argu~d that the amount of capital necessary to purchase nuclear 
materials on the international market is staggering. Even if a state meets the advanced 
technological requirementss, the costs will be in the hundreds of millions or bil lions of 
dollars to finance the venture. 50 When a country desires nuclear weapons its program must 
move underground, in which the costs associated can rise exponentially, as was seen in the 
case ofIraq shortly after the Gulf War. Iraq had massive oil revenues and could afford a 
black program." The financial drain upon the economy was significant and may not be 
acceptable to the populace of either a more politically liberal or less wealthy nation 
However, North Korea proved that technology and financial resources may not always be 
necessary to achieve weapons status Here, an economically crippled and re latively 
isolated, backward, third world nation conducted what appears to be an extremely 
successful nuclear weapons program. North Korea has effectively forced international 
leaders to negotiate with it on a super -power level. Both of these cases occurred under the 
full auspices of the NPT, the lAEA, export controls, and safeguards programs in effect 
and working as intended. The lAEA did become suspicious of North Korea which led 10 
further investigation of its program, which brought us to the current situation. What thi~ 
really indicates is that the United States, and the world, can be misled by a country that 
has the desire to do what is necessary to obtain nuclear weapons technology This thesis 
Zimmerman, "Technical Barriers to Nuclear proliferation," 145-3 55 
Iraq was in fact not running one expensive nuclear weapons program, but rather 
several expensive nuclear weapons simultaneously. 11 was attempting to build 
breeder reactors to produce and were chemical refilling, 
ultra-high-speed spinning centrifuges, and into weapons 
grade U-23S. Estimates, from UN inspectors, now the multiple Iraqi programs at 
two years or slightly less from a successful weapon at the out break of the Gulf War. It is 
anyone's guess how far away Iraq is now after its rec~nt major set back, William Burrows 
and Roben Windrem, ~ (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994), 1-22 
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states that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, nations intent on aquiring nuclear 
weapons will now find the process much ~impler A Department of Energy Threat 
Assessment report on the activities of the "Russian Mafia," released in November of 1993 
included the following findings 
L 4,000 crime groups of various size and influence are operating inside of Russia 
This corresponds with most other estimates from intelligence agencies world wide 
2. A significant number of groups have merged some or all activities with corrupt 
government and police officials 
3. Forty percent of private businesses and sixty percent of state-owned companies 
have been corrupted by organized crime 
4. The "Russian Mafia" may own half the nation's commercial banks, and SO to 80 
percent of the shops, hotels, warehouses, depots, and service industries in Moscow 
Dusinessmen are forced to pay on average 15 percent oftheir income for protection, either 
to a private security force (ex-KGB and GRU officers) or to the Mafia 
S. Corruption within the officer corp of the anny appears to be high. In February 
of 1993, Russian officials announced that 3,000 officers had faced disciplinary actions for 
questionable business practices, and an additional forty-six general officers faced 
court-martials on corruption charges. The corruption was the selling of large quantities of 
all types of conventional weapons 
6. The organized criminals now have access to the latest in communications and 
surveillance technologies and equipment'· 
It can be seen that an organized Russian Mafia does, in fact, exist. From the above 
few examples, it can be supposed that they have access to large fi nancial resources 
through their alleged national and international dealing~. This combined with the 
mismanagement 0[S1.4 billion, between 1992 to 1994 from the u.s. State Department's 
Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), and one is talking big money. I, Based on 
Hersh, "The Wild East," 61-86 
Russian organized crime groups obtain acce~s to these funds several different 
ways. But most rely mainly upon Russia's own fiscal irresponsibility and decentralized 
hanking system to fraudulently gct low-interest loans which they intend 10 never repay, 
other~ use computer "Hackers" to crack into small bank systems, looting what they can 
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a U.S. Embassy estimate in Moscow, it appears that through sophisticated counterfeiting 
techniques, the organized criminal elements absconded with between thirty and fifty 
percent of the funds for privatization. This accusation has been supported by CIA and AID 
officials. 
~ 
In reality these criminal groups do possess the financial resources necessary to 
purchase nuclear materials and the coercive power to remove by force these materials if 
need be. Organized crime in the NIS is huge, there are 4,000 seperate groups, that control 
50 percent of the regions hanking, 60 percent of the government owned businesses, and 
collect at least 15 percent of80 of the total profits of all privately owned businesses. They 
also possess ties to politicians, spedal forces within the military, and contacts around the 
world, including the United States.~ Organizations such as this have not been taken into 
account by the world community and its nonproliferation regime 
6. The Death of Michael Desaro 
The Russian organized crime elements apparent financial strength, with their 
militant or violent enforcement and coercive power, make them a very dangerous entity in 
the nuclear black-market arena. Their influence can be seen in the following case 
On 13 November 1993, Michael Desaro, an American Embassy contract employee 
was found dead in a blood filled bath tub in his Moscow apartment. The apartment had 
been stripped of everything of value. The Moscow police autopsy "revealed" that Mr 
Desaro had died of heart failure and no crime had been committed. Upon protest by 
American Embassy officials for a further investigation, the police stated that Mr. Desaro 
was actually gay and threw a gay party the night before his body was discovered. They 
held to their conclusion that he had probably died of heart failure, case closed . American 
doctors, upon review of the autopsy concluded that there was no presence of heart 
before being discovered. And lastly simply taking advantage of conupt financial managers, 
which skim off the top (this example is what the ON has faced world wide in their aid 
programs, percentages, some times very large, simply disappear into some ones pocket) 
Ibid 
Tbid 
24 
disease , However, too much of the body was missing to accurately determine the cause of 
death.;) The full weight of the U.S Embassy and State Department could produce no 
further results. Mr. Desaro had at the time of his death been compiling documentation of 
the previously mentioned theft of privatization funds by the Russian "Mafia" for the 
embassy and the AID organization, One is left to his or her own conclusions, but it 
appears that organized crime can do practically anything inside Russia with impunity, to 
include circumventing export controls or many other nonproliferation programs in effect 
today as is seen in detail in Chapter vn 
Externally the situation is just as grim. Internationally known weapons dealer Alfred 
JaekJe was arrested in T engen on Lake Constance, with 100 million dollars available for 
the purchase of weapons grade plutonium and "other" nuclear materials for an unidentified 
group,"; Due to diplomatic reasons the two Spaniards and one Colombian arrested have 
not been publicly identified, but speculation could point to the North Koreans, Iraq, or a 
host of other nuclear hopefuls. In an interview with Welt Am Sonntag, in Bonn, a woman 
identified as Dina N ., with close business ties to Mr, Jaekle stated that she could mediate 
the purchase of nuclear materials, or place one in contact with the proper military people 
and scientific institutions for di rect negotiations Swiss sources confirm she also has ties 
with the Russian military, and had at one time worked for the KGB, and that ~he still 
maintains that relationship today" 
Ibid 
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D. ARE NUCLEAR MATERIALS TOO EXPEl\"SIVE IN TODAY'S I\[W 
WORLD ORDER? 
We have seen that criminal groups possess cash and international connections, but 
are these financial capabilities and close relations with ranking military and governmental 
officials even necessary? The Russian economy as seen in Chapter II, is abysmal. The 
once elevated workers and scientists in the nuclear industry are now paid nothing, granted 
no privileges, and still expected to maintain the most significant and sophisticated weapons 
and research facilities next to that of the U.S in the world. When a technician makes the 
equivalent of $1 00 dollars a month, how much does one need to bribe them? In America, 
the most prosperous nation in the world, the entire Walker "spy ring" was bought for what 
amounted to a few thousands of dollars 
No matter what the estimated costs of nuclear material and technology in the 
legitimate nuclear market may be, the asking prices on the non-legitimate nuclear market 
have been no where near the projected value of the material involved. On November 27. 
1993, in Bursa Turkey, three Georgians were arrested while attempting to sell 4.5 kgs of 
uranium. The asking price was $150,000 dollars, the tme value was estimated at a value of 
several million dollars. OI The groups selling are asking what appear to be very reasonable 
prices. Granted there have been a large number of hoaxes, but according to the German 
BND, most oftheif cases were legitimate.}' 
What is visualized in the smuggling of nuclear materials is a picture of warheads 
weighing hundreds, if not thousands of pounds, or large containment vessels of plutonium 
This is not necessarily the case. In actuality, the gray metal plutonium comes in two-pound 
bars, or gravel-like pellets,(,() and is highly toxic, one grain can cause lung cancer 
However, its radioactive alpha rays do not penetrate very far, so thick lead shields are not 
required for transportation, ~l The above combined with the fact that since the collapse of 
Editorial, "To Ban The Bomb, " ~, v. 2,27 August 1994, p. 10-1 J 
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the USSR, Russia has thousands of miles of nearly unmonitorcd border. A good smuggler 
will choose a route with little danger of detection," 
E, WRA.T ISTHE TRUE NATURt OF THE DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR 
MATERIALS? 
Nations in the past have sought to aquire nuclear weapons. We believe that 
nations will continue this behavior in the future. This section shows that there are entities 
- states and non-state actors - attempting today to aquire fissile materials and technologies 
They want to sell these items to others or to use for their own purposes. 
To determine if there is a market for these materials we must show that there are 
legitimate cases outside of the highly publicized Gennan instances, After aI!, has the West, 
in running sting operations of the size and sophistication of those in Gennany, artificially 
created a perceived demand for these materials If so, then all threat assessments may be 
greatly exaggerated. Russian officials to this day claim no significant evidence has arisen 
indicating any of the material seized positively originated in Russia.OJ They also clai"m that 
all nuclear material is positively accounted for, but this may not be the case. (See Chapter 
VI.) No accurate records had been kept before 1984 in most of Russia's nuclear of 
industries (See Chapter VIl.) For several years super tankers carrying oil have been sold 
on the black market by using doctored manifests. Documents will frequently read, 
120,000 rubles for 10 water faucets, the next bill will read JO rubles for a thousand water 
faucets, There is no accounting accuracy or even gL"Tleral accountability,""' Of course if 
This type of smuggling may now not even be necessary. As nations leap into 
Russia with aid and organizations of all types, these provide legitimate covers for the 
movement of nuclear and other sorts of materials. The Iranians have established legitimate 
air freight operations inside several orthe Newly Independent States. These cargo planes 
are loosely regulated, In fact flights leaving the country back to Iran with less than 15 ,000 
lbs of cargo do not need custom inspectors to monitor loading, or even get a written 
confirmation of what it is being shipped 
Schmidt-Haeuer, "Isotopes From The Preserving Jar," JPRS, p. 9-11 
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one cannot prove at a specific point in time that one had something in their possession, 
then one cannot prove that they no longer have it either!M This is one the point we are 
making: IAEA accounting practices cannot be applied where no accurate accounting and 
control have been enforce 
Russian Admissions 
What do the Russians publicly admit? Mikhail Yegorev, Interior Minister Viktor 
Yerin's first deputy and commanding militia general in the fight against organized crime, 
stated that over the past one-and-a-half years, authorities have investigated 74 cases of 
removal of radioactive material from various sites Yegorev's investigators have 
successfully captured one entire group of nuclear thieves66 Sergey Stepashin, head of the 
Federal Counterespionage office (formerly the KGB), acknowledges that his forces 
repelled 53 separate violent "terrorist" attacks aimed at nuclear facilities.6? The terrorists 
were anned with automatic weapons, flat-bed trucks, and large powered cranes. Finally, 
Russia's Justice Minister, Yurij Kalmykov revealed in Cyprus in June of 1994, that 
organized crinte groups "appear" to possess most of the componems needed to build a 
bomb (If they have not already built and sold one or more of its components on the 
black-market.) After his statements Kalmykov was visited four separate times by 
Counterespionage officials to learn the details of his documented evidence.68 This is 
another example of the lack of inter-agency communications, accountability, and controls 
within Russia. 69 
The above example goes even funher, the water faucets may not even be real 
faucets. Smugglers had been illegally moving pure nickel out of Russia, formed as water 
faucets. Another scam is to set up a false company, get "loans" from pre-established 
accounts in Switzerland, using strategic or precious metals for collateral. The fake 
company then defaults on the fake loan and the "collateral" is then seized. This is similar to 
how the drug canels laundered money in the 1980's 
S~hmid\-Haeuer, "Isotopes From The Preserving Jar," JPRS, p 9- l1 
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Additional Brief Examples 
-From [991 to [992 an employee of the Podoslk Research Institute near Moscow 
systematically stole 45-percent enriched uranium 235, by using small deviation~ on a scale 
He compiled L5kg on his baleony 71 
-In 1992, three men were arrested in Ishevsk, who wanted to sell uranium rods 
weighing l40kg altogether. After their anest the nuclear fuels site that they worked at in 
Glasov (Udermurtia), was inventoried, the results indicated that 300 plus kg of uranium 
was missing 11 
-On October 29, 1993 in block III of Chemobyl, it was discovered that 123 grams 
of fuel were missing,r. 
The list of incidences is too great to cover in its entirety here, please refer to 
appendix A, for further examples and documentation 
The materials seiled and thus available on the intemational market include the 
following; weapons grade plutonium, highly enriched uranium, cesium-J73, cobalt-60, 
stronium-90, and even a new substance called "Red Mercury, a yield enhancing material. " 
Last[y, complete and functioning warheads are possibly being offered for sale." 
Even more startling are the claims of army Special forces Sgt. 1st class (Ret.) 
Keith Idema, made in an interview with Jim Morris, Mr. Idema was working a~ a security 
advisor in Lithuania in the early 1990's, and through his contacts in the Lithuanian police 
leamed that they had arrested former Soviet GRU agents for attempting to sell SADMs 
(Special Atomic Demolition Munitions, i.e" backpack nukes). The bad news was that this 
had been the third shipment of tOUT, Mr, Jdema's sources indicated that four had probably 
gone to Iraq, the others to parts unknown 
Peter Scherer, "Illegal Dealings in Nuclear Material Soaring:' from DIE WELT, in 
:proliferatiof!.Js~lles Germany, JPRS-ThTI-94-006-L, 20 April 1994, p, 2 
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It is not that difficult to move these materials. Artillery pieces (shells) are small 
enough to be transported by one individual . Legitimate sellers have been arrested in 
Gennany, Turkey, Ukraine, the Baltic states, Hong Kong, Macao, Poland, and Spain 14 
The Hesse Office of Criminal Investigations (LKA) has reported a marked increase in 
illegal trafficking. Three incidents of fissile material smuggling were reported in 1991, nine 
in 1992, and thirty in 1993. From January 1992 unti l early 1995, close to 300 incidents of 
nuclear trafficking were reported from all over Gennany to the Federal Office of Criminal 
Investigations. According to Gennan sources, the smuggling seems to be dominated by 
Russians, Chechins, Poles, and Czechs. ' ,' The "hot" material is frequently smuggled into 
Gennany by way of the Baltic States, Poland, and southeastern European countries There 
are even reports of material arriving from Siberia aboard military transport aircraft.'6 It 
appears that the network, market, and availability of nuclear are large. The enforcement 
agencies in Russia and the other inheritor states do not appear to be capable of containing 
this serious nuclear threat 
Conclusion 
The evidence is compelling There are, in fact, highly organized, extensive in 
scope and power, criminal clements actively operating inside Russia. They are involved in 
all arenas of commerce and govenunent. They are taking any means and course necessary 
to increase their income and one would be terribly naive to believe that they would avoid 
the high profit potential of selling nuclear materials on the open market. There is also 
ample evidence that private individuals are attempting to do the same, although a bit more 
ineptly. These materials are there for the taking, access is not that limited, and as has been 
discussed, once in possession, transportation out ofthe country is simple 
The assumption of massive expense that was at one time associated with the 
acquisition of nuclear materials is quite possibly no longer present. In all documented 
cases, individual material right up to weapons have been reasonably priced, from a few 
Ibid 
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hundred dollars 10 a few minioo. Opposing arguments ignore this significant evidence and 
thus deny an extremely dangerous new proliferation threat 
With no political agenda, except that of profit, how does one identifY future 
sources of nuclear materials_ How does one stop nations from seeking weapons when it 
may be easier to acquire weapons than ever before? Even when the world had earmarked 
Iraq and North Korea as slales that might seek nuclear weapons in the future, it was still 
surprised by the extent and size of their nuch~ar programs Nations that desire nuclear 
weapons may now have access to a ready source of fissi le matcrial& provided by organized 
criminals. This could pose a balance of power shift on a monumental scale. The success 
of one group, either a nation-state or sub-state actor, could result in a cataclysmic event 
3] 

IV 
This chapter builds on the previou~ chapter's discussion of the criminal element by 
explaining the ease of which nuclear materials could be moved internationally 
Specifically, the open borders of the Russian Federation tic in diret:tly to the means used 
by organized crime to transport and smuggle their goods between Russia and the rest of 
the world The porous borders also present a major problem for the current 
nonproliferation regim, because programs such as export controls often assume effective 
management of the horder regions [0 ensure proper policy implementation. This chapter 
v.rill demonstrate how porous borders, particularly in Central Asia, are opening up Russia's 
highly sophisticated nuclear and space technologies to the black markets of EUrope and 
the rest of the world 
A. BORDERS AND SMUGGLNG 
The horders of the Russian Federation are vast and difficult to guard and monitor 
{"he transfer of materials and goods range from agricultural products, to strategic minerals 
and military hardware, to technology and knowledge. Realistically, some of this trading is 
illegal and occurs virtually unchecked hy government authority. Of concern to this thesis 
is the smuggling of nuclear materials and related \eclmologies. To better understand the 
comprehensive problems associated with Russia's porous borders, we can examine specific 
areas where smuggling is known to take place and is becoming a great concern to the 
international conununity 
.\1ost of the attention and investigation into nuclear smuggling is focusing on the 
Baltic regions and the countries of Eastern Europe. The Baltic coumries, specifically 
Estonia, are widely accepted as being the central place for thriving legal and illegal trading 
practices. Located near many of the industrial regions of Russia and connected by vast 
rail and road systems, every conceivahle "commodity" passes through the ports and 
borders of the Baltic stales. Trade bt..>twccn Russia and Europe pass through this area and 
are increasing at astounding rates, The ports and merchant sections are controlled almost 
entirely by the organized crime elements discussed in Chapter Two Many of these group 
Jl 
members are former Russian soldiers who remained here after leaving Soviet-Russian 
military service." Nuclear materials recovered in Germany ~ast year are believed to have 
passed through the Baltic region and originated in Russian nuclear facilities. Countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Romania, and even Turkey have also made arrests in 
conjunction with significant quality nuclear materials 
If one were to study a world map, the correlation between where these "nuclear" 
arrests are being made and the major industrial-trading centers of Europe becomes visible 
Germany is renowned fOf its industrial and technical infrastructure, Prague is flooded by 
foreigners and international entrepreneurs_ Bucharest and Constanta offer cheap and 
extensive transportation complexes built up under the Soviet era,7'l Istanbul is, and has 
been for centuries, the crossroads for trade between Asia, Europe, and Russia, Trading 
routes of the past remain today_ Although the nature of the traffic may have shifted from 
silk and spices to narcotics and immigration, the basic premise still exists: commodities 
and technologies transferred happen because there are profits to be made from supply and 
demand For anyone, especially the nonproliferation regime, to assume today that nuclear 
materials and related technologies are magically excluded from such economic forces is 
both naive and dangerous. 
B. mESTANS 
The region that requires greater attention, and is often ignored, is the southern 
border of Russia and the countries of Central Asia. The area contains enormous resources 
related to nuclear weapons and other WMD, Bathing this area also are the chaotic waters 
of economic and political degradation, With industrial production down over fifty percent 
from the days of Soviet domination, the World Bank estimates unemployment rates in 
William E. Schmidt, "Latvia's Worry: What to do With All Its Russians," New 
York "Iim£s, 1 March 1994, p, A3 . 
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shipping business 
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Central Asia run at thirty-five percent, while real wages have fallen up to sixty percent 
since 199 1/J 
The concern most often sited when referring to Central Asia is the increasing drug 
production and trafficking taking place. Fueled by poor economic conditions, the 
production and trafficking (and use) of opium and heroin amount to thousands of tons per 
year, pfO'lriding a valuable "cash crop" for local economies. The real extent of these 
operations is not known, but regional and international officials present a dismal picture 
that is only getting worse. Allhough some countries have stiff penalties for apprehended 
drug dealers, like Uzbekistan's death penalty, local smugglers and police officials admit 
that "only the fools and the small fry get caught." 10 If the death penalty does not deler 
dmg smugglers, then how will expo11 controls deter nuclear smugglers 
[he problem extends over a region that is roughly twice the size of Europe, where 
border comrols are among the worst in the world . "Most cars pass between Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and, in the north, Kazakhstan, without incident or inspection 
Some Ii'ontier~ simply have stop signs."' 1 Despite attempts at replacing or retraining 
border guards, the economic reality of the sinlation (as discussed in Chapter IT) often 
overpowers the idea of stopping the dmg trade. First, considering the value of narcotics 
to local economies, it is hard to convince local authorities to cut off this source of income 
to their people. Second, bribes to border authorities, who earn approximately $45 per 
month in pay, can reach a minimum of $200 per vehicle. The only vehicles inspected are 
those who cannot afford the bribe!" As seen elsewhere in the 1\1S, the incentive for 
personal profit outweighs that of moral duty. Without a strong concept of moral duty, 
there can be no legitimate enforcement of order 
Mi(;hael Specter, "Opium Finds Its Silk Road In Chaos of Central Asia," New 
York Tim..!<1l, 2 May 1995, p. A4 
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The Russian government, already strapped for cash, is trying to help the situation 
as best it can In Turkmenistan, Russia has increased its presence along the 
Turkmen-Iran-Afghanistan frontier by placing more officers in charge of border units. The 
Soviet collapse left this border, all 2,472 kIn, with thirteen trained Turkmen officers to 
watch over it. Russian presence here is intended to help train more Turkmen officers and 
to eventually withdraw Even with Russia's assistance, the border units remain 
undermanned'SJ Increasing eTR funds for border guard salaries may be a short-term 
solution, but smugglers will still be able to pay the bribes that allow their wares to pass 
Trade between Iran and Turkmenistan is steadily increasing and seven border 
crossing have been established. In fact , Iran is building its trade ties with almost of 
countries in this region as well as the Caucasus. With border guards underpaid, or 
sometimes not paid, their susceptibility to bribes is a critical factor in the ever increasing 
area of smuggling. Drugs and anns flow almost freely through border crossings as well as 
the numerous non-guarded mountain passes and the Caspian Sea.S4 
All across Central Asia narcotics, and weapons, are transported using almost every 
conceivable means of transportation. Official Russian trucks are driven by Tajik drivers so 
that plausible denial can be used if something goes wrong. Russian border officials will 
use their helicopters to deliver opium for those who have enough cash. Even small, 
private planes and commercial airlines are used for trafficking." 
The information presented here lays the groundwork for a potentially greater 
problem. Consider this region and overlap: (1) the opium production and trade areas; and 
(2) the nuclear production and storage facilities . This has been done on the maps in 
Appendix B What is presented now is the recipe for potential disaster, if it has not 
already happened. In Eastern Kazakhstan, opium production fields lay close to and south 
of: (1) the 55-IS ICBM base at Zhangiz-Tobe; (2) the huge LEU production plant, 
"Border Troops Chief Views Russia-Turkmensitan Military," from 
"iEZA VlSIAfAYA GAZETA, in JPRS Report Central Eurasi!l, JPRS-UMA-95-003, 13 
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Ulbinsky Metallurgy, at Ust-Kamenogorsk; (3) the Baikal Nuclear Test Facility at 
Semipalatinsk; and (4) KUfchatov, the site of possible nuclear weapons assembly plant 
Further north, in Russia, there are the nuclear facilities in Altay, Novosibirsk, Tom~k, and 
Kra~noyarsk _ In central Kay..akhstan, opium production fields are positioned east of the 
Baikonur space and missile test complex. To the north oftrus region lie the SS-18 ICBM 
base at Derzhavinsk and the uranium mining facility al Stcpnogorsk_ :\'orth of this region, 
in Russia, there is the vast nuclear facilities in Orenburg, Chelyabinsk, and Svcrslovsk 
Finally, ill western Kazakhstan, there exists a fast breeder reactor and uranium mining site 
llcar Aktau on the Caspian Sea 
C. SPACE PROGRAM 
The Russian space program is another potential source of concern for WMD 
technology proliferation. The home of the program is base at Baikonur Space Center, 
Kazakhstan. Once a crown symbol of Soviet (and Russian) power, the spa(;e agency is 
dwindling away. Due to lack of funding, many of national spa(;e programs are being put 
on hold or tenninated. Work ofthirty-four of seventy proje(;ts has halted, and funding for 
1994 programs amounted to less than ten percent of 1989 levels. The 1995 budget is 
under $300 million, compared to NASA's $14 billion. As a result, officials plan to send 
25,000 of the 40,000 space employees back to Russia in the next year. Many of the 
engineers have already fled and many others would leave if given a viable opportunity 
Leninsk, the town that supports the Baikonur faci lity, has seen its population drop by one 
half, to 50,000, over the past three years. The threat of proliferation coming ITom this 
area is that ofheary-lift rocket tedmology that could be applied to the delivery ofWMD 
As stated by Russian officials, the population of Leninsk "would drop more if people here 
had any place else to go.,, &6 
As demonstrated by the discussions on Russia's "Brain Drain" in Chapter Ill, as 
well as porous borders which help promote a vigorous smuggling empire throughout 
Central Asia, one can sec the danger of technology and scient ific transfer into regions 
Michael Specter, "Bleak Times Where Sputniks Once Soared,' New York Times, 
21 March 1995, p. BII 
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desiring advanced missile and ICBM capabilities. From neighboring countries like 
Pakistan, India, Iran, and Traq, to far away countries (tied together through diplomatic and 
underworld channels) in Latin America and East Asia, the demand for advanced lift 
technologies are real and should not be ignored 
The combination of poor economic conditions, an expanding drug and organize<! 
criminal element, and the close proximity to some of the most advanced nuclear and space 
technology, persOIUlel and material in the world, make Central Asia a proliferation 
warehouse. The centers for the drug trade in Osh, Tashkent, and Samarkand are all within 
a day's drive to most of the Central Asia region and across easily penetrable borders."' 
The implicit scenario drawn from the Ihis milieu is a chiHing one. In the immediate 
region, we havc numerous countries and factions desiring nuclear and ballistic missile 
technologies. Take your pick from the usual suspects of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, India, and 
even China. However, if you look at the extent of the drug trade and the connections to 
cartels in Europe, Latin America,s; Asia, and yes, the United States (the world's leading 
consumer of heroin)!9, the potential for undetected nuclear proliferation is very real. The 
money exists, the supply and demand exist, and the means exist. This is something not 
addressed by current nonproliferation programs 
Finally, CTR fu nding to Kazakhstan has been sparse. Money for the MC&A, 
export controls, and other ways to get the least bit grasp on the nuclear industry of this 
troubled region remain mostly on paper. Despite Project Sapphire the greater extent of 
the nuclear issue remains unattended. It is an issue growing out of control and may very 
well be beyond traditional solutions offered by policy makers and the nonproliferation 
regime advocates 
Ibid 
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This thesis is not about the nonproliferation regime and it will not discuss the 
regimes numerous programs in detaiL This chapter furnishes a brief description of what 
the nonproliferation regime represents and what it has been intended to achieve. The Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International case study, included in the chapter provide an 
excellent example of the ways a non-slate entity may be able to circumvent many of the 
nonproliferation regime detection and deterrent policies 
A. THE NONPROLIFERATION REGL'1E 
The nonproliferation regime is not one program or policy, it is composed of 
numerous treaties, accords, and enforcement agencies. The nonproliferation regime is an 
entity or institution similar to the British Constitution, no one document or accord 
provides for all of the regime's fimctioning parts. With the British Constitution it is the 
Magna Carta and the Aristocracy class, that the rest of the Constitutional frame-work 
evolved from and now revolves around_'>il The nonproliferation regime also receives its 
focu~ from two major fixtures, The Treaty on the !'.ion-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Cr-.rpT), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The NPT is the soul of the 
nonproliferation regime, while the lAEA acts as the regime's primary rcgll iatory arm The 
NPT, which was signed in 1970, and IAEA represent the apexes oflhe world communities 
~earch for a solution to the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
The }"rpT and lAEA are not the only significant programs of the nonproliferation 
regime. For instance, beginning in 1974, a series of laws required that unclassified nuclear 
information be withheld from sensitive nations when, in the judgment of experts, it could 
help those nations produce nuclear weapons. The Atomic Energy act places controls over 
data that would assist in weapons production or acquisition The Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation act does the same. The export Administration Act specifically calls for 
Dudley Julius Medley, A Students Manuel of English Constitutjonal I-listo~ 
(London, Simpkin, Marshall, Hamil ton, and Kent & COo , 1907),33-40 
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safeguards against the transfer of even unclassified technologies of any type, that might 
significantly contribute to the conventional or nuclear posture of other nations.91 
The successful control of dual-lise technologies has also been a major member of 
the nonproliferation regime. Dual-use technologies would be anything that possesses a 
benign function , but also could be legitimately used to facilitate nuclear weapons 
programs The actual concept is simple. The Pershing missile contains 250,000 separate 
parts. One does not need to control all 250,000 parts, just many of the primary ones 
necessary for the weapon to function. On a Pershing missile this would include the ablative 
nose cone, electronic stage separators, pumps, and navigation hardware. This is not an 
inclusive list but presents the general idea behind this concept ."" 
The various programs and accords the make up the nonproliferation regime 
originated as dialogue between nations in the international arena. These discussions took 
place in the United Nations (UN), regional forums, and between bi-lateral super-powers 
The focus in the international arena is upon nation-state actors. Countries negotiate and 
sign treaties as a nation and then act in concert to fulfill their respective treaty obligations, 
at least this is the theory. When sub-state actors become involved in the international 
environment, again the world community looks 10 state actors to address the situation. In 
the example of terrorism, nations know that they can expect reprisals, loss of financial and 
military aid if they allow or support terrorist groups internationally. Countries such as 
Jordan, Syria, and recently Libya have forced the terrorist groups that once operated 
within their borders to stop operations or have forced these groups to flee to safer venues 
A major assumption made by this thesis is that Russia and the other inheritor states 
due to the current problems will have a very difficult time effectively managing and 
enforcing many, if not all aspects of the nonproliferation regime. Russia today is having 
difficulty keeping the water running and the electricity on in Moscow, let alone being able 
to adequately monitoring its borders. The nonproliferation regime has many great 
programs for denying nuclear materials and making it considerably difficult for nations to 
attain nuclear weapons. What needs to be addressed is how to bring a nation back up to a 
Windrem and Burrows, Critical Mass, 188- 189. 
Ibid., 486-487 
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level where it can again adequately follow these programs. As Kathleen Bailey notes, "any 
nation with enough money and dedication can build a nuclear arsenaL And if a nation 
studies the lessons of how other countries (e.g" Israel, India, South Am(;a, Iraq, and 
North Korea) have gone about hiding their programs it may even be possible to build a 
secret arsenaL',93 We concur with this assessment, and when added to the ("urrent situation 
in Russia and the other inheritor states, it may now be even easier to cheat. In the past it 
was believed that non-state actors wuld not gain wntrol of any type of nuclear weapons 
materials because the magnitude of the system prevented it. We have shown this to be an 
incorrect assumption after the collapse of the Soviet Union 
B. ILLICIT NUCLEAR PROIXFERATION BY NON-STATE ACTORS 
USDER THE NPT AND [A,EA SAFEGUARD REGIME 
The Bank or Credit and Commerce International 
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), was founded in 1972 by 
a Pakistani businessman named Agha Hasan Abedi. It began supposedly to be Islam's entry 
into the world of international banking, She was to rival Bank of America, Chase 
Manhattan, Lloyd's of London, Barclays, and the German Deutsche Bundesbank,9>I What 
they turned out to be was a nefarious international institution that left death, destruction, 
and financial ruin in their wake. 
Beer acted as a secret international cash transmission network for what may have 
been thousands of illegal and gray transactions involving dmg trafficking, conventional 
arms and technologies transfers, and money laundering. Most significantly they provided 
the transfer of funds and acted as hrokers for the movement of nuclear materials to Iraq, 
Argentina, Libya, and Pakistan.o, 
Kathleen Bailey, "Problems Facing Nuclear Disarmament," Paper presented at 
'The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: Review and Extension." Lawrence Livermore 
Laboratory, 19-20 July 1994 
Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, 142-143 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International 
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BCCI through the 1970's, 1980's, and early 1990's operated illegally in many 
forums with impunity from treaties and laws such as the I\rpT, LA.EA safeguards, and 
National and International Banking Regulations, BCCI was not a small shadow 
organization, it was high visibility and high finance They possessed between 20 and 30 
bilEon dollars in assets, employed more than J 2,000 people from 83 different countries, 
with over 400 branch offices in at least 70 nations including America, Switzerland, 
Columbia, Pakistan, England, the Cayman Islands, [ran, Nambia Nigcria, South Africa, 
South Korea, Hong Kong and a host of others. Bank of America had been an initial 
invcstor; they acquired Independence Bank in Encino, California, Central Savings in 
f-.1iami, Florida, and National Bank of Georgia in Atlanta, Georgia, all illegally'" They held 
accounts for Manuel Noriega, the Columbian Drug Cartels, Daniel Ortega, Abu Nidal, 
Ferdinand Marcos, and Saddam Husscin,?J The U.S, Ccntrallntclligencc Agency (CIA) 
and British Intelligence had accounts with BCCI, as did Adnan Khashoggi, the millionaire 
Arab arms dealer9i The bank maintained a 1,500 member intelligence and enforcement 
branch head quartered in Karachi.1'O It would pay bribes, head off potentially da~gerous 
investigations, transfer weapons, and if nccessary kill people,lw They also channeled 
money for the National Security Council (NSC) to the Nicaraguan rebels. 1Q1 
Operations of the Committee on Fariegn Relations, The BCn Affair, (Washington, U.S 
Government Printing Office, 1992) Sen, John F. Kerry, Chainnan, This is a five volume 
record of almost 3,000 pages of testimony beginning on 1 August 1991 and concluding 
after intermittent breaks on 14 May 1992. vol. 1, 2-67 
Mark Potts, Nicholas Kochan, and Robert Whittington, Dirty Money BCCI: The 
Insidc StOry or the World'~ (Washington D.C., National Press Book, 1992), 
9-25 
lames Ring Adams, and Douglas Frantz, A Full Servicc Bank How BCq Stole 
Billions Around the World (New York, Pocket Books, 1992),3-9 
Kerry, Thc Beer Affair vol. 1,27-31, vol. 2, 421 -474 
Burrows and Windrem, ~~, 143-145 
Kerry, The BCCI Affair, vol. 253-254. See Appendix G, for further documents 
Adams and Franz, A Full Service Bank, 189-190 
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All this was done a few steps ahead of the law and audilOrs like Price Waterhouse, 
which gave the bank multiple clean hills of htlalth. In all fairness though, the bank had as 
friends and supporters the likes offonner president Jimmy Carter, Secretary-general oflhe 
UN Javier Perez de Cuellar, former ambassador to the UN Andrew Young, Carter loyalist 
Burt Lance, and had donated funds to the Bush election campaign, to name a thy, 102 None 
of these gentlemen had anything 10 do with the banks illegal activities. They were used as 
cover, credibility, and legitimacy 
Keeping close tabs on a multi-national corporation like Beer is an extremely 
difficult task in part because in the United States alone, over the two financial wire 
clearing systems, the CHIPS and the Fed Wire at leasl 1.3 TRILLION dollars a day 
moves through the system! Nobody knows where this money comes from and a 101 of the 
time no one knows where it is goingWJ Internationally the system is just too difficult to 
track. Wilh 10's of thousands of commercial shipping vessels, each v,ith hundreds of cargo 
containers on board, moving daily, no customs agency could be expected 10 catch all or 
most of Ihe drugs, weapons, or nuclear contraband being moved. This is exactly how 
nCCI was able to operate, and this is how smugglers continue to operate today 
BCCI moved large weapons and huge amounts of narcotics illegally aU over the 
world without getting caught, and assisted terrorists to do the same (Sl!C Appendix C),I'" 
But what is most significant here is that BCCl assisted several nations in the quest for 
nuclear weapons and arc the ones most responsible for Pakistani's successful nuclear 
program Senator Kerry's investigation also indicates that the bank assisted terrorist 
groups in acquiring the same nuclear materials as the nation-states involved-'Ol In 1983, 
Potts, Kochan, and Whittington,~, 14-1 5 
Kerry, The RCCI Affair, voL 3, 51-54 
Ibid, vol. 2, 6-117. Appendix C includes evidence given to the Senate 
Subcommittee, showing several illicit arms transfers including Centurion Tanks, and F-86 
Saber Jets 
Ibid" vol. t, 248-250 
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Dr. A.Q. Khan stole plans for a uranium enricrunent factory from the Netherlands, and this 
plant was later built in Pakistan. BCCT paid for his legal defense, they also got him safely 
out of the country prior to arrest. BCCl financed the attempted illegal purchase of high 
speed nuclear triggers for implosion devices. In 1987 they were caught attempting to 
purchase 50,000 pounds of maranging steel C-350. This is a very high strength steel used 
in centrifuges. Berillium, a yield enhancing substance was also unsuccessfully purchased 
iUegally. These are a few of the only semi-successful and failed attempts, Senator Kerry's 
investigation though led to the conclusion that BCCr was a major contributor to Pakistan's 
successful nuclear weapons progranl. i ()\ 
The BCCT scandal is a prime example of an organization with little or no political 
or moral agenda easily circumventing existing legal barriers to almost all international 
criminal activities, up to and including the spread of nuclear weapons technologies 
Score Card of International Non-Proliferation's Successes 
This example shows that these programs have difficulty addressing what can be 
done by a sub-state multi-national organization intent upon proliferating nuclear weapons 
technology. They are not even looked at by the proper controlling agencies. What was not 
discussed here were the other successful nuclear proliferation cases that took place while 
these treaties and aggreements were enforce. India, and its "peaceful" detonation, have 
now aimed these same "peaceful" weapons at Pakistan. Pakistan may now have weajXlns 
aimed at India. Israel, Iraq, South Africa, and North Korea have succesfully entered into 
the nuclear arena 
Briefly what the above case indicates is that many of the proliferation myths 
believed do not apply in today's world. These countries did not have the huge 
Ibid., voL I, voL 2, vol. 3, and vol. 5 
Burrows and Windrem, Critical Mass, 145-154. The Congressional 
sub-conunittees findings show that BCCI was from its inspection a major player in 
obtainin& an Arab nuclear bomb. They bought and sold anything and everything, some of 
the evidence appears in appendix e . The BeCl web is so large that everything it was 
involved in may never be known, but the fact that it dealt with every major Arab nation 
that desired nuclear weapons technology, as well as with Argentina, Libya, and Nonh 
Korea, one can only speculate at how greatly nuclear materials were disseminated in these 
regions 
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technological, science, and industrial super-structures that were believed to be necessary 
to produce nuclear weapons Except for Iraq, they did not have the financial wherewithal 
and depth to support an expensive program. And they were not adverse to the moral and 
political pressurl:l the world places upon proliferators . As a result the following also 
occurrtl<l 
North Korea, has been a poor, isolated, and technologically backward nation since 
the 1950's, yet they successfully went nuclear, and now can bring the collective world to 
the negotiation table. Then there are the new nuclear nations by default, Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Kazakhstan, who were created because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. They 
appear to be falling in line but what about all their weapons and materials. With no 
accurate measures or controls it can never be known for certain if they have spread 
weapons elsewhere 
The Japanese admitted to possessing Ihe capability of being able to assemble 
defensive nuclear weapons on very short notice. It is unknown if this is houN, days, or 
weeks_ Regardless then of their current NPT adherence, they must be considered as 
"virtual proliferators" and when national interest dictates they will become actual 
proliferators_ It must then be believed other teclmological1y advanced nations possess a 
similar capability For instance, Germany currently possesses all the required technologies 
tools, and materials to build weapons. Currently, today both Argentina and Brazil have at 
least publicly backed away from their pursuit of nuclear weapons. But that was not due 10 
worlds nonproliferation regime, it was due to the United States stepping into their 
recurring crises situations in South America and dictating that we would not allow them to 
go nuclear against each other, or else they might face a real nuclear power 
This should not be construed as a diatribe against international non-proliferation 
programs, and tl!e regime itself but rather examples of their periodic shonfalls_ No 
program could be perfect in an environment where each nation has their own perception of 
threats real, or otherwise. A nation will do what is in its best interest to survive 
internationally. Tltis has never been more true recently \\~Ih the end of the Cold War and 
the draw down of the U.S. war machine. Regionally now, nations wi ll be looking inward 
for security because the USSR and United States will not rush in and jockey for power or 
4S 
try to support every regime that needs it, for example the Chomoro Islands, Liberia, 
Rwanda, Somalia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result regional conflicts \vill be solved 
much more locally. This could increase the international demand for nuclear weapons and 
even if not, the following still remains true, that Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Taiwan, India, 
Pakistan, Libya, Angola, Israel, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Ukraine, and others will choose 
to keep the weapons they already possess, build more, or attempt to acquire a nuclear 
capabili ty, With the collapse of the Soviet Union these capabilities and technologies are 
currently much easier to obtain, as e"plained in the fol1owind two chapters 
Since WMD were used in the Tokyo subway attacks and terrorists have struck 
here in the United States multiple times, it would be wrong to assume that these types of 
organizations would be adverse to the use, sale, and movement of nuclear devices and 
materials in the future. Thus they must also be viewed as both a legitimate threat and 
market place for these materials as well 
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VI 
ThlS seclion of the thesis addresses Russian and American assessments of the new 
proliferation threat posed by the Soviet collapse. It displays the inadequacy of Russia's 
internal nuclear control measures and outline why Russian nuclear experts believe that 
international nonproliferation programs do not cftcctively help restrain what they sec as 
the new proliferation threat 
A. REGULATION OF TAr, NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
The Russian Federation has the agencies in place for the control and safety of their 
nuclear industry. One key element that is missing is a clear national policy that wil1 
delineate the legislative and administrative responsibilities between the agencies. The 
three main safety bodies are the Ministry of Atomic Energy (.\1inatom), the Sanitary and 
Epidemiological Authority (Goskomsanepidnadzor), and the Federal Nuclear and 
Radiation Safety Authority (Gosatomnadzor or GAN). Presidential Instru(;tions 137 
(1991),283( 1992), and 636(1993), e~tablish GAN as the overriding authority for nuclear 
safety of all civilian and military nuclear industries_ The decisions of GAN are binding on 
"all stale management agencies, companies, organizations and military divisions located 
on Russian Federation territory, irrespe(;tive of such bodies' affiliations or form of 
ownership, and also upon officials and citizens,"187 
The present system hy which GAN carries out its duties is based on the old Soviet 
system of safety regulations and standards. One of GANs primary goals is the 
transformation of this system into a modern, legally based structure that will set nuclear 
safety standards on a solid national basis. GAN wrrentiy oversees greater than thirteen 
thousand facilities that arc considered radiological dangerous. These facilities belong to 
A. T. Gutsalov, "Regulating Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia: Where do we 
Stand and What are the Issues?" trans. Catherine Boyle (Paper presented at the 
Symposium on Nudear Safety in the NlS, Monterey InsL ofIntemational Studies. 
Monterey, 12-13 April 1994), 1-6 
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Minatom, the Ministries of Defense and Transportation, the State Committee on the 
Defense lndustry, and all businesses of radioactive substances such as the Kurchatov 
Institute_ lD8 
The sticking points to legitimately establishing GAN a~ the safety authority in 
Russian have been the lack of legislative and political support, and financial backing. In a 
society where law is something of an anomaly and political infighting and stubbornness is 
an established art fonn, GAN has been plagued by its inability to create a credible and 
authoritative standing, Lack of funds has cut down on its ability to statT inspection teams 
and administrative support structures to cany out proper nuclear safety enforcement 
The major opponents that GAN must battle with arc the Ministry of Defense, 
Minatom, and the Federal Counterintelligence Service The three agencies are 
well-entrenched bureaucracies that are defending the old Soviet system quite faithfully 
One could apply organizational theory here and say that these agencies are fighting for 
their existence and way of livelihood. Their refusal to admit that major problems exist 
within the nuclear safety field may cause serious short and long tenn damage to security of 
Russia and the world 
It is estimated that 170 tons of military and civilian plutonium and 1000 IOns of 
highly enriched uranium (HEll) exist in Russia. Officials at MinalOm publicly deny that 
there are any security problems surrounding this material or any other nuclear materials. IN 
They describe their system as being as tight as any bank vault and the world need not 
concern itself over the theft of plutonium and uranium However, nuclear specialists both 
inside and outside Russia see this nuclear bank as more ofa nuclear bazaar_ l:o 
'Minatom is a huge bureaucracy with approximately one million employees' ll Its 
accounting and control procedures for nuclear stockpiles are fragmented and in need of 
Ibid_, p. 6-7 
Gordon, "Russian Controls on Bomb Material Leaky,' New York Times, p. AJ 
Nelan, "Fonnula For Terror," p. 49 
Matlhew L. Wald, Michael R Gordon, "Russia Treasures Plutonium, But U_S 
Wants to Destroy It," !"ew York Tim,§, 19 August 1994, p. A6 
48 
major modernization. Inspections and detailed measurements of existing stocks are rarely 
conducted and each nuclear institution is virtually responsible for their O .... "Il stock 
accounts. Yevgeny Ve[ikav, director of the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow, states that 
Minatom's security system can be portrayed as national, but in reality it does not exist. 
Plutonium and HEU storage areas are scattered widely between military bases and less 
protected research facilities and power plants. Yuri Vishevsky, director of GAN, feels 
thaI order and discipline must be regained in stockpile accountability and adds, 
"Unfortunately today, there are too many possessors of nuclear material We need to find 
out who possesses nuclear materials and get them to carry out an inventory",l l 
Seizures of weapons-grade plutonium and HEU in Germany this summer have 
placed international attention on Russia's nuclear security. A. Dyakov, head of the 
Moscow Center for Arms Control, Energy, and Em~ronment stated that no one really 
knows how much plutonium and uranium are produced in civilian reactors. He defends 
his country's position, however, by saying that this is not unique to Russia "In the entire 
world there are no exact figures, just estimates. ul" v..'hatever validity this statement holds 
is a matter of conjecture, but it is arguments such as these that come out of every comer 
of the status quo nuclear community in Russia 
Aleksandr Mikhaylov of the Russian Federal Counterintelligen!.:e Service admitted 
in June 1994 that some radioactive material may have been smuggled out in the past, but 
added that this no longer occurs. As for plutonium and uranium, none has ever been 
smuggled out. The Federal Bureau of Investigations and other Western intelligence 
agencies have failed to produce evidence of leakage of nuclear weapons components, l'he 
Service also released that in 1993 all attempts by foreign secret service agencies (including 
Korth Korea's) to recruit scientists or extract nuclear information and technology had been 
thwarted. He concluded by saying media claims that Russia had lost control of its nuclear 
industry "are aimed at preparing public opinion in the West for the idea of establishing 
Gordon, "Russian Controls on Bomb Material Leaky," p. AI 
"Russian Physicist Interviewed on Plutonium Theft," from DIE WOOIE, in ~ 
&e~FBIS-WEU-94-118, 16June 1994, p.l 
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pOlitical control over Russia's nuclear weapons. ""< If this sounds like Cold War rhetoric, 
keep in mind that the Federal Counterintelligence Service used to be the domestic side of 
the KGB 
G Kaurov of Minatom and Interior Minister Y YeTin share a similar vicv.', Their 
feelings are that journalists are creating all the fantasies about uranium and plutonium 
smuggling. No one, they say, can prove that any of these materials come from Rus~ia, and 
there have been no reported thefts of these material inside Russia m The blind nalUre of 
these statements compared to the facts surrounding numerous arrests, both inside and 
outside Russian, plus testimonies given by scientists inside the nuclear industry, is self 
evident. Yerin's first deputy, M . Yegorev, contradicted his boss the same day by saying 
that his organization has investigated over seventy criminal offenses involving radioactive 
materials in the past one and half years, Ll ~ 
Similar routines were displayed again in August when weapons-grade plutonium 
and HEU showed up in Germany. Despite preliminary analysis that practically identifies 
one of three sites in Russia. Minatom and Counterintelligence kept up their statements of 
denial. Kaurov called attacks on Russia's nuclear safety as "a campaign of provocation." J >7 
Following the Munich seizure, President Yeltsin established a commission to monitor the 
nonproliferation of radioactive elements and nuclear weapons, and placed Stephin 
Stepashin as overseer of the project. As good as this sounds, Stepashin is the current head 
of the Federal Counterintelligence Service and is an outspoken opponent of GAN and 
western media. After his meeting with Germany's Bernard Schmidbauer in late August, 
Stepashin held a news conference, He announced that the two countries would cooperate 
"Counterintelligence Chief Denies Leak of Nuclear Components," from 
!TAR-TASS, in !2.~Report Russia International Affairs, FBIS-SOV-94-I20, 22 June 
1994, p. 2 
"Plutonium Trafficking," JPRS, p. 2 
Ibid 
"IAEA 'Alarmed' Over Nuclear Smuggling Incidents," fromAFP, in~.Qrt 
Internatjonal, lPRS-TND-94-016, 15 August 1994, p. 2 
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in the future to combat nuclear smuggling. He also used the opportunity to skillfully 
spftlad the responsibility of preventing the proliferation of all radioactive materials onto 
the international community -- al l countries should "create international guarantees 
for .,non-proliferation, . I l ! 
Stuck in the middle of all this tWIDoi1 is GAN, The agency which, by presidential 
instructions, is to have top priority in regulat ing Russia's nuclear institutions is caught in a 
battle to establish its credibility and legitimacy. Defense :\-iinister Grachev and ,Minatom's 
Mikhailov have been fighting at all levels to limi! the regulatory agency's power to oversee 
their facilities. GAN officials, though empowered on paper, say they lack the legislative 
backing in Parliament. Funding for equipment and personnel are scarce, The path toward 
a truly national regulatory system is off to a rough start.'L9 
Further complicating the establishment of GAN is Russia's historical void of any 
legal fo undation. The USSR was not a state that was founded and maintained based a 
system of laws. The atomic industry is not exempt from this legal vacuum, Many of the 
problems that nuclear regulatory agencies face stem from the lack of any grasp of atomic 
law The USSR had no atomic law to regulate the industry, using instead an enormous 
administrative structure (those of Minatom and the Ministry of Defense) which issued 
orders and instructions from a centralized government. This issue is one of the major road 
blocks slowing down the development of a national regulatory system for nuclear 
security;;xl 
"CounterinteHigence Chief Heads Nuclear h'{onitoring Body," from Moscow 
Oslal/kino Television, in jpRS Report Central Eurasia, JPRS-TAC-94-011 -L, 23 August 
1994, p, 2 
Gordon, "Russian Control on Bomb Material Are Leaky," p. AS 
Misharin, "Disintegration," 73-76 
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B. PHYSICAL SECURITY 0:1" RUSSIAN NUCLEAR fACILITIES 
1. Security: Background and Details 
The collapse of the Soviet Union left the responsibility and physical control of all 
the nuclear weapons and most of the nuclear facilities in the hands of Russia and the other 
inheritor states. Political relations between Russia and the other nuclear inheritor states 
have strained the old Soviet system of central command over the nuclear weapons. Due 
to insufficient workmanship within the military industrial complex (MIC), logistical 
support for the transportation and dismantling of nuclear weapons has caused safety 
concerns. The military is also undergoing drastic restructuring while trying to form the 
new Russian anny. The wmmand structure is not clear and there are gaps in troop units, 
including the strategic nuclear forces. m 
The atomic industry as a whole has lost much of its prestige. Government orders 
for both civilian and military nuclear materials are decreasing, with some plants operating 
at 40 percent of their 1992 capacities. m Decentralization has also removed the tight state 
management system and pushed responsibility to local administrations. The independence 
perceived by the atomic industry has allowed local trade unions and free market 
entrepreneurs to take hold. The lack of training and skills to engage in a market system 
have caused economic losses, a reduction in maintenance practices, and economic 
hardship the surrounding areas. m 
fhe majority of Russia's most secret nuclear industrial complexes were once closed 
cities (For example Chelyabinsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk were engaged in tritium and 
plutonium production, weapons assembly, enrichment, and reprocessing.)Il.4 Under a free 
Vladislav N. Misharin, "Disintegration of the USSR and Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation" (paper presented at the Monterey Institute ofIntentional Studies, 
Monterey, August 1994),82-84 
William C Potter, Eve E. Cohen, Edward V. Kayukov, Nuclear Profiles of the 
Soviet Successor States" monograph no. 1 (Monterey, Monterey Institute ofInternational 
Studies, 1993),45 
Misharin, "Disintegration," 84 
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society, these cities are now open to everyone, Physical security under the old system was 
simply a well-guarded wall to prevent undesired penetration, What limited electronic 
S\lrveillance equipment that existed in the old system has not been upgraded due lack of 
funding , ,2, FW1hermore, the emphasis on security under the Soviet system was based on 
the person, not a physical system of alarms, locks, seals, inventories and accounting."" 
The Russian Federation is currently operating twenty-nine nuclear power plants 
(NPP) and another eighteen are under various stages of construction According to the 
U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 17 of the 29 1\'PP are considered to have 
major safety problems inherent in their design and or operation Eleven of these NPP are 
Chemobyl-style RUMKs, m 
There are twenty nuclear research reactors (NRR) in Russia. In Moscow, there 
are forty-two nuclear research instal lations, nine of which are NRR, I,. One nuclear 
research facility, the Kurchatov Institute, contains twenty-seven nuclear sites and located 
in the middle of Moscow. Three other major nuclear research centers in Moscow are: the 
Institute of Theoretical and Experimental Physics; (2) the Moscow Engineering-Physics 
Institute; and (3) the Research and Design Institute of Power Generation Technology.IZ'J 
Potter, Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States, 59-63 
Misharin, "Disintegration," 86 
William C. Potter, "Nuclear Insecurity in the Post-Soviet States,' Nonproliferation 
Review 1, no, 3 (Spring-Summer 1994): 62 
Ivan Selin, "Remarks for Symposium on Nuclear Safety in the Former Soviet 
Union" (Paper presented at the Symposium on Nuclear Safety in the ~lS, Monterey 
Institute oflntemational Studies, Monterey, 12-13 April 1994), 5. Safety problems 
include poor design (no containment), siting, construction, quality assurance, operation, 
maintenance, and regulation 
Potter, Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Succe~S1IDJ<.\i, 54-55 . 6 of9 are located 
at thlt Kurchatov Inst.. with one each at the Moscow Engineering-Physics Institute 
(\1EPI), the .MIPI (expansion unknown), and Inst. of Physics & Power Eng 
"Safety of Moscow Nuclear Sites Assessed," from IZVESTIYA , in JPRS Report 
Central Eurasia, JPRS-TEN-94-0J9, 13 July 1994, p. 1 
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Recent inspections of the Moscow sites by the Federal Inspectorate for Nuclear 
and Radiation Safety claim that all storage facilities fall v,ithin prescrihed levels. The study 
did note that nuclear wa~'te is piling up due to cost associated with transporting and 
processing of spent fuel. Findings issued on Moscow's NRR, many of them built in the 
1950's and 1960'~, point out that the fragmentation of the nuclear industry is hampering 
parts support, modernization, and decommissioning. The lack of funding has hurt 
retention of young persOlmcl and continued downward trends will force the closing of 
certain 1\TRR There also needs to be an updated system for the safe storage of radioactive 
waste and spent fuel "" as well as a better plan for the hazards associated with 
decommissioned NRR. ,Finally, the Federal Inspectorate report said "the status of security 
at the reactors in operation must be "reevaluated" using contemporary approaches."I)1 
Despite the general positive tone of the report, this last finding is short and to the point 
nuclear security needs immediate upgrading 
This "fe-evaluation" n:ay be urgently necessary if security at the Kurchatov 
Institute is indicative of Moscow's other nuclear sites. The in~litule is located in the 
middle of the city and employs twenty thousand people. The 5.2 km-long wall 
surrounding the institute is pan brick (40 years old) and pan concrete, The decaying brick 
section is secured with alann systems from 1953, while only one-quarter of Ihe entire wall 
has modern alarms. Although the institute produces highly enriched plutonium and 
uranium 235, personnel guarding the wall do not have equipment to measure radioactivity 
Unused fue l rods for nuclear power plants are stored here under the protection of 
()epartment 7, which is headed by only one person. This violates JAEA regulations that 
call for two person controls for such sensitive materials. In 
"State of Nuclear, Radiation Safety 'Unsatisfactory'," from lNTERFAX, in JPRS 
B&2Qrt Centrl!!..E.~, JPRS-ThIJ)-994-002-L, 8 February 1994, p. 2. These problems 
are indicative of the larger issue at stake here: storage facilities will be exhausted in two to 
three years 
"Safety of Moscow Nuclear Sites Assessed," JPRS Report Cenlral Eurasi1b p. 3 
"German Media Exposes Plutonium Trafficking,' from DIE ZEIT, in JPRS Report 
~ill~, JPRS-TND-94-006-L, 29 July 1994, p. 3 
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The condition~ at Kurchatov arc not unique. Tn a Fcbmary 1994 interview with 
Yuriy Rogshin of the Russian Nuclear Tnspection Agency, the number of nuclear facility 
violations found in 1993 was over twenty thousand. Though many discrepancies arc 
cleared, the operation of some nuclear facilities has been curtailed. For example, two 
plutonium production reactors at Krasnoyarsk 26 (southern Siberia) were shut down due 
to violation of "all environmental and safety norms ,,] , ) The lB-8 N"RR at the Moscow 
Institute of Energy and Technology had to cut operations due to a lack of qualified 
personnel, a common problem found throughout Russia's nuclear industry_ Rogshin states 
lhai the most severe problems are found at uranium mines and enrichment facilities, 
nuclear weapons production plants, and nuclear waste storage sites_ Due to inter-agency 
disputes, the Ministry of Defens~ often deni~s aeeess to military nuclear storag~ sites 
which makes official inspection difficult However, fonner military personnel serving in 
the Inspection Agency claim safety risks at nuclear weapons storage facilities are uniquely 
high,];" 
Th~ collection an<! storage of approximately twenty-five thousand tactical nuclear 
warheads within Russia poses a very real threat. Russia has to ld the United States that 
between twO and three thousand warheads a year are being dismantled, L3l However, 
inventories are not accurate and security for the more than one hundred sturage facilities is 
limited or nonexistent' >6 It is estimated that fifty tons of weapons-grade plutonium will be 
"Nuclear Agency ChiefYiews Safety Issues, Uranium Thefts," from DIE WOCHE, 
in JPRS Report Central Russi1b JPRS-TND-94-007, 24 February 1994, p, I. 
Ibid ., p, 1-3 
\Villiam C. Potter, Leonard S Spe(.,'tor, Nuclear Successor States orthe Soviet 
Union: Nuclear We?lP9n and Sensitive F-xport StatuS Rep9.!1, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace and Monterey Tnstitute ofTntentional Studies no . I (Washington, 
D.C. , Carnegie EndOI,\'Illent for International Peace, May 1994): 9 
"Nuclear Expert Describes Security Measures as 'Outdated'," from DF-R 
SPJECEL, in I2IDlY..R,~~ia lntemati()n~, fB1S-SOY-94-162, 22 August 
1994, p_ 2 
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from the dismantlement process, IJ1 plus approximately sixty tons from plutonium 
production facilities over the next ten years,lli 
There are at least ten locations in Russia that have separated weapons-usable 
(fissile) material with quantities sufficient to make one or more nuclear weapons1l9 
Almost all the facilities have plutonium and or uranium enriched to 90 percent or greater 
(I{EU). The functions related to these facilities range from warhead design, assembly, and 
dismantlement, plutonium and tritium production, spent fuel reprocessing, fuel pellet 
fabrication, research reactors, and fabrication of mixed-oxide fuel elements (MOX) 
Because Russia is a nuclear-weapon state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not 
required to place its nuclear fadlities under lAEA safeguards. Besides the above ten 
sights, there arc approximately 35 to 40 more locations and administrative districts that 
contain nuclear weapons or sufficient quantities of fissile material to build one or more 
nuclear bombs The criteria for a nuclear bomb is considered here to be either five 
kilograms of plutonium or fifteen kilograms ofHEU_,4() 
Vladislav N, Misharin feels that the world's media and leaders have a justified 
concern about the possibility of nuclear material theft, With the rise of internal criminal 
and anti-social elements as well as the relative transparency of over eight thousand miles 
of borders, the ideal culture for proliferation has been created, Mishann (eels that Russia's 
inherited nuclear security system "was designed to guard against isolated instances of 
abuse that were assumed to take place against a background of rigid discipline and social 
"Growing European Concern Over Nuclear Smuggling Issue, " from THE 
EUROPEAN, in Daily Report International Afl~, FBIS-SOV-94-053, 18 March 1994. 
p 2 
Nelan, "Fonnula For Terror," p, 49, The amount of60 tons is an extrapolation 
from a combined US-Russian total of 110 tons ofplutonium 
Potter, "Nuclear Successor States," 12· 14_ The 10 locations arc: Aramas- J 6; 
Sverdlovsk-45; Zlaloust-36; Chelyabinsk-65; Krasnoyarsk-26; Tomsk-7; Sverdlovsk-44; 
lnst. of Physics and Power Eng. (Obninsk); Lenin Inst. of Physics (S1. Petersburg); and 
Scientific Research, lnst. for Atomic Reactors (Dimitrovgrad). 
Ibid_ , 12- 18 
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control The system was not designed to protect against public turmoil. 1.1 41 This 
underscores the essence of the new proliferation threat being reiterated throughout this 
thesis 
fhis view is shared by others inside the nuclear community_ A. Dyakov at the 
\1oscow Institute for Technical Physics ~tates that the safety systems in place no longer 
suit present conditions. He shares the view of his colleagues in that one of the weak links 
in nuclear security are the research institutes. These places act as the crossover point 
between civilian and military sectors and provide thousand of personnel access to 
weapons-grade materials Quite often, plutonium production plants slill practice 
establishing a nest-egg of extra plutonium to fulfill orders when production drops. The 
plutonium produce<! is always an approximate amount, thus hiding surplu~ production 
Exact figures are simply not the way the industry had practiced in previous decades 
Further complicating the ~ecurity picture is those security personnel once employe<! hy the 
KGB are now paid through the funds of each nuclear facility. Due to tight budgets, the 
number of security personnel has been scaled back , '., The ramifications for potential 
undetected leaks of plutonium are quite glaring. It is conceivable that security personnel 
and the nuclear facility opt..'fators view the illegal transfer of their nuclear material as being 
mutually beneficial in terms of financial gain and economic survival 
Example. The Breach of Security 
Interpol reports that radioactive materials have been stolen ITom a wide 
range of source. In 1993, Russian authorities stated that there were over nine hundred 
900 attempts to penetrate nuclear fac·iJities and 700 instances where workers tried to 
smuggle out nuclear materiaL 14J 
Gennany's Fedcral Office of Criminal Investigations (BKA) reports that from 1991 
to 1993 the number of case~ involving nuclear material increased from 41 to 24 \ The 
Misharin, "Disintegration,"] 13 
"Nuclear Expert Describes," FBIS, p. 2 
"Growing European Concern," FBIS, p.1 
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number of cases for the first six months of 1994 is down 30 percent from 1993, at a level 
of about ninety, However, BKA does point out that although the quantity of instances has 
decreased, the quality of nuclear material being confiscated has dangerously increased 
Problems with plutonium and highly enriched uranium have become more abundant 144 In 
May, six grams of plutonium enriched to 99.7 percent was found during the arrest of 
Adolf Jaekle in Baden-Wuerttemberg,14S In August, one arrest yielded 350 grams of 87 
percent enriched plutonium, 200 grams of uranium, and 200 grams oflithium-6,"" These 
cases represent "the crossing ora boundary," the indication that a new dimension of 
nuclear smuggling is occurring on the international scene. Wilhelm Gruelin, director 
of Euratom, expresses his concerns about weapons-grade plutonium available on the 
market "It is very, very alarming. A boundary has been crossed that should have never 
been crossed."'" Those who can remove small quantities of these materials may be able to 
gain access to larger amounts 
The decreasing centralized national command authority has also allowed criminal 
activity to increase. It is believed that much of the nuclear material stolen is low-grade 
uranium and radiological or chemical weapons, It has been reported that these products 
have been used between rival gangs, thus causing concern for the greater population. 
Other materials are stolen for sale within Russia or elsewhere. Authorities of len gloss 
over these cases, but this may be due to their inability to prevent these criminal acts or 
even pinpoint the players l ~ 
The decaying economic structure and the subsequent de~emphasis of the nuclear 
inoustry has also caused the brain-drain (discussed in Chapter III) among the estimated 
"BKA Wams of'Dramatic Increase' ," FBlS. 
"Report Views Weapons-Grade Plutonium Find," fromDER SPIEGEL, in ~Jy 
Report Gennany. FBIS-WEU-94-I39, 18 July 1994, p. 1 
Craig Whitney, "Germans Suspect Russian Military In Plutonium Sale," New York 
~, 16 August 1994, p. A6. 
"Repon Views Weapons-Urade Plutonium Find,' FBIS, p. 2 
Misharin, "Disintegration," 1 03-4 
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twenty-five thousand experts in the nuclear field Although most of these experts have 
chosen to stay in Russia, some have quit their jobs to seck more profitable ventures 
Others have chosen to emigrate to the West, Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and 
South Asia. Countries like North Korea, Iraq, and Iran have been actively pursuing the 
employment of fonner Soviet nuclear specialists. l~; 
The cases from Appendix A demonstrate that virtually all sectors of the nuclear 
industry are vulnerable to penetration and theft. The arguments put forth by proponents 
of Russia's nuclear security structure are defending a system that in reality does not exist. 
There seems to be no national policy or consensus on nuclear safe keeping. As stated by a 
German journalist, ", . .the outdated nuclear facilities are a greater threat than ever to 
Russia and the world , They are time-bombs, for whose detonator there is no secure 
overall control anyrnore."m 
2. Material Control & Accounting 
There is a growing belief among those studying the developments in the nuclear 
successor states that it is only a matter of time before significant amounts of 
· .... 'eapons-grade fissile material or components of nuclear weapons are divened. Reasons 
for tltis doubt center on a number of key indicators: (I) the placement of priorities of hard 
currency and personal profit over those of any form of export controls; (2) and strong 
evidence of deficient safeguard systems for fissile material in the l\.T{S; and (3) wnfirmed 
cases of weapons-grade plutonium diversion out ofRussia]51 
As the eTR programs concentrate on reducing nuclear arsenals and converting the 
l'vUC. increased attention and action must be directed toward physical security 
Specifically, these efforts need to address the threats posed by non-state actors 
Commonly referred to as "national safeguards,' these include emphasis on material control 
Ihicl. , 108-9 
"Report Views Weapons-Grade Plutonium Find," FBIS, p, I 
William C Potter, "Nuclear Insecurity in the Post-Soviet States" ;-.IonproliferatjQn 
~ I no. 3, (Spring-Summer 1994) 6 1 
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and accounting (MC&A) and physical security, as applied by a national government, "to 
detect, deter, prevent, or respond to the unauthorized possession or use of nuclear 
materials"152 
The national safeguards in the nuclear inheritor states and regions exist in various 
strengths and applications, but the similarity they all share is their generally insufficient 
suitability in meeting international standards or stopping today's proliferators, However, 
even the Soviet system, which ran under a system of centralized directives, was not 
uniformly instituted and did not adhere to international norms. Even within the same 
ministry, approaches toward physical protection were implemented differently, especially 
between civilian and defense installations When the Soviet system collapsed, the already 
inconsistent regulations and standards further degraded, This left the individual states, if 
not the individual facilities, without direction and as one official stated, "we started sailing 
Many of the successor states did, in theory, try to establish their own standards 
according to intemationallevels, but the void between the political commitment to adopt 
such standards and the capability to implement this commitment could not be overcome 
Obstacles to be overcome range from economic to psychological in nature. The nuclear 
succcssor states are only two or three years old. The difficulty of establishing a 
comprehensive legislative work to deal with export controls, MC&A, and other demands 
from the world community often take a position secondary to those of maintaining even 
minimal political social order.Is.! 
Undennining any effort at physical security and material control is the 
over\.vhelming need for employees of the nuclear field to have hard cash. With greatly 
diminished salaries, the temptation of accepting work in other occupations, or even bribes, 
Ibid" p. 62 
William C Potter, Emily Ewell, Elizabeth Skinner, "l'\uclear Security in 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine: Interview witb Vladimir Shkolnik and Nicolai Steinberg," 
b'mlpBilifu~~ 2, no. I , (Fall 1994): 50 
Ibid., 47 
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is not out the realm afreality. As staled by one Ukrainian official stated, "When a bribe is 
on the order of the amount of money he would eam in the rest of Ills life, I don't know that 
every person could resist, and ~till continue to carry out his duties." Adding, "Therefore, 
when you ask a question about the efficiency of physical protection, this is a question that 
doesn't have an answer. "Ill 
Similar inferences can be drawn from the closely related topic of material 
accounting. Under the Soviet Union, no system of accounting existed until 1984, and 
the system implemented thereafter did not meet the standards of the intemational system 
As for the cohesiveness oflhis system, each ministry (even within ministry), had their own 
separate accounting systems. Therefore, civilian indust ries, the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, the KGB, and the Army and Navy, all had their own systems.'S<; 
As can be imagined, nothing exists that resembles an accurate inventory of 
radioac1ive sources and nuclear materials. Ukraine has been trying to establish its 
accounting system and their data reveals that "somewhere from 100 to 50,000 sources of 
radioactivity" Ij, exists in their country alone. This can be explained in part by the fact that 
the system of accounting which did exist in the FSV civilian and military reactor and 
reprocessing sectors was not concerned about exact amounts of plutonium. What 
mattered to the Soviets was the number of fuel assemblies, and more so for knowing the 
number of spent assemblies being shipped off for reprocessing The exact quantity of 
plutonium, in kilograms, was inconsequential In fact, some spent fuel as that from 
RBI\.1K-type reactors was never reprocessed accounting here had no specific function. 
Scientists are t rying to backtrack and recalculate the approximate amounts of uranium and 
plutonium produced, Il! but the history of uncharted production stretches back decades 
Chaos abounds 
Ibid., 48 
Ibid 
Ibid 
Ibid., 48·49 
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If one examines the substantiated cases of weapons-grade nuclear material 
diversion , the potential threat of highly dangerous material being smuggled out of Russia 
becomes clearer. The seizure of six grams of plutonium in Tengen, Gennany, on 10 May 
1994 was determined to be 99.75 Pu-239. This is very high quality weapons-grade 
material. Through isotope analysis, the likely source of the material was a plutonium 
production facility in Russia It is believed that the plutonium was obtained from the 
waste streams of the reprocessing site . I~9 
Provided the isotope analysis is correct, there are people who believe that if lAEA 
safeguarding standards had been in place, this plutonium collection and diversion could 
have been prevented. However, closer examinations of the lAEA standards reveal some 
inherenl shoncomings that increase the chance for diversion. For example, if one assumes 
that Russia meets IAEA standards at all of its reprocessing, production, and storage 
facilities, we can apply a term known as "material unaccounted for" or MUF. This factor 
allows for inaccuracies in scales and other measuring devices and is called MUF sigma 
The lAEA accuracy value for MUF sigma is 0.3 percent and measurements below this 
level are considered a mistake in scientific evaluation. So, everything that is below the 0,3 
percent i\1UF sigma is suspect for accountability purposes. To make this a bit easier to 
understand, apply this error factor to Russia's official claim that some ninety tonsl'" of 
weapons-grade plutonium are in storage: the resulting MUF is 300 kg of Pu-239, enough 
for fifty warheads. 161 (Actually, the math for this using O.OO3X816k kg = 2,440 kg, 
enough for over 400 warheads, using 6 kg Pu per warhead.) 
The problem here is characteristic of the entire international nonproliferation 
regime. It assumes that IAEA-type safeguards will mean thorough accounting with only a 
small amount of insubstantial error. However, this allowable and seemingly small error 
compounds itself as the nuclear system grows. The unintended result is a nuclear 
nightmare that threatens U. S. and international security As the years of nuclear 
Potter, "Nuclear Insecurity," 62 
Most estimates place the actual level of weapons-grade plutonium between 125 to 
200 metric tons. The 11UF for these amounts will, fonunately, increase proponionally 
Potter, Ewell, and Skinner, "Nuclear Security, " 52 
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development ron by, the amount of nuclear material accumulating increases, as does the 
proportional level of "MUF. " The level of chaos and uncertainty have expanded to the 
point where the application of solutions such as the l-.'PT, IAEA, and export control no 
longer address the magnitude of the problem 
Evaluation 
The program of MC&A can be examined on two different levels· the 
national- system level and the sub-system leveL At the national-system level there arc a 
number of institutions and organizations who have a role in the custody and control of 
nuclear materials_ In Russia for example, the following groups claim to have somc 
influence in the nudear MC&A arena Minatom, GAN, Ministry of Shipbuilding, 
Committee for Defense Industry, Ministry of Transponation, just to name a few_ Within 
this system can also be included the Navy and Army departments and possibly even 
individual facilities_ As stated earlier in Chapter VI, the theoretical comprehensive nudear 
autbority in Russia is Gosatomnadzor or GAN, However, GAN not only lacks political 
and financial backing, it sutTers from a severe lack of respect from the other national 
nuclear players 
For example, GA,'J would like to inventory naval nuclear fuel storage facilities to 
veril)' recorded quantities, The problem is that the duality of control exerted by the 
Ministry of Shipbuilding and tbe State Committee fOf Defense Industry, claiming custody 
for reactor fuel stocks and strategic fuel stocks respectively, refuse any intrusion by GAN 
At best, GA,'J is allowed to count the number of storage containers, but not their contents. 
It is believed that no inventories have been conducted on the past ten Of more years, and 
this is not limited to just naval facilities GAl'Js rejection by many nuclear agencies is 
endemic of the bureaucratic infighting, and also because these agencies fear that GAN just 
might rind something missing . l~:l 
Examination of the sub-system level of MC&A reveals that the possibility of 
missing material is quite real , This level looks at the nature of actual control of the nuclear 
Potter, "Nuclear Insecurity,' 62-63 
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material The United States uses a system of centralized training and qualification, unified 
r~gulation and information systems, and physical protection based on technical and 
tangible assets. Most, if not all U.S.-style measures are nonexistent in Russia and the 
other nulcear inheritor states. "" Although negotiations continue on the improvement of 
these standards, the system in place today is much like that of the old Soviet version: one 
that was based on "personal responsibility in which a designated person was entrusted 
with the nuclear material until it was passed on to another designated individual. ",'" 
The premise behind the accounting system was, and still is, for financial accounting 
and material planning. Along with the lack of national uniformity in regulations and 
duality of control at the nation-system level, the "human factor,, 16S at the sub-system level 
represents a major hole Russia's MC&A. The once highly regarded nuclear elite contained 
loyal and obedient workers within a rigid social structure that placed zero monetary value 
on nuclear material as a conunodity. With the collapse of this elite status, the reliability on 
the individual person has been greatly degraded. Widespread corruption and crime have 
lowered moral standards in all realms of the MIC and the nuclear industry is not excluded 
The diversion threat of utmost concern is from the inside of Russian and inheritor states 
nuclear industry'66 A knowledgeable, experienced, and corrupt individual (5) working 
with the material make the human factor one of the weakest links in nuclear safeguards 
Coercion from outside criminal organizations, or desires for personal profit or political 
gain mark the human factor as a legitimate and accessible target 
The sub-system level problems are exacerbated by the lack of support from higher 
authority. Funds promised by Minatom to its O"WTI subordinate commands designated to 
combat nuclear issues have not been delivered. Institutions dedicated to resolving 
problems with fissile material control under a March 1993 Minatom safeguards program 
Oleg Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Safeguards," 
N9JlP-Icli~  (Fail 1994): 30. 
Potter, "Nuclear Insecurity," 62 
Bukharin, "U, S-Russian Cooperation," 31 . 
Ibid 
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have been crippled due to the void in political will and funding shortfalls Links between 
the already limited R&D programs and production facilitie~ are causing grealer gaps in 
safeguard initiatives_ Production facilities are cutting costs by eliminating material control 
personnel, even with the increased demands for safeguards due to warhead 
dismantiement L67 Despite intemationa! efforts, the situation in the successor states has 
worsened, and pro~pects for the immediate future are dim 
3. Material Control & Accounting and Cooperative Threat Reduction 
The Cooperative Threat Reduction Act (eIR) will be fully outlined and cri tiqued 
in Chapler VII in greater detail. However, it is important to discuss here how lhe eIR 
applies to MC&A programs in the I\'TS 
The efforts of MC&A cooperation between the United States and the NIS can be 
divided into four general categories. The first is the DOD CTR program which is also 
referred to as either Nunn-Lugar and Governmcnt-to-Government, or "CrOv-to-Gov," The 
second is a relatively new initiative administered through the Department of Energy 
(DOE) called the Laboratory-to-Laboratory Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and 
Accounting Program, or "Lab-to-Lab" The next category falls under the International 
Science and Technology Center (ISTC) effons, funded by Nunn-Lugar, that employ NIS 
nuclear scientists to help develop solutions to nuclear issues The last general category 
comes under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) efforts to help GAi'l develop 
safeguards within Russia, M 
The latter two programs have received little attention and scrutiny because they, 
especially the ISTe program, have been obligated small funds, The ISlC program as of 
27 February 1995 was obligated $23.2 million of the proposed $61 million, with S23 .057 
nuJlion going to Russia."" Effons by the NRC have been delayed by GANs inability to 
build credibility within Russia and gain access to much ofthe nuclear industry 
Ibid,31-32 
Thomas B. Cochran, "U.S, Assistance to Improve Physical Security and 
Accounting of Fissile Materials in Russia" (Remarks on a presentation given at the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Conference, 31 January 1995), 1 
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The first two categories have received, or wil! receive, most of the U.S 
government funding. Because of this, they also received much of the examination and 
criticism The CTR program, in place the longest, has been criticized, and rightly so, by 
both government and non-goverrunent bodies. The primary problems indicated rest 
squarely on the fact that there was no specific plan of action prior to, or for many months 
after, the decision by Congress to give transfer authority of $400 million of DOD FY 
1992 Appropriations to the Nunn-Lugar ActPO Characterized as "tOO late, toO litt le, and 
roo slow,"'" the CTR program has failed in the critical area of improving the material 
protection, control and accounting of Russia's nuclear industry. As will be discussed 
below. it can be argued that the CTR program has also failed in its objective of the 
reducing and eliminating the WMD in the NrS 
The blame for the failure of the Nunn-Lugar program can be directed at more than 
one area, but much of it falls on the Executive Branch. Starting with the Bush 
administration and cascading into the Clinton administration, failure was destined given 
the lack of planning, managerial skills, political will, and most of all a firm grasp of the 
enormity of the nuclear problem following the Soviet collapsel'n Although the reduction 
ofWMD is important in its own right, the focus of U.S. efforts should be less myopic and 
should as a minimum encompass the threat posed by the whole nuclear inheritor states 
industry Beyond this, solutions can be found be addressing the economic miseries that 
arc rippling through the political and societal spheres, resulting in chaotic conditions. 
Mendelsohn and Lockwood, "U.S, Security Assistance," p, 24, See Table 7, I for 
more information 
Senator Sam Nunn, "Reducing the Soviet Military Threat: (Remarks to the U.S 
Senate, 7 February 1992), p. 3 
Cochran, "US. Assistance," p. 2 
Ibid. , P 2, 6 
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Project Sapphire 
The eTR program known as Project Sapphire is often championed by the 
Clinton Administrat ion as a signjficant step toward the reducing the nuclear threat posed 
by the N1S. However, closer examination of this case reveals the relative emptiness of this 
achievement , Project Sapphire was a deal between the United States and the Kazak 
Republic to remove six hundred kilograms of HEU from the latter territory The HEU, 
enough to make approximately twenty nuclear weapons, was transported to the Y-12 
plant at Oak Ridge for storage. The HEU itself was intended for use as naval fuel and 
served little interest to Kazakhstan. The cost of Project Sapphire was reportedly over 
SIDO million_'7J Secretary Perry comments on Project Sapphire, "We have put this 
bomb-grade nuclear material forever out of the reach of potent ial black marketers, 
terrorists Of new nuclear regimes This is defense by other means and in a hig way_,,'-'4 
First , forever is a long time, especially with nuclear material having half-lives of 
20,000 ycars_ Second, on the grand nuclear scheme, the six hundred kilos of HEU 
represent approximately 0.05 percent of the estimated 1,200 metric tons of separated 
weapons-grade fissile material in the N1S, enough to make over 60,000 additional 
warheads , This does not include the estimated 28,000 warheads still in existence. Most 
of these materials exist in Russia, not Kazakhstan, 17I and Russia continues to produce two 
to three Ions of plutonium annually, l7<; Given the immense magnitude of the nuclear 
inheritor regions nuclear capacity, it is clear that efforts to protect and account for this 
Mark Thompson, "Sapphire's Hot Glow," Time,S December 1994, p. 38. US 
officials said that the REU was enriched to ninety percent. The six week operat ion fi lled 
over 1050 55-gallon drums with small portions ofHEU and were transported via USAF 
C-55 back to the United Stales 
Ibid., p. 39. Emphasis added 
Cochran, "U,S , Assistance, " p 4 The estimate of 1,200 tons of stored weapons 
grade material is based on 1000 tons ofW-G HEU and 200 tons ofW-G Pu_ One 
warhead consists of ei ther 5-6 kg ofPu-239, or 30-35 kg ofHEU 
Thomas B, Cochran, "Disposition of Fissile Materials from Weapons" (Paper 
presented at the International Policy Forum Management & Disposition of Nuclear 
Weapons Materials, Lansdowne, Virginia, 22 March 1995), p, 8 
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material must be greatly increased if we truly intend the have "defense by other means and 
in a big way." 
Another U.S effort is the proposed deal to purchase five hundred tons of HEU 
recovered from warhead dismantlement. The contract, brokered between United States 
E!1richment Corporation (USEC) and the Russian Federation, calls for the HEU to be 
converted to LEU prior to transport and will take place over a twenty year period. m At 
$11.9 billion for the total deal, the price per kilogram is $780. The effort, however, may 
be dying a slow and fruitless death. Due to contract stipulations, implemented by DOE, 
Russia will not receive payment for the uranium until one of following occurs: (1) the 
contract expires in 2013 ; (2) the uranium is sold; or (3) it is used to overfeed u.s 
enrichment plants. The concern on the Russian side is that Minatom is expected to pay for 
tho: blending and pay for the uranium feed up front. This whole process leavo:s Minatom 
with very little profit and bitter resentment toward USEC and the U. S government. Into 
its second year, the program has converted only two metric tons of HEU and no delivery 
of LEU has been made to the United States.' ll 
The CTR program has also funded other notable efforts that deem only brief 
mention because they demonstrate a pattern of linear, easy-solution reactions employed by 
the U.S. government. First there is the purchase and delivery of rail car conversion kits 
($21.5 million)ll9 and heavy equipment like bulldozers and road graders ($8 million)lJO It 
is a wonder that Russia, with its huge industrial sector, could not provide these items on 
their own and save millions in CTR funds. Second is the development and partial delivery 
of fissile material containers and the construction of a storage facility . Nearly all of the 
S50 million has been contracted out, but actual deliveri~ of the expected 42,000 
containers number in the tens. The use of these containers implies that a modern and 
Ibid., p. 5. The rate of transfer calls for 10 t ofHEU equivalent per year for the 
!ir~t 5 years, followed by 30 tons equivalent per year for the next 15 years 
Ibid. , p. 6 
Perry, "Second FY 1994 Semi-Annual Report,' p. 46 
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secure facility will exist for their housing. CTR funds have been used to help design a 
'generic' facility ($14.999 million actually obligated), but the construction of the facility 
located at Chclyabinsk has been delayed by bureaucratic red tape and by wavering Russian 
commitment $26 ,5 million, of $75 million available, has yielded the dearing of physical 
site, but Russian fundi ng and construction have yet to l:onunence.1!1 
Perry, 'Second FY 1994 Semi-Annual Report," p. 43-45 
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Vll 
In this chapter, we will outline the Cooperative Threat Reduction (eTR) program, 
covering its legislative background and applicability to the nuclear issues in the new 
nuclear successor states hrought ahout by the Soviet collapse. eTR is the United Slates 
most recent and best effort at assisting Russia and the nuclear successor states to control 
their respective nuclear industries. As a result of OUT analysis, we will see that the eTR is 
a mi ld. short-term fix plagued with indecision and an inabili ty to deliver most of its funds 
to proposed programs 
A. COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTIOJ\, NUN~'-LUGAR 
1. Background of Legislation 
The erR was developed out of concern for the safety of Soviet nuclear weapons 
following the attempted coup against :\1ikhail Gorbachcv on 21 August 1991. On 28 
August then Representative Les Aspin (D-WIS) suggested that a humanitarian aid 
provision for $1 billion be added to the DOD authorization bilL DOD funds were to be 
transferred for emergency food and other humanitarian aid for the Soviet people. The 
Aspin proposal drew heated opposition from the Republican Administration as well as 
from Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chainnan of the Senate AImed Services Committee. Nunn felt 
that instead a transfer of DOD funds on humanitarian grounds, funding should be used to 
help conven the Soviet defense industry to civilian uses l !' 
Details of a tentative Aspin-Nunn provision were worked out be 13 Novemher 
1991 , but the political mood in America was shifting toward a domestic agenda. The 
provision was criticized by Democrats and Republicans for spending $ 1 billion on Soviet 
problems instead of American issues. Consequently, the proposed aid package was 
rejected and dropped from the Department of Defense Authorization However, within 
Theodor Galdi, "The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for 
Soviet Weapons Dismantlement: Background and Implementation," Congressional 
Research Service, 29 December 1993, CRS- l 
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two weeks Senators Nunn and Richard Lugar (R-IN) proposed to the Senate an 
amendment to the Conventional Forces In Europe Treaty Implementation Act of 1991 
The amendment, passed by the Senate on 25 November and becoming Public Law 
102-228 on 12 December, called for up to $400 million to be spent predominately on the 
dismantlement nuclear weapons belonging to the Soviet Union and its successor states 
The same day Congress approved the transfer of S400 million from DOD funds through 
Section 108 of the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1992 . As Public 
Law \02-229, the Nunn-Lugar act would be provided for from already approved DOD 
programs for Fiscal Year 1992, A similar transfer of $400 million was authorized for FY 
1993 Subsequent Nunn-Lugar CTR funding has been provided through specific 
appropriations, not transfer authority, III 
2, Where the Money is Obligated 
The total amount of funding authorized by Congress, as of February 1995, for the 
CTR program has reached $1.6 billion. However, $330 mi ll ion of tltis was lost due to 
DOD failure to appropriate funds before expiring , 14 Tn fact as of 30 June 1993, CTR 
programs had spent almost none of their available funding. Figures show that $4764 
million had been proposed for obligations, of which $44 mi llion had actually been 
obligated and only a small portion of that had been expended. Delay in the use of CTR 
funds at this time were said to be caused by the concluding times of project agreements 
and the long-term nature of certain programs. These issues in tum delayed the notification 
of Congress by DOD as to the amount and source of funding in each program, and the 
Ibid., CRS-2-5. FY93 funding was provided through P.L 102-484 and PL 
]02-396, which also allowed FY92 Nunn-Lugar funds to be camed over into FY93 . 
FY94 authorization and appropriation bills allowed for another $400 million through P,L 
103-J60andP.L. I03- 139 
$212 million ofFY92 transfer authority funds and another $118 million ofFY93 
transfer authority funds had failed to be obligated by 30 September 1993. Calculations afe 
based on 29 December 1993 "CRS Report for Congress" by Thcodor Galdi (CRS-9) and 
February 1995 "Annual Report to the President and Congress" ~;ubmitted by Secretary of 
Defense (p, 64) 
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respective obligation laid oul by Congress to meet it. The long-term nature of the 
programs abo drew out the actual expenditures. m 
The latest data for CTR program spending, as of27 February 1995, demonstrate 
tha:. of the $1.27 billion currently available lor obligation, SU S] billion in obligations 
have been proposed to Congress, $497,9 million has been obligated through signed 
CO!ltract~ , and only $150 million has been spent. As oflate Mar(;h, the Senate and House 
,verc negotiating in committee the House proposal to cut $80 million from the FY95 
appropriation bill ofS400 million,: l<i 
Galdi, ''The NUM-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction," CRS-9, 13 
Jack Mendelsohn and Dunbar Lockwood, ·'U.S. Security Assistance to the Fonner 
Soviet Union," 23 no,S, Anm Control Today (April 1995) 24-5 . See Table 7.1, next 
page 
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BEQl1ill::!I !.Lill.lTI:: ~~million<i" OB!.lGAIEQ(S millions)"· 
'.0 
Railcar Securit)'lWeapons Sc<urity 41.5 
EmergenoyResponse 15.0 
MatcrialC<)ntrols 45 ,0 
Sl<JrageContainers 50.0 
Facilil)Suppon 75.0 
Facility Tksign 15,0 
ExponControh 
Sci""ceCenl~r 
Chemical Weapons DestructlLab 
Su-ategicOfTeru;iveArrnsElimin 
Arctic Nuclcar Waste Asst:ssmem 
o"fenscCom'crsion 
R&D Foundation 
= E"""geocyResponse 
CommunicatiollsLink 
Export Controls 
ScienceCcntt:r 
Environmental Restoration 
Det;,nseCon~rsion 
Slralegic Offeru;ive Anns Elimin 
Military-Io-"-'filitary Contacls7 
= EmcrgcncyRcsponse 
Communications Link 
ExportCon lIoh 
Sdenc«Center 
o 
0 ,175 
~ 
2.005 
0.332 
0.301 
o 
3029 
Militar..-_Io-Mi litary Contacts 0,074 
Strategic Offensive Anns Elimin 0,167 
DcfenseCoovcrsion 5,146 
~lrn:m..I6l. ~ 
Emergency Response 2.002 
CommWlicaliuns Link 2.4 0 35 
Export Controls 7.26 3.164 
Material Control, 4.495 
0,144 
StrntcgicOfrensi"cArmsElimin ~1 .9 87 
Nuclear Reacl<Jr Safety 11,0 
Military-to-MilitaryC<)nLlcts 5.9 0,518 
Dcf=Convcn;ion 5(l ,0 38,21>4 
~~~~TE~~erpriseF~Assess ~ ::~~~ 
TOTAL 1,181.11 ~97.929'" 
• Jack Mendelwhn and l)unbarLoch...-xxl, "U,S, Security As",~!anceto the FormerSo.iet Union: tImIIi 
);o®S!!~ 23 no. ),(Apriil9'J5): 24_5. SolJI«s DepartmenlofDefen"", Department of State, Dd<'IlS<: Budget 
Proj ~".'c' _ _ ______________ _ _ 
As of 3 february 1995 
As of 27 February 1995 
Through the end of February 1995, it is reported that only $150 million of the 
obligated $497 ,929 million has been actually spent 
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Congress has delegated responsibility to the Department of Defense for a number 
of a(;tivi ties under the CTR program Specifically, DOD tasks include: (1) destroy 
nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction; (2) transport, store. disable and 
safeguard weapons in connection with their destruction; and (3) establish verifiable 
safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons, , <>] Title XIV of the FY93 DOD 
Authorization Act (p.L l02-4S4) added three additional tasks (4) demilitarization and 
conversion to civilian purposes the industries of the :\lS; (5) estahlish science and 
technology centers in each state of the N1S to employ nuclear scientists; and (6) expand 
contacts between U.S, and NlS military personnel 
B. DIVlSJONS OF FUNDING AND PURPOSE 
The six CTR program objectives assigned by Congress are being carried out 
through a series of activities that fall into four general categories, As stated by DOD 
sources, the first category cncompasses the Destruction and Dismantlement programs and 
consumes fifty percent of proposed CTR obligations. Designed to reduce or eliminate 
W~1D and their launcher systems, these activities include training, equipment and 
inducements to the four nuclear successor states, The Second category, possessing 
twenty-nine percent of proposed obligations, is Chain of Custody, Activities in this 
grouping address security and custody for nuclear warheads and fissile materiaiR in the 
Sllccessor states that present a potential threat to the United States and this region, ' 01 
f he third grouping is the support activitieR for Demilitarization. With sixteen 
percent of the proposed obligations, the aim of these programs is to reduce production 
capabilities for W1-m by converting or eliminating certain military industries. Through a 
system of industrial partnerships, they are intended to "prevent proliferation by reducing 
both the supply of WMD available for foreign sale or diversion and the incentives for 
"Sccond FY 1994 Semi-Annual Report on Program At.'1ivities to Facilitate 
Vieapons Destru(;tion and Nonproliferation in the Fonner Soviet Union, " 30 October 
J 994. Secreta')' of Defense William Perry, p, I. See Appendix D for CTR funding break 
down 
Perry, "Annual Report," p. 65, 67 See Appendix E 
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relying on such sales for income Hl91 The last category backs "Other Programs and 
Support," using five percent of proposed obligations. The thrust behind these activities 
centers on increased military and defense contacts, the idea being the "development of 
democratic and civilian control of ntilitary departments and the restructuring and 
dO'.>m-siling of defense capabilities 10 better reflect these new nation's needs."w; 
CTR activities are claimed by the Clinton administration and DOD ollicials as not 
being traditional foreign aid, but are instead "defense by other means." '''' They are 
eliminating the Cold War nuclear and other W1-ID threats "missile by missile, warhead by 
warhead, factory by factory, and person by person.,,195 The focus and emphasis of Fiscal 
Year 1995 win be to "take specific steps to stop the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery [as pan of) the most ambitious 
nonproliferation agenda in history." Additionally, "The centerpiece of our global strategy 
is the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty."''"' 
1. Defense CODvenioD 
The level of attention given to defense conversion efforts in the inheritor states is 
growing. As mentioned earlier, Senator Nunn's original plan for the conversion of Soviet 
military industry into civilian producers was rejected in November 1991 when it was part 
of the Aspin-Nunn proposal. Today, Secretary of Defense Perry is the leader and 
Ibid p. 66 
Ibid 
"Overview of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,' p. 1 
"Defense Conversion in the Former Soviet Republics: Win-Win-Win for Both 
Teams," point paper issued by Office of Secretary of Defense, 21 March 1995, p. 1. 
"Support for Nunn-Lugar Affirmed by Secretary Christopher: Non-Proliferation 
Agenda 'Ambitious'," Post-Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 31 January 1995, p. 2 
Remarks made by Secretary of State Warren Christopher during a presentation to the 
Kennedy School of Govenunent 20 January 1995 
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chc.mpio!1 supporter for conversion efforts in the NIS, where some twelve percent or $155 
mi:lion of available erR funds are currently focused 197 
The amount of obligated conversion funds as of 27 February 1995 is 
approximately $60,5 million As mentioned above, the purpose ofthese conversion efforts 
is 10 reduce the capacity of the NlS to produce WMD. This has been accomplished so far 
through DOD arranged joint ventures, partially fimded by U.S industries, to induce 
spin-off products from firms in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, With the 
intention of producing goods for domestic and international consumption, Russia has 
received improved air traffic control, hearing aids, dental equipment, and cola Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan have better commercial telecommunications capahilities, while Belarus 
can now charge car batteries better than ever, 198 
The ultimate result stressed here is that we have a "win-win-win for the United 
States and the NlS ," investments in defense conversion yield: (I) reduced "threats from 
the most dangerous weapons;" (2) viable commercial-market economies with the !\'lS to 
reduce "excess military capacity;" and (3) entry opportunities for U.S. companies into a 
potentially huge civilian rnarke(99 
The debate over defense conversion can not he discussed properly unless one 
considers the full intended scope of the program. There seems to be an intentional 
disconnect in government statements as to the actual magnitude and focus of Nunn-Lugar 
funds, Although the statements provided above focus of nuclear and other WMD, this 
distinct ion is blurred by the broader reality. eTR funds for conversion are also intended to 
encompass major conventional industries as well 
This topic covers the range of interests and exposes the void existing between 
Western visions and Russian realities. Defense conversion faces a number of critical 
obstacles. Due to budgetary cuts and economic troubles, arms sales and reactor sales 
Mendelsohn and Lockwood, "US. Security Assistance," p. 24. 550 million ofthis 
amount may go away pending the outcome of Congressional committee hearings. 
'"Defense Conversion," p. 1 
Ibid 
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revesent a valid source of much needed hard currency. Because of the monetary and 
poiitical interests of Rosvoorouzhenie,200 Minatom, and the state, many Russian officials 
fee; that these transfers are becoming a central aspect to their country's grov.rrh. Arms 
sales and nuclear transfers represent some of the few areas in which Russia can globally 
complete with quality goods 
Given the value placed on arms exports by an increasing numbers of Russian 
oft1cials, the Western logic of defense conversion becomes less clear. Taken from a 
pragmatic and Russian view, why would it make sense to use money earned by exports to 
pay for the conversion of that defense industry, In other words, given the decline in 
industrial output in general/OJ why would you convert an export-producing plant that is 
successfiil at making arms into a substandard consumer-goods producer that has no 
market. Second, many feel that profits from successful producers could be redistributed 
to help convert less efficient facilities. This provides no incentive for the competitive 
producers to grow and seems dead on arrival This idea is also abolished by 
Rcsvoorouzhenie's distribution of credits to more competitive manufacturers.Nl 
Consider also Rosvoorouzhenie's own profit incentive and bureaucratic survival 
Why would it cut down or limit its own income derived from commissions or waste funds 
OIl inefficient plants? The answer may lie in the internal balancing between its 
organizational profit margin and the political capital expended as one or more of the 
seventy military-dependent cities experiences economic and social instability 
Rosvoorouzhenie is the new state 'company' set up 10 manage aU conventional 
arms transfers. It has direct authority, and a virtual monopoly, and has a vested interest in 
promoting all sales due to commission fees 
Julian Cooper, "Transformation of the Russian Defence Industry,",!ruJ~ 
Intelli"ence Review 6, no. 10, (Oclober 1994): 445. In 1992, total defense industry 
output dropped 18 percent, with military output declining by 38 percent. In 1993, the 
l'.umOers were 38 and 30 percent respectively. For the first half of 1994, they were 43 and 
40 percent respectively 
Edwin Bacon, "Russian Arms Exports-A Triumph for Marketing?" !~ 
Intelligence Review 6, no. 6 (June 1994) 268 
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Thtl logic of the above discussion can be camtld over into Russia's nudear industry 
a~ welL Although .\1inatom is not technically the monopolistic enterprise charged with 
overall responsibility of the nuclear arena, the political and economic woes of Russia 
virtually dictate this reality_ As discussed in chapter five, the legal overriding nuclear 
a(lt ilorilY in Russia is GAN. However, the political savvy and power wheeled by 
M;khi]ov and his one-million-employee strong Minatom have pushed GAN aside. The 
consequence is that, like mosl of the MIe, Minalam has enormous influence on the 
d:lmeslic and foreign policy of Russia. The threat of economic chaos and mass 
unemployment within the nuclear industry if plants and fa(,-torics are shut down keep the 
industry itself alive 
The sale of reactors abroad is a series source of badly needed hard cash_ The four 
reactor deal with Iran, for instance, alone is worth $1 billion to Mkhailov's nuclear clout 
The United States is pressuring Russia to halt this sale for various reasons and is 
reportedly offering Mnatom up to $100 million ifit cancels the Iran deaL·OJ Compare this 
offer or the $1 SO million CTR fimds spent in all Russia to the $ 1 billion ITom the Iran 
Deal. Being pragmatic, as thc Russians surely are, it does not take long to realize that the 
bottom line may very well be drawn at profit margin. Minatom can not afford to push for 
the sale, It , like Rosvoorouzhenie, depends on self-generate profits to feed its massive 
structures. Ethics and international political pressures weigh in only slightly_ In fact, they 
may only be used convenient masks to cover what looks like state-sponsored sales nuclear 
material X>! 
Looking at lhe trend of defense conversion will also lend insight to importance of 
Russia's defense industry, During the middle to late 1980s, Mikhai l Gorbachev tried to 
Steven Greenhouse, "ll S Gives Russia Data on Irans Atom Plans," ~ 
~,:; April 1995, p, AI, A6. The $100 million was offered as part ofa deal to help 
modernize Russ ian reactors and clean nuclear waste sites in Russia 
It can he argued that if the Russian government supports the sale of nuclear 
in;-:Ierial to a nation like Iran with controversial foreign policies, the message being sent to 
the nucl~ar industry as a whole is frightening. Basically, the State is sanctioning nuclear 
fe';- cash, ethics and morals aside. They are willingly promoting the very thing U.S. policy 
IS trymg to SlOp 
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redirect the MIC in an attempt to increase the production of consumer goods. The effort 
""as intended 10 break down the oversized defense industry to make it fit into his new view 
of Soviet global involvement. With over five thousand enterprises, the MIC constituted 
ap:lroximately 70-85 percent of Soviet industry. By the ]991 Summer coup attempts that 
brought down Gorbachev and ushered in Yeltsin, the success of conversion seems 
doubtful Although official figures show significant increases in consumer goods 
produced by the We, many feel that they reflect creative book keeping 
A shift away from defense conversion can be detected in late 1991. Yeltsin and his 
government began to emphasize publicly that arms sales would be playing a more 
significant role in economic recovel)'. By winter 1992, the production of civilian goods by 
defense industries began to falter, and of the 120 commercial products slated for 
production, only twenty-three actually did so. Of these twenty-three, only five met 
international guality standards. Military production was also down sixty-six to eighty 
pecent To prevent the breakdown of the MIC and society, Russian officials claimed they 
would have had to spend approximately $150 billion over five years to con~ert, or 
produce and exports anns. Given so little funding for conversion, the only option was the 
latter. As one official stated, "Now that we arc entering seriously into the world market, 
we cenainly need 10 trade in anns ... ,,2'), Nuclear materials and technology can be implicitly 
adci~d to this trend in rcality. 
Funding has often been considered the main deterrent toward progress on defense 
conversion, The $1 SO billion quoted above seems a bit high compared to most of the 
estimates from other sources. Many feel that the amount needed is approximately $20 
billion, Regardless, Russia's central government has covered no more than fifteen percent 
of the amount needed, while foreign funding constitutes no greater than OJ percent.wo 
The United States is one of the leading outside contributors, yet even its obligated 
funding has amounted to less than a half billion dollars. The !'\unn-Lugar Aet has divided 
Steven Gallant, "The Failure of Russia's Defense Conversion," ~~~ 
Review 6, no. 7 (July 1994) 304 
Khripunov, "Conventional Anns Control Initiatives: Russia as a Special Case," 
A:mL~ 24 no. 10 (December 1994): 13 
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this money over several diverse programs_ Administered originally by the U.s. Defense 
Nuclear Agency (DNA), Nunn-Lugar has provided $36.8 million to a conver~ion program 
called the "fast four:" a consortium off OUT earmarked Russia plams, the DNA, and several 
U.S . corporations. The four former defense plants now produce navigation systems, 
hearing aids, dental instruments, and yes, cola. An additional eighty-two plants have 
selected for conversion, but competition for the limited funds has delayed final 
decisions. '07 Another $20 million is going toward a prefabrication housing industry, 
presumed to be intended for displaced military officers 
Delays are experienced because many Russians are frustrated by American visitors 
asking all sorts of questions and not delivering any money. This has led to Russian 
suspicions and hesi ta tions toward disclosing much of anything, Other snags include U,S 
payments being "lost" in bank transfers and a high inflation rate that causes Russian firms 
to spend their funds rapidly and ineffectively, Finally, Russia is not the only newly 
independent state receiving bits of the Nunn-Lugar funds; as mentioned before, programs 
for Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are among the other potential recipiems."oi 
The Russian decision to virtually abandon conversion can be seen through the 
state-backed push for arms sales in 1993 and 1994. Cases of export examples (not 
discussed in this thesis unless nuclear related) involve high-level government officials 
traveling to different regions of the world to re-establish ties broken by the Soviet collapse 
and to break into new export grounds, With the creation of Rosvoorouzhenie, we see 
further emphasis on arms for cash, Additionally, "Russia does not exist in a historical 
vacuum. Knowledge of this cannot be tossed aside--it must be overcome.,m-9 Al though 
Jeffrey M, Lenorovitz, "U.S.-Russian Teams Get Pentagon Funds," Aviation Weeic 
& Space Technology 14 1, no , 6, 8 August 1994, p. 27. The "fast four" Russian 
companies arc teamed up with US sponsor companies GosNUAS with Rockwell; NrO 
lstok with Hearing A.ids International; NPO Mashinos-troyenia wi th Double Cola Co.; and 
Leninets with International American Products 
"Perry Outlines Plans to Aid Russian Defense Conversion," AYirulon Week & 
Space TechllQ!Qgy 140, no. 13,28 March 1994, p, 62-3 
Yuri N Afanasyev, "Seems Like Old Times? Russia's Place in the World," 
Current History 93, no. 585 (October 1994): 305 
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beyond Ihe scope of this paper, the history of Soviet politics and internal political power 
struggles cannot be ignored. This must be kept in mind, and often is not, when 
considering policy toward Russia. From defense conversion to arms control, Russia's 
views ollen differ from the West due to its unique internal struggles and the way in which 
it deals with them 
If one considers the success of extreme groups and communists in the last 
elections, as well as their promises to the military for a return to Soviet-era production 
numbers, it is no wonder thaI Yeltsin would give in a hit 10 appease the political, military, 
and social unrest. In the short run, arms exports and reactor sales bring in currency to an 
ailing economy and help prevent Yeltsin's political demise. Wilh his failing health and 
increasing international pressure over ehechnya, the uncertainty of Russian export policy 
and overall political livelihood are questionable 
As a final remark on the issue of defense conversion, let us be reminded that the 
goPJ of conversion was to reduce the threat of WMD to the NlS and United States by 
converting the production capability of WMD into civilian product industries. The "fast 
four" mentioned earlier arc often championed by Secretary Peny as prime examples of 
e TR success. Take for example the hearing aid company that is now "off and running" 
and supplying their wares to neooful Russians. If you look at the justification used by 
Secretary Perry/ l ~ the inadequacy and lUnacy of this endeavor stand out Istok Audio 
lmernational (IAl) used to produce microwave and laser tedmologies before being 
"converted" First, why are these talents not being utilized and expanded upon? Second, 
this company, presumably instrumental in producing weapons of mass destruction, is not 
what most people would consider an integral part of the nuclear war machine 
I'his brings about an important point: the eTR funds usoo for the production of 
hearing aids and cola cannot even be evaluated for their effectiveness at reducing the 
tr.real posed by nuclear weapons because they simply missed the whole nuclear issue 
Morc dirct-'tly, we are conceivably facing the greatest threat to human existence and our 
bes: effort is to improve the hearing capability of the Russian people It is OUI 
See Appendix F for written statement used in the DOD Press Release 
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rcnmmendation that the efforts of CTR should somewhere include the production of 
SUilbloc 4000 and really dark sunglasses to protect yourself from the untimely detonation 
of a nuclear weapon composed of material diverted from the real threat to world security 
the entire Russian nuclear industry 
Dismantlement 
As a driving force behind the Nunn-Lugar Act, the dismantlement of nuclear 
weapons has been the hallmark of success, and focus of effort, stressl-d by the Clinton 
Administration . By March 1995, the CTR has helped ", .. ith the removal of over 2,600 
warheads from various bomber and missile bases, 750 missiles are gone from their 
launchers, and approximately 600 launchers and bombers have been destroyed I I I 
It should be noted again that the number of nuclear warheads remaining in 
the nuclear inheritor states is not an exactly known figure. Most estimates place the 
level at approlimately 25,000, with a claimed annual reduction rate capability of 
2,500 warheads per year. However, considering that Nunn-Lugar has been working 
to reduce warhead numbe.-s for over three years and only one third oftbe reduction 
capacit)' has been utilized. The continued production ofW-G Pu and HEU, as well as 
having no available secure storage facilities for dismantled warhead material, is actually 
increasing the amount of dangerous nuclear open to potential diversion and proliferation 
The removal of nuclear weapons from states outside Russia has seen some 
significant progress. Ukraine and Belarus are the most positively referred to examples 
from \Vashington. In Ukraine, over 610 of 1,734 warheads have been deactivated and 
approximately 360 of these have been shipped back to Russia for dismantlement and 
s'.Orage!l' Included in these numbers is the deactivation of four regiments of SS-19 
silo-ba,ed ICBMs.'" Belarus has deactivated and removed more than one half of the 
"Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense William 1. Perry at the 
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations March 8, 1995," no. 115-95, Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC, 8 March 1995, p. 3 
Perf)" "Annual Report," p. 68 
"Overview of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program," point paper issued by 
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e;gjty-one single-warhead mobile SS-25 ICBMs. Belams is expected to remove the 
rcn:aining systems within the next year.ll' 
l( is reported by DOD that over sixteen hundred warheads have been removed 
from their delivery systems and nine hundred of these warheads have been transponed 
back to Russia trom the republics of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan It should be noted 
that another sixteen hundred warheads remain "active" in these three republics.m 
Kazakhstan is not discussed in detail in most of the DOD statements. Although 
sume to the 104 SS-IS IO-warhead silo-based ICBMs have been deactivated, there have 
been a number of delays associated with cominued missile, warhead, and silo 
dismantlement. The main issue still being negotiated revolves around Russian objections 
concerning the destmction of SS-IS silos and the role played by the United States in their 
destruction. Specifically, Russia is weary of U.S . access to sensitive infonnation and 
design characteristics Officials from Russia and Kazakhstan are negotiating settlement 
details. postponing further implementation of the SS- IS destruction program l16 As a 
result, CTR funding for "Strategic Offensive Anns Elimination" in Kankhstan has only 
o1:Jligated S167,000 of the $87 miUion proposed 2l1 
Office of Secretary of Defense, 23 Febmary 1995, p. 1. 
"Cooperative Threat Reduction in Belarus: A Shining Example," point paper 
issued hy OHiee of Secretary of Dcfense, 21 March 1995, p. 1-2 
Perry, "Annual Report," p. 64, 68 
"Second FY 1994 Senll-Annual Report," p. 38 
Mendelsohn and Lockwood, "US. Security Assistance," p. 25. See Table 7. I for 
a complete CTR funding list. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
A. SUI\-LI\'(ARY: THE REALPROLlFERATION THRIAT 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990's, it left a large nuclear legacy 
While there has not been a yard sale of Russian nuclear materials and weapons wo rld 
wide. What it docs mean though, is that there are now 950 nuclear research, test, and 
weapons siles spread throughout Russia and the nuclear inheritor states that are under 
marginal positive controls. These facilities were, for the most pan, kept in closed regions 
and cities designed to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials witrun a rigid, well 
ordered society, not a society bordering on funher collapse. The physical security, 
material control and accounting programs, based on the human factor do not adequately 
address tlus new, wide open milieu emerging in the NIS today 
The dynamic reasons that the USSR collapsed economically, politically, socially, 
and spiritually in themselves are inconsequential to the discussion. \VI\3t is important, 
however, is that the collapse has allowed serious criminal forces to fill the void left by the 
communists. This, combined with the rampant corruption the Aparatcht:k has come to be 
known for, makes combating these criminal elements more difficult Nuclear materials can 
be fairly easily diverted at numerous places in Russia by these criminal entities or 
disillusioned employees, which indicates a substantial threat of prol iferation. With 
unchecked borders and the t:ase of international smuggling, one might bclieve that only a 
small percentage of the nuclear materials moved so far have been ddected, and 
successfully seized. If this is the case, then nuclear materials are much more readily 
available then they were in the pas\. \\'hen one adds it to the phenomenon that there is a 
relatively large demand for these technologies and materials, the size of the threat becomes 
disturbing. The world has seen in the last thirty years numerous nuclear proliferators, near 
proliferators, and virtual proliferaters. There are still those today seeking nuclear 
technology for military purposes. This t rend will likely continue and should be addressed 
by policy makers 
What has been discussed thus far leads one to see the serious proliferation threat of 
today and tomorrow more clearly. \Vhilc the behavior of the international community is 
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CluciaJ in the nuclear proliferation arena, it is insignificant to this discussion. Why nations 
seek nuclear weapons has and will be debated hy Realists, Neo-Realists, Structuralists and 
all others who study the realms of international relations and interactions Rational actors, 
baiancing, international security, or whatever the reason or theory one supports, nations 
have and will continue to seek weapons. This is because nuclear weapons might provide 
them status or act as an advantage or equalizer to their "perceived" enemies and threats 
The bottom line is that one's perceptions are always one's reality 
Nuclear proliferation has not occurred in a vacuum. Internationally, the world 
community, super-powers, the United Nations, NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and others have 
through various treaties, accords, and international watch dog organizations attempted to 
prohibit nuclear proliferation. We have been unsuccessful in this endeavor. Of this there 
can be no real debate, since a little is always too much. Today, proliferation of nuclear 
materials has become considerably easier and with the loss of a bi-polar world, incentives 
to proliferate have become greater. What has not kept pace are the nonproliferation 
programs and strategies to minimize this source of weapons material proliferation and its 
threat to the world today, In fact no organization or program seriously addresses nuclear 
proliferation from sub-state actors. This oversight has, in the past assisted nations in their 
quest for nuclear weapons and will to a greater extent, continue to do so in the future 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
There will most likely be a non-peaceful detonation of a nuclear device, by a 
nation-state or a sub-state actor, within the next ten years. This statement arises because 
there are certain prohlems, commonly defined as "non-linear," that cannot be solved. As a 
result what must be done is to manage these un-solvable non-linear situations a best as we 
can. This will result in very specific and diverse solutions which are to be discussed here in 
greater detail. What will be attempted in the conclusions is to define possible non-linear 
solutions to the nuclear proliferation from sub-state actors problem, this is a unique 
approach since in the West we generally see problems as linear in nature and thus Ihe 
solutions will he linear also. This in lact is not the case for most of the interactions in 
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nature, the universe, and everything. In fact attempting 10 mold a linear solution to a 
non-linear problem may actually cause the situation to gel worse 
\\ie show thai the proper applications arnon-linear thought and Chaos Theory, can 
provide much more accurate and effective solutions to the very complex: and non-linear 
problems created by the spreading of nuclear materials (both supply and demand), the 
current Russian disintegration, and the inadequate US policies designed to address these 
threats 
Definition of Terms 
Linear - Jnvolves measurement in one direction only III mathematics it will 
iriVolve terms of the firsl degree. It will have the same effcct on a sum as on each side or 
part of an equation, Small deviations initially wiJJ no! cause large deviations, but rather 
very predictable dc\~ations in the solutions'" For instance, ballistics anillery 
projectiles' flight paths can be easily forecasted Changes in projectile weights, powder 
charges, and surface winds will produce predictable and accurate results_ They can be 
captured by a straight line and are easily solved. 
Non-Linear - Is much more difficult, esoteric, and obtuse. Expressed relationships 
are not strictly proponionaJ Generally non-linear systems and equations cannot be solved. 
In environments or systems, like social interaction, international relations, fluids, and 
mechanical, the non-linear terms are the features that people want to leave out so as to 
achieve a simple understanding. 219 
Without frict ion one has a simple linear equation that expresses the amount of 
enerb'Y needeci to accelerate a jet off an aircraft carrier. With friction the equation becomes 
complicated, because the amount of energy changes depending on how fast the jet is 
moving at a given point in time You cannot assign a constance imponance to friction 
because its importance depends on velocity. Small variations in turn wi!! cause significant, 
non-linear deviations in time. TillS is known as Sensitive Dependence Upon Initial 
Webster's College Dictionary (New York, Random House, 1991) 
James Gleick, Chaos (New York , Penguin Books, 1987),20-37 
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Conditions:'" or more conunonly called "The Butterfly Effect." The idea of a small 
butterfl y fiurtering its wings in China, could evcntually cause tornadocs in Kansasnl 
The real world is full of and only operates because of these sensitive dependencies, 
to fal-'tm them out because they are too difficult to manage easily results in inadequate 
answers or programs for very serious threats. These conclusions will provide a frame 
work to address these inadequacies and guidelines to, if not solve, at least contain these 
new and greater nuclear proliferation threats 
2. Carl \'on C1ausewitz on Chess 
In the West over the last few centuries, we as a society, for the most part have 
addressed our problems in economics, physics, hunger, poverty, military strategy, and 
ot'~er realms in linear terms. More simply it can be viewed the way we observe Carl Von 
Clausewitz's On War, and with the medieval game of Chess. Clausewitz viewed warfare 
scientifrcally, one could simplifY functions, hold inputs constant, take into account and 
measure unknowns such as "The frict ion of War," By doing so one could accurately 
determine or model outcomes in war or battle.~ The reason for tins again is that we can 
only solve for artificial linear equations and not real world non-linear equations 
This mind set produced the game of Chess in the West. In the game, one player 
moves their pieces across a one dimensional board attempting to corner or trap an 
opponent in checkmate, a position from which he cannot move one dimensionally from 
This is also the way we attempt to solve most of the worlds' situations 
.-\n example of this linear mind set is the United States War on Drugs We spent 
bill ions of dollars and provided national assets (ships, planes, and military personnel), to 
stop the influx of illegal narcotics into America This is the largest force ever assembled to 
fight a specific criminal threat, but since we did not target "critical nodes" of the drug 
Ibi.d 22-24 
Ibid 23 . 
Carl Von Clausev.ritz, ~ (New York, Penguin Books, originally published 
1832 by Vom Krieg), 162-167 
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operations, we lost. The smugglers simply avoided the billions of dollars worth of assets 
placed in their way and thus were never checkmated 
3. SUIl Tzu and the Art orGo 
Sun Tzu and the Chinese board game of Go represent non-linear thought and 
stlategy al its greatest. It is flexibility and movement that matter. It is not one dimensional 
or linear. There is no front and back, defense can and is offense at the same time Sun Tzu 
said "all warfare is based upon deception," the U.S . war on drugs had only predictability 
To achieve deception one must identify the opponents important "nodes" of operation 
SU!l Tzu called this attacking the enemy's strategy_llJ In Go a board of 19 squares by 19 
squares is used, moves can be made anywhere on the board in any order, unlike chess 
where moves follow a pattern_ Different pans of the board will be important and 
insignificant from game to game, just as different world threats will have different critical 
nodes. No onc linear answer then can address alJ or even a few of the potential crises' 
What Sun Tzu and Go give to the drug war are nodes to focus the war upon. A 
major problem the drug cartels had was the movement of billions of dollars in cash, and 
the eventual laundering ofthese funds_ This was not targeted but should havc been. Banks 
in Europe, the Middle East, and the Caribbean should have been made to cooperate 
immediately and the accounts identified and seized The chemicals, like ether, that is 
needed for processing could only be manufactured in the required quantities in Europe and 
the United States Deny access to these chemicals. The aircraft used to move these 
materials were manufactured in the United States. The modifications added to give these 
planes the range to smuggle drugs had to be inspected by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), which means this node could also he targeted. These are just a few 
critical nodes that could have been easily targeted but were not 
{'he smugglers on the other hand targeted the U.s. strategy_ They hought patrol 
and flight schedules to avoid areas of surveillance_ They flew around radar stations, and 
paid off law enforcement officialsn4 They simply did not fight a campaign that 
Sun Tzu, The Art of~ (London, Oxford University Press, 1%3), 76-89 
T;-anslated by Samuel B_ Griffith 
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complimented our strategy, and as a result have been highly effective The 
nor,proliferation regime must not also make this mistake. 
The solutions discussed in Chapter V, were as we see now somewhat linear in 
nature They havt difficulty addrtssing the chaotic nature of the international arena, 
regional security issues, and the mess created by the collapse of the Soviet Union With 
the collapse of the USSR., a whole host of new and greater threats are now available 
internationally. Each one of the following, nuclear materials, nuclear technologies, nuclear 
",-,eapons, nuclear experts, and the brain drain, all contrihute more uncertainty, friction, and 
noise to the proliferation problem. This in light of the fact that all the other reasons or 
proliferation threats still exist 
Many of the critical nodes in Russia and the other inheritor states evolved out of 
the greater long-term problems stated in Chapter II. With the social, political, and 
economic collapse the only real long-tenn solution is to fi x the internal society and get 
Russia functioning again 
After World War II, the United States saw the critical threat corrununism, as a 
philosophy, held towards a war ravaged Western Europe The United States and Europe 
recognized that they could not rebuild on their own and that assistance would be 
required~!S As an answer, the Marshall Plan was passed . It directed that Europe works 
together to rebuild, provided hundreds of millions of dollars in aid from the United StattS, 
and was designed to allow each country to rebuild her economy from the inside out 
Russia's situation is not so different today, they must now rebuild a viable internal 
economy. What is different is the U.S. solution towards assistance. The CTR and 
programs such as defense conversions do not give much assistance Funds it does provide 
arc spent on limited programs making hearing aides, dental chairs, and cola 
These endeavors may not be enough to move markets, create jobs or support an 
entire economic infrastructure, but may offer a place to start If the entire economy is not 
Rice, Trafficking, 145-151 
Pelling, Modern Britain (New York. W.W Nonon & Company, Inc. , 
1960), 
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supported and working then neither wjllthe social and political sections be supported and 
working, The United States could aid the Russian government in areas of government and 
security; police forces , borders, and anti-organized crime. This is, however, an internal 
problem that may require internal answers. One probable long-term solution is 10 let U.S 
and imernational business interests assist in solving the economic woes through joint 
business vcntu re~ The following trade agreement is a positive example of what could be 
done 
4. One Billion Dollars for Sixteen Satellite Launches 
Lockheed-Martin will be paying one billion dollars to the Russian Space program 
for sixteen satellite launches over the next two years. They are investing an additio nal $25 
million on infrastructure upgrades to facilitate these launches,"" This is ten times the 
amount that the US government has spent on CTR (NutlJJ-Lugar) in the last three year~ 
Lockheed-Martin is also getting a deal because to launch those satellites trom the United 
States, it would cost two billion dollars. These are the types of progr<lms that the United 
States must faci litate and push for because this is what the economy nl.:eds and will 
respond to 
Russia possesses several internal industries that can and do support entire 
world-wide industries. They have some of the largest oil, natural gas, precious metals, and 
old gro\.\th timber reserves in the world . Anyone of these industries, if properly 
developed, could immediately infuse hundreds of billions of dollars in hard currencies into 
the Russian economy. This is exactly what Russia needs if it is to continue towards a 
healthy political and economic recovery, Boeing Aircraft is looking into joint ventures 
with Ru~sia using the trade agreement in appendix E as a basis. The U,S. government 
could assist in future agreements such as the example outlined above. Giving financial 
assistance may be necessary but only offer~ a short term answer Lockheed-Martin's 
satellite venture is an example ofa long-term economic solution that benefits both Russian 
and U. S. economies and improves international stability 
Los Angele~ Times, 21 March 1995. 
91 
5. Concluding R«ommendations 
Short-Term Recommemifltions 
- Current programs such as CTR, Laboratory-to-Laboratory, and 
Government-to-Government should be continued and supported into the near future 
Thcy may provide the short-term stability necessary to increase US. and Russian 
cooperatlOn 
- Enforcement of the current nonproliferation regime should continue to be 
pursued by the international community, While imperfect in the past it provides vital 
deterrents and hurdles against those seeking nuclear weapons status 
- The criminal and corrupt elements within the NIS must be adequately combated, 
the United States and others in the international community can lend technical and training 
assistance when and where ever practicaL But this will only be successful if those in this 
region lake an active role in combating these elements and applies an et1ective rule oflaw 
Long-Term Recommendations 
- Most importantly, an internal Russian consensus towards international 
co-operation must become evident 
- The fractious political leadership must develop a working level of co-operation 
between themselves. They must be able to put together a vision for the future that will 
morally, spiritually, socially and functionally replace the lost leadership and guidance that 
was provided by the communists 
- What we called the Marshall Plan following World War 11 could be applied in the 
NIS today. It should be noted that arulUal assistance programs to Egypt and Israeli 
average about four to six billion. This is over ten times the annual level of funding 
authorized for CTR programs. Due to the potential devastating nuclear proliferation 
problem outlined throughout this thesis, U.S. policy and assistance programs may need to 
be re-evaluated to ensure the greatest stability for each dollar spent. This is critical in 
today's limited budget environment 
- Russia and the NIS possess large quantities of extremely valuable natural 
resources. Economically speaking these resource industries must be put to work. These 
arc industries that could support the economic tum-around that is presently needed to 
assist solving many of the system wide problems 
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- The United States should facilitate international 
ventures that will also assist in getting Russia and the NIS 
Lockheed-:'vlartin ex:amp1e above infused in one transaction ten more currency mlo 
Russia l~lan all the CTR programs combined These arc the programs that "Will produce 
gro'l'lth over decades 
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solutions that must be 
lfthey do not take the 
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APPENDIX A. 
ILLICIT TRANSACTIONS I1'OVOINING l'\UCLEAR MATERIALS FROM THE 
FSU 
This Appendix conlains a compilalion of reported illegal nw.:lear materials 
diversions for the past four years The list is not inclusive but will provide ample 
documentation of the new nuclear proliferation threat thai is the basis for this thesis. This 
list was compiled by the CIS jVonproliferation Project, located at the Monterey Institute 
for International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, California. No atlempl has been made to 
ascenian the veracity of these reports 
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I LLICIT TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING NUCLEAR f'o'.ATERIALS 
FROM THE: F'OR!'!ER SOVIET UNION 
A CHRONOLOGY Of' NEWS REPORT S 
May/ J une 1 995 - BULi.E':' IN 0 2 Tl'!:::: ATOM I C SC!E~T IS7S , " ';l'"id, Fi~sil", 

spoxes;ma" p"t."" Ondcr,,- stilted t1,at on 
4/ '- 9 / 95 
F i ona F l eck 
'Gc;c"ma:1Y denies i t sLilge d Russian " L ltonium 5:>.1",. · by 


3/23/95 R;;:UTER, "Ukraine holds e x-soldiers wit h uranium _" 
(:",:'01".,,1 Mykha ilo Sadovyi of Ukraine ' s I:1terior Ministry stated ::hat 

2( .... 1/95 - o"s~ DATLY DIGEST, NO . 35 , ?art L "Russian ::lVestigator ,s"ys 
t he' poor pay . 






increased is t:hat. for mon t.hs people worlc~ng at. r.uc l ea:::- facilities were not. 
paid their · .... ages and t.r.e theft of :lUclear materials could i mprcve their 
financial sit.uat:ions. Also, Russia lacks a syst.e:n of Me&A and physical 
protection t.hat. meets int.ernationa l requirements . 
.L2j';l40 - , HE FRAJ':X:-mn PEACE RESEA.'lCF. INSTITUTE "Vagabur.die:::-endes 



11/2/94 - REVl'ER. "Romania Face s Wave of Smuggled Nuc l ear Ma:::e rial . " 
This year alor.e. Rumanian po l ice have seized 10.45 ki l os of 
racioactive uranium and stror.tium s;nuggled ir.to the country and arrested 2 1 
people for invo l ve;nent in the i l l ega l traf fic. According to the head of 
Rorr,ania's organized crime squad , "All 10.45 kilos of radioactive material 
ca?tured so far definitely carne from abroad. but expe.::-ts have yet to 
estab l ish the o.::-igb. of e ach shipment _" ,he materials are believed to have 
o.::-igi::Jated in Moldova, Russia ar.d Ukrai::Je . (See also NUCLEONICS WE:E:K 
1:/3/.,4, p _ 17 _1 
11 / 1 / ., 4 - KOMME.'<SAN'T'. "Iadernyi gruz ne doshel do poluchatelia , ,. p_ 14 
C\,;sto:ns officials ir. Ore nburg have seized an unspe cified amount 0: 
natural uranium which was discovered on board a tra in at Sol-I letsk 
lerer.burg Province ) T"" uranium is bel ieved to have originated in 
Tadz:'1ikiSl:an, and 1:0 have beer. bound for I:he Saint Pet e rsburg - based 
IS01'OP. A spokesman for Orer_burg O_:stoms stated that the uranium 
detained oecause it had ne.ither the r"quired sa::ety documents , nor 
necessary p e rmit for r:ransporti:lg nuclear materials across Russian 
ter ritory . 

Pl.P". Ear-ly results at an investigation indicated t"at the materials 
originateci rr-om d i:ferent s tates of the former Soviet Union . 
1 0 /12/94 ~ THE FINANCIAL TIMES, "N\.!clear Arre!>t5 I n Romania," p . 2 . 
RUr:'.al'.ian autl-.oritie s announced that t:"!ey have seized 7 kg of u:::-anium 
a[; well as a quantity of strontium, both of which are be l ieved to have 
originated i:1 Ukraine . Two Jordanians have been arrested in connection 
with this incident, wnicn is the seco:ld int. e:::- ceptio:1 of uranium [;muggler s 
in a8 many weeks . [S ee also REUTER 10/ 1 2/94, "Roma:1ia Sei zes Ur-anium, 
Arrests J o rdanians " I 

9/23/94 r AtA PRESS RELEASE, "rAEA Genera l Cor.fer~nce Adopts Resol u::.ion on 
Measures Against I ll icit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials.' 
This reso l u::.::'o:c. by the lAEA General Conference asserts that national 
governments and a"J.thorities carry the main responsi::.ility in thif; field and 
calls UpO!1 lAtA Merr".ber States to "::.ake all nec~ssary measures to prevent 
illicit traff:'cking in n"J.clear material.' lAEA Director General aan" Blix 
expressed the agency's readiness to conveCle a round table specifically to 
address tr.is issue , say ing that lAEA assistance could b" expand~d in the 
areas of nuclear accounting and con::.rol, physical pro::.ectior. ar.d systematic 
repor::. ing of accounts of illici1: nuclear material 1:raffic.'-cing 

~~e~~~ i~~~~~~l~a~~~~s t;~ n~~o~~~~a~r·~:~:i~:~, a~~~~~~n~n~h~~n~p 
them . [See also FBIS-WEll 9/13/94, pp. 15-6.] 
9/6/94 . THE FINANCIAL TIMES, "Nuc lea!:' Fea!:'s Spu!:' Europol, " p. 2. 
European ll:lio:l i:lterior min;'sters are movir.g towards the crea::ion of 
a p,.n-Eurap~an police agency, motiva.ted i:l pa"t by fears of weapcr.s-grc.de 
ph.tonium smuggling from Russ ic. and the forme::: eastern black. Germany 
views the crea.tion at "Europol" as a top p:::iarity, while France a nc Britain 
· ... ant ::0 proc~ed mare s lowly 
The a l ~port equipment was developed by th" KGB duo::ing the time of ::che 
Soviet Union anc! tr.,,~efore , according to ;::his source. is LOO\- relLJ.ble. 

is as widespreao chr::>'-lghou t the worle: as other mi r.e r als. Not on ly c a n it 
not be c:.sed i n a bomb, i t cannot be use d i n a ny reactor" 
thf' MU:1ich Airport, ',.,hich cor.rained 350 grams of plutonium . 
SOm<! $100 
",fforts to 
p rograms Hl 
prOJ"'ct s . 
to the form<!r Sovie t repub l ics to fur t her their 
J a pan- supports denuclearizatioll 
tr.E'm to <! stablish their own concrete 
""ich radio,:ctive mat"rials have been leaking, a ta<::k tha t should be 
har.dled ::lY :L:ldivldua l countrles. 
international ",ffo!"tG to fight nuclear smuggling, along th .. l ines of t l,c 
bilateral deal recently worked Oc:t with Mosco'''' 
8/22 - 28/94 . LA T RI Bu"XA DE AC1'lJALlDAD (in Spanish), "Gcrr:ldny Dcce:cvcs 2 
Spaniar-ds To Halt Russian Nuclear- Smuggling." 
On August 10th, Julio Oro>: of Spai:1 and his Columbian par-tner arrived 
Franldu::::-t o:J. a Lufthansa flight from Moscow, only to discover that the 
of their 300 grams of ?'-' was the Germa,:, police the:r,se l ves: Acco::::-ding 
Ge rman sec::::-et service, several count :::-.le s a:::-e inter-est e d In the black 
for plutonium. (See a lso MOSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI no . 34, 8 /21 - 28/94, p. 
However, Director Johr. Simosor. of the nuclear research center at the 
University of Southarlpton questlor.s whether these markets would exist if 
the Genr,an intel l igence author i ties were not acting as agents provocateurs 
D". William Potter, Ci:::-ector of the Program for- Non-Proliferation Studies 
at the Monterey Institute, r.ctes thac in the past the maiori~y ::;,f tr.e 
pot.entia l ouyers '""ere journalists trying to ascertain it it · ... ere true t hat 
one could obtai:"! mlC l ea:::- mace ria l i n ?ussia 

do,,;; :1.01:. :::orrespond ::0 :r:ateria l s f!."om Russia's military arsenal [See a lso 
RCSSlISKAYA GAZBTA 8/17/94. , p _6_] 

ReperC:lss ions of Nuclear Smuggling Noted," p. 21, o!'iginally from ~~NlSATTA 
8/20/ 3 4, in ;'Endi. ] 


8/16/94 - EXECuTIVE KEv.'S SERVICE, "Ge::-man Pcl i ce L"nco vc:: Thi rd ? l uton:>-um 
Smuggi i :lg Case, " or ig:>-na :Cly i :l :<.EUfSR, Ha r !l.ld Schul t z 




centrifuge cascade at the Ku::chatov Institute in Mosco,,", or at th.:. 
enrichment facility in Sverdlovs k-44. 

IAZA director, is s<!!eking to . e[;~abli[;c clos<!! r cooperat:'on wit:h Russian 
J.ntellJ.g<!!nc<!! J.n collecting J.nformatJ.on about:. t:h<!! pro l ifcratJ.on and 
dcve lop:1lent: of weapons of mass cest:"uction, inc l uding r.uclear weapor.s . 
small quantity of 90 ... 
off of the premi ses. 
tran!Jpi.r ... d only several 
also rZVESTI YA 6/9/91, p 
in h is 
- WIENER ZErTUKG, "Vien:1a ; 5.7 kg Enr i ched Uran i n ", Di scovc:::-ed, 

Europe 

co,mtry's borders wit~ p::J land "nd Li tnU"nia, for the purpose of preventing 
r_!:e s muggli n g of a rms, drug,; and sc rlltegic raw m"teriaL;. 
4/1"'/~4 - J?RS - TND, " Secret rtep0rC ' Cited On Nucl e ar Weap0:ls S illeG ' 



[Se~ a lso ReUTER 2/21/94, 'TI ME 31'1/94, 
RCSSIISKIE 'lEST I #34, 2/25/94 and JPRS~TND 

1 /94 
er.viro""'ent a l cri",,,,s u n i t of the Genr,an 
ov"r the cOurSe of l ast y ear there were 18 





al:lugg l ing ucanium or" f r om the reg i on . 


be gen:line by a lab:::>ratory test. The repo"ters said tr.ey co,,- tacted the 
dealers together with British and Germar. tele vision repo!.""ters One of the 
dealers, "Gennadi," stated tl;at he could deliver 15-16 kilograms of 
plutonium-239 in 10 days. He a lso offered two " -20 missiles w.iL"""! ;;,uilt - in 
warheads. The agreed p rice for the plutor.i"::l was $ l S million per l;:i10g.::a:n. 
Ge:madi said that:: an advance of $100,000 was needed to pay scientists in 
restricted towns "'he:::e strategic weapons dis:nan::1ement was t::a.l:.ing place 
iluthorit i cs t:hat tl'.e cargo was 
of LibY>l:1 scie:1tists working to 
6/93 - ARGUMENTY I FAKTY 11-26, p. 4 
~"c b.ands 
Russian Federat: i on 'lice -?resid",,,t: Aleks«ndr R\lt~koi has accus ed <:-he 
Russian f inn Promeko l ogiya of illegally exporting "1."ed mercury." Tne 
firt:l's pres:'dent, Oleg Sadykov, insists that Prome!tologiya has filed all 
the oorrect docume:lts and notified al l neoessary officials He says that 
it i~ only.beoause of other, il l egal exporters that the governrr.ent has 
::-esclonded lots approva l of Prorr.ekologiya' s exports 
5/28/93 - KOMSOMQLS!(AYA PRAVDA, p.l. 
Ten radi.oactive isotopes and their "t ech..,ical passport"" we re stolen 
from t h e Nikitovski::' rr.ercury prodUction faoil:'ty Six men were arrested i:l 
connection with the inc:'de:lt 
5/23/93 . ~CSKOVSKIE NOVOSTI. "N'-lclear Materials ?e;:>ortecly Smuggled to 
Middle East,· p. AS. 
Investigations into the theft of urani'-lrn from an :Jdrr.urtia p l ant have 
uncovered an "enti:::'-e internatior.al synd:'oatec co:npri.si n g Russia. Belarus, 
the Ba l tic states and Poland" which transships ura:>i'-lm - 238 to Weste"n 
2urope. The plant has been :'dentified as the Chepetsk Mec:'la:>ical Plant 
[See also FillS-CENTRAL ElJAASIA 5/26/93. J 
5/15/93 - WASHINGTON POST, 'Nuclear Goods Traded In ?Ost - Soviet Bazaar, " 
pp. Ai, AlB, by Steve Cal l . 
Two citizens of Kazakhstan 
sel l LED fuel pellets tr.at had ;;,ee:> 
Accordi:>g ~o Western officials in the 
non-Russian f orm .. r Soviet republics A 
se!'lior IAEA official stated that the 
system " of tl'.aterial contrcl anc. 
rc~ublics . 
5/2.2/93 - IZVESTI YA, "lJkraina postavila Irany 'Josem' krylaty:':h rake r, " ;:> . 3 
Accordir.g to data collected by British and Ame rican intelligenc e 
reported in the Egyptian newspaper AL - AKBAR, Ukraine l<upplied Iran with 
eight cruine missiles. From Iranian borders, the missiles are capable of 
reaching any site along the Strait of Hort":luz, w;'lich connects the ?ers:'an 
Gu l f with the Indian Ocean. T"e trans fer ' ... as apparently part of a" 
agreement between Ukraine and l "an to "mode~'nize the army of the Is l ao\ic 
Repub'..ic of Iran.' 

4/ 13/93 - DAILY TELEGRAPH, "Sa i.<'! ty ?e .. r in Lirhl:aI'.ia. as CJra,,".Cl'" 
Disapp"ars. " 

""ucle"" center," ~he 3Se l:ero:cted ~h&t 
republic in an attempt to ;,."rch""e 
3/1:1/93 KOMSO~O LSK.AYA i?RAVDA, "Nc vse kr.orosho, chto plckho l ezh ;.t 
, . 
Three containers ',.,ith ccsiu:l1 -1 3 7 weighing a total of 16 kg were stolen 
from the Petrovsky Pl«:lt: in Dn"pro;Jetrovsk 

ana buy<!rs . 

;'1/24/32 • JPRS -?ROLIFE:<ATIO;J ISOiUEOi, ' Unenr ichcd Ur"nium - 231::l R"';oor:edlv 

Pola:ld. The m<J.tE'rial was stolen from a Russian :ni litary 
repo!:"tedly already bee:l sold t o polis!'. clien:cs fo r $500 per 

9/23/92 - hWLIFERA'!'IOr; I Ssm:S, " Tajik u::iinic; :r. s a l es to IriOn " llC3ed , " 
2) i ::;OM CHAS PIK 8/10/ 92 

Russia:> a.:-my bas<!s. en August: B, I;l l a:>s 
en.:-iched uranium to fo!.""<!igners wer" 
I talian busin<!ssmen w<!r<! arrest:ea on 
what is thought to be u!:"anium 

~~~ /9 2 - KOM.'1ERSAJ.'lT, \1 18 , "Tsirkoniy zal e :: !! l n a 213 mil:ioncv rubley, " fl. 
" o::ad i od.ct i ve llranium o::ods " out of Ukraine i:lto Hungary 
a:J.d ::he thieves th:::.-eatene d to b l ov,' up the material if tigh ling i:l. ~!olciova 
is not stoOlpec. 
~i~BI92 - THE WASHINGTON POST, "1st Russian Purchases App:t"oved, " pp. Ai. 
ha ... approved ::he purchase and importation of nuclea:t" 
including a Topaz II n,actor ilIed $6 mi lliO:1 wo:t"th of 
depCSlt:s 
Gesel lsc:haft fr Reaktorsicherheit 
'.)rani:lm was "not suffic:ien::c ::co be a 
Some iOr;!1 of scrap . The 1AEA os:ima ~ eE 
1AE.'> published a stat eme r.t cr. 2/27 
smugg l ing, inc:ludi"g tr.e 30 kg of 
~~e t~a~~~;a~o h:~f~~~n t~;e:~C~r l;o;w:oli;;;.~io; · ·,j;;;;;C :" '''''' 
2/13/92 - :-'-UCLEONICS "'EEK , " Hoax",s and 2 ~a'.lds P~cl i£ e~at ~ng P"ste~ Than Ex -
Soviet Uranium, pp. 1, 10-12. by t~a ~k Hi bbs, Laura Pilarsk.!., iCaro:"y Ravas z 
2/92 - DEFENS2 AND FOREIGC>' A=FAIRS STAATEGTC FOL I CY , SPEC1;,r, SECT I ON BY 
YOSS 
reject clau'ls ~ :'lat ~hey are selling 
nuclea.::- we:lpcn:; 
::::astern countries, reported THE CHRISTIAN SCI::::I'CE ~ONITOR ° 70 this 
27 t r.c,,"sand n°.lclear warheads in th", FSU must be ir.ventcried and 
including those s lated for destruccion through START , to preven t 
sales of these weapons ° 
1/B/92 - LITERATURNAYA GAZETA o "A ?inch o f Uranium ar.d Everythiny :'a l l s 
l2/1G/~1 - BBe, " Minist:cy W" ". !Os of ' Red Mc:ccLlry' On 31"c>:: Ma:ckct, " p_ 31 , 
troM Bl3LGARIAN TSLSGAAPH /\GSNCY 12/11/9J. 
lLl l garian authorities have Geizcd 'red mercury" from black ma r ket 
traders on " seveL'al occasions." 
12/14/91 - THE LOS A.'lGELES TIMES, " C'S Give s Soviets Proposa l s to Bloc;'; 
Nuclear Exports, " p. /\10 
The US has made concrete proposa l s to four Sovie " republics aimed at 
blockiny '.mautho:" i zed ,",xportB of weapons or t e chnology. 
CHRISTIAN SCI E~.;cE MONITOR, "Hav", Bon-b . 1-::. 1 1 Trav",l, ' p_ 19 
s~f~f~ards 01". Sovi e t nucl ear materla l poG e B a :nasGive 
POST, · CI/\ Director Wa r ns of Civil Disorcier Thi s 
A3 : . 
agencies involved .... ith .,'eapo:'! and misB i le 
World b ccy ",rs to k " ",p tr.emselve s : n ousiness 
APPENDIX B. 
.MAPS OF RUSSIAN NUCLEA R FACILITIES AND SMUGGLING ROUTES 
The maps contained in this Appendix graphically illustrate the routes smugglers 
freq uent in and around the southern borders of Russia and the Newly Independent States 
(N1S). Access to nuclear facilit ies and locations are also documented on these maps 
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APPENDIX C. 
BCCl CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY 
Appendix C contains testimony from Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations. The following excerpts from the full 
five volume set contain evidence of the Central Intelligence Agencies (CIA) involvement 
with the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), as well as BCCf's 
involvement in illegal weapons sales, smuggling of contraband (Drugs, people), 
assassinations, and lastly the movement of nuclear materials internationally 
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S. HRG. 102-350, Pr. 1 
THE BCCI AFFAIR 
HEARINGS 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
TERRORISM, NARCOTICS, AND INTERNATIONAL 
OPERATIO~S 
u.s. CONGRESS;· SENATE. OF THE 
If COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
.s..702"" 
UNITED STATES SENATE 
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS 
fIRST SESSION 
AUGU8'I' 1, 2 Ai'ro· 8, 1991 
PART I 
P .. inted fo .. the use of the Committee on Fo .. eign Relations 
u.s. GOVERNMENT PRlNTINO OFFICE 
WASHINGTON: 1992 
For we by the U.S. eo"emm..n! Printing Office 
Superinren&n! of Documents. Coos:re»iona.l SaJez Officc. w ...,rungton. DC 20402 
ISB~ 0-16-037256-9 
607 
The Honorable John F. Kerry 
Chairman 
Subconvnittee on Terrorism, NaIcot iC$ and 
International Operaltions 
Committee on Foreign Relations 
United ,States Senate 
Washinqton, D.C. 20510 
Dear Mr. Chairman: 
This is in response to your 11t:ter of M8y 14, 1~91 
regarding the Bank of Credit and ':ommeIce International 
(BCCl). I apoloqize for the leng';;b.of time it has taken 1::0 
respond. 
Your letter requested a copy )f· a I'I1Bmorandum prepared by 
crA that was made available to fo:r::l'Iler customs Commissioner 
William Von Raab, and information on CIA'S relationship with 
BCCl. We have now located a 1986..,orkinq paper prepared" on 
BCCL and an update of that pllper prepared. in 1969. While we 
cannot be certain. we be lieve'it is likely that the 1966 paper 
is the document reviewed by Hr. Von Rub. The updated version 
of t!lis. paper was clearly dissemi\1lIted to the Customs Service. 
BeC5use' of the e%tremely sensitive n!lture of this information, 
we will- make it a"'Bil~ble teo :reI!, throu;h th:o Se .. ata Select 
Committee on Intelligence. I have provided the :,twodocuments 
to Mr. George Tenet. Staff Oirector of the Intelliq'ence 
Committee, and I have askea him t, make them IIvailable to you 
or !lppropriately clellred members <:.!' your staff for review in 
the Intelligence Committee's secu _ '" space. 
Our Inspector General is curr'-'ntly reviewing the matter of 
any CIA us·e of BCeI,and wiU pro',ide a report of his findings 
to the House and Senate Intellige)·ce- Committees. 
If we ean be of any- further aL~istancQ in this matter, do· 
not hesitate to contact us. 
Silicerely, 
/"j",.{ ,fc, .• ;) 
Williar., H. ·Heb,{ter 
Director of Central Intelligence 
12H; SIOlIr of lml 1 erim~ i ~ FUll f~r .. : . 
No'e-tlerl1.1H1.Thursd!y.Finll!di tiDn 
SECjjO~ : F i ~ s: Section; i j 
LEWG 'i H: lBC'rgres 
~HDl1HE: Hell. IS CcnsulU"t: 
HellS to Ocerale ~n lnter~.zt i ou l C{I~su l tini Firm: 
A Go·Bttwur. for Ir~" i l" Bus inessu 
BYL1~: : By Bill Ricftuds, .i15hin~ta. PaH Staff . rite r 
BODY : 
ForHr AI~ISSIdor to Iran Ritlllrd '-. HellS hIS o~efted an interutioul 
c o n~u l t i n' f i r. here .hich he Slid ,estHdal rill con.e"tntf on deytlo~in; 
bus iness interuts in the Dr-ited SUtes for Iranian co.~.nits. 
Melu, 6', uid, ·1 ~igilt be I go-betwn~ or re~ruent Irui!nintffuts who 
roull! lint to de sOlftning in tai~ country: He ' ~lid he nned hi$ ney consult;n; 
busiMU the Sifter COlplny becuSf Slfur luns ·lIblsslde( in the Peniu 
lIngulgeofF"si. 
Helcs us fi ned tl,OOO Ind giwen I two-yur sU5~eftde~ suttnce ~ov. Ilfttr 
he pluded nc CO~teSl in federl l court here to t.o tounts 01 fa il in; to test ify 
fully I ~ d Icc urate ly beiore , Suate cQllittee C~lIS i (!eriag his lIOIIint ion to be 
nblSSIdor to Jfi ~ in I9fl . 
Tht ~~If!H IS, i~st HeilS were re l,ted to ~is tuti.ony o~ two occasions 
tldon the Ser"te forei~n Rehtions tOllittee. HI testified that til! Central 
Jnte llige~c;e.5my, wllich he foraerlyhuded, hid not interftrrfd il pclit;~1 
aihirs r~ lIt<~ ,: :~: ::te ~ •. qe!n President Saludar mend!. 
HelflS' no rol. as aresputivt ·gc~betw~an· lor lflnin interest seeking 
businU$ in the United Sutes could ~on i ~ly ubr~il lIil with the U.S. 
r!guh, ions govern ing conflicts of interlSt f~r forlH feoenl egloyfes . 
tht U. S. tri~ inll tcae prohibiu formr ;overnent noloyfu ftL'll t.lk i~t pitt 
for I~ lent O~ yur in proceedinlS icvohin; fore igD Indiyi~1J.I1s ar 
corPcOTIt ians whI ch ,iiM hn hllen ueder tllt ir offitill rtl~on5ibiljt,. 
Hi llS offiei ll!) resi;nd frol his lraniln .. blnadors~ia Jan. l! of this 
,elr. Leil) uperu ~ele unclur yesterda, w!lttlltr HtllS' role 15 ublsnllor 
would r,ne ;i~e n bi. sDlcifi~ ruconsibil:ty yndtr the U.s. eod. fer Iranian 
lirmJ 01 DtrSOIlS ~oin~ busineu hffe . 
. ~~lls Slid he IJrleO ~IS consult ing firl Oct. 3 in U50tlltion lIit!! Irnian 
busineSSlln Rlhll M. lInn\. Ir\"lni i$ an uec~tlve of tbt Melli Ildustrill 
Sroup ir,Tehrln. The ;:onlulti ng flrl hu not rlt1ccntedlnycliuts. ud 
HellS 51i: ht hl$ M[ ngisured hue u ,lobbyi5t. 
'J '. Q~ i tt al;ferl~t frci I lobby Ist br n id .. , ' . not tryin, to iDfluer.cl 
our 90¥ernlent or GH c~unt" . ~I I J' . ti;i "; to Co 1$ helD our tllue. of 
ol,~e r,u. · 
,,,Flot·id>lofrices. 
, ~Ia~"'ln Hanccxk 
~r as th., head of 
t o la""d e r drug 
dm'l drug money 
'r: or ",one r had 
e bank told the 
thi> deposit and 
At. th" sa"e tiC1e (he bank ct"elf "nd a ' ·a rlet,· of ""count,, 
... hi e", hev e b een lnden'.ifi~d ,,~ drug accou n ts ,,'-11 be seizen her" 
ar.d in London and ?ari.s. The s"i.zures should·to\.~i. ,"are t.han 550 
;nilL.on dol) " r" if the poLice are lucky. 
The ope ration is b"i.na; run by the cu"t.o",s sen·i.ce The Cus _ 
SCP'ice , th e Tr"n~ury Depart",,,,,t and th" Justi.,, ~ Del'a:-t"'''n\. 
h ... ve a joint pr"ss conf",ence. I'll' · und" rs t.andine is th .... t 
are "orking on snappy !:raphi.cs and an "tabo",at .. s~o,", . 
7hi~ is th .. ""nte rpiece of a three ;".r~ drl,:!i: ex,,,a"'''I''I.,.,,,,," 
~et for n"xt """k. The other peices invoLve la,~e scal " a.,r"~t" 
directed .. t the Jatllaican posses and a ,ound"p of l ... ,)(e ",mu/(-
~ Li"g o,ga nizB.tion. All of this i.s ~imed t.o the ThurSday 
debate. 
Th e Customs opera~ion is the re"ult of a t«o j"ea~ st::.,, \! 
opera tion. Offic.ials of the b""nk « e r" lured i.nto ... hou se i.n 
'''tllp" !:"igi:"d up as a recordinc. studio "he ,e· !I. vari e ty of drug 
deals "ere proposed and tra.nsacted. The, ind·ict",ents ,,11 :,cotlle off 
the t.md",ove,"ork and do not ,,,,, lly ti" ·tb.e bank b" ck lo· ·""ri.e!':". 
Further, tb.e investigators hav" a !!o,""what Li. .. itcd kno~l edr:" of 
the· bank's s b.areholde rs. business ""ctiviti.es and athe, con ... ec-
I-,f' a; r "~ d. to the dela,v and. told. t~," [)"p ... r~m""t ,l liI' ' ,f! d,cl 
." n t Lo 10 "'n~·th "'S; to end"''' I1 '''' til,,;, I 
.'t ',hat ,-; .. " I t"l~ed '-0 Ja" ':agl', Lh~ 
u", ,"mpa officI! about tn" ,",sse l t.<,l<! 
"'II. L ian a .,au L ~or Le ga' $ i", ","l""'''n '-
d"scnb .. the iot .. rn"tional up .. r a tions 
,-"" U.S. Atto~n"y to look at the iarge r 
[n ~ubs "qu"n t convers a t ian", I ~na r e d 1l 
" ilcki~ound information ,.bout lh" " ," 
; "ont j nued to de\'e lop i nfor ... a~ L ' c. :i "" '" . " "o,-, ~" 
r",. ... ",. hi : h lev cl off,,,el' "ho " ,,-s "0' ,nval '_- " d. 1" t he c,",r.".Lr.ai 
a"ti~lty but ~ '.<5pected it "as gOln~ 0" and Llu,t Leea""e !,,, dl~ 
nat like "hat th" bank '-'as doing . 
The attached dacultlent~ a nd the depositlon 5~ould ~i."" you a lL the 
i n fo rmation you :"teed. to h" nd t e the press inqui~les. In OIl' ~eih' 
OnCe A" a n is /l rre sted. all our promises about keeping- his ma"-~~ial 
confi eiential a~e off . I plan to cnl 1 Altman short Ly after the 
ar('es ~s and tell hi'" that a ll bets a~e off 
'th ~ only pi e ce of infarOlation .. iSSlng from to., packa ge ,s a bout 
tlla ath .. r P"kist!!.nis /lnd ttoo aff:'li !!.t"d companies "ho .... il l he 
tak~n do .... n at the sallIe ti .. e. Th."v are Capcoll! 'in>l.ci"l S .. rvice~, 
Ltd. a commodi ti es broke~ag e fer,.. with off",e" in London. Miami. 
and Chcc a go, "nd it s President :;r. _~kbar as wel l as " London 
based tra ding ca"',,"n), rUn by .'1~. Ali. Slla;" . 
C"pco'" b o,,",n e d by the Saudi. G"ith [-'haron ... ho fin " n" ed Akba~'s 
ent~y ln t o the business. Peopl " "ho know Pharon "",,e ce rtain that 
h .. "ould know th" t the comp""y "as engaging in illega l "c tivL';.y 
beca use he keeps hi,. inv""tmen';.s unde~ very close "atch. Ii" h " ,·" 
.,et "ith Hr. Akb".r:- on ';."0 occas ions he lied a bout th ,,':-naturc of 
his activities but ga.v .. us so",e gene" ... l tlack1("ound. 
Ali Akba~ "as the "an "ho ar- r "nl!'ed the billion doli a r- loan to the 
,overn", .. nt of Nigeri '" He developed close rel"t~onships "ith the 
Mi gerian government and "e believe is i"volved in the launde ri n !! 
of heroin ",on .. ,. tbrough )./e" '{a,..k and Lagos . 
\/e ~ hould release the detail s of t~e ban1,'s de,,1ings .. i th 
)./ori " ,a, the A""'n tra nscript, and the t' o r"'ieg a hot"l bill,. . '{ou 
,.houtd ask toh,. the , avernment didn'~ do more to tie up !'o~Lega'5 
)lote that the S"i,.s gOv e r-nOlent h",. decid",d. not to cooperate in 
the t .. keda"n ,,-nd compl .. in .. bout _ the Swiss l a ck of coope ration. 
you "il the 
In "'l' vei" 
is ,.at",i"l 
r after th~ 
te c" about 
ho .... ill '0" 
1 Se rv ice", 
ndon, MilL",i 
1 activity 
h, We hav e 
',-nature cf 
oan to th., 
" with the 
launderinl 
i"ts wi.th 
DIs. You 
Noriega's 
p" r a te 
ration. 
2S 
,~,~c. . tll" t th- S:>u<l ia .. ho O"n the b"ok -are 
Fi. ~sl .... "' .. ric~r. inliashintlon, This "ill 
, .. ~~ " l l hou~h Lh .. pr,,~ o; ~'ilj be '· e ,·v aware 
Th'5 [,,,,,1< h~~ "Ius" c"n,,~. <,;;.. i on" "'tl, U, .. l!O"~ .. ""e"t ,,( 
~n~ ~~e ~c>p p"uple in :hat ~O"~'rtl"e llt. The P"" s id(·n~ "I 
~ceps his ""count 'dll, th" l>an~ and the bonk lS .:los .. 
SiKe,ian, (i,overni!lent. 'lot." the internalional i .. plicBtinnL 
1'he,_blinl',.is ,uninsured a nd "i1'l "'ost 
s('izu~e and Ute ,,,,d hcc"",,se it 
wh;~ the bank ""nnot m"e' .. Lu~ e .. bou~g 
financial instiutions and "0 centnd ""nk 
Sote lhA t k e )· Saudi ShA,eholtiers were , n'o \ ,""d '" I' i ';alle i n , 
~:~~:;~:n~he~o:e~~e i~,:oSl·,.e!n e;s::~:~~ ...... ~~~~a ,aa;"s~s i ~h: Sq,,~~~:~;' 
of "he~her ~he b .. "k has intel Li.t e nce con"ecti.on~. 1 So"rc,,~ in 
t.he intelligence co_unity hAve sai.d on "n off the recorel b!\si~ 
thBt it does have connections.) 
Th~$ "ill be the largest financ;al sCll.nd,d in "arid h,~or)" and 
r epeats a pat':."rn "e h!\ve seen _before s ta~tilll': "ith Bernard 
Cornfeld in I.O.S. follo"ed bY,Ve sco then Nu:: en Hand Ba n i, a"d 
Bishop R ... "ald, lOS "a ... a ,2. Billion dollar offshor e fund. this 
i s 'Ii s2.0 bi.llion institution_ 
You ",ust alert the debate prepara tion tea ... tha t t.his is ..; oing to 
h"ppen and prepare the., for' i. t. 
We should take credit fo, finge,ing the situation and cle!\rly 
... ke the preas look Il t the big picture rlLther thZUl f ocus, on t.he 
bust.s and the bad guy transac t ions , 
YOu at"e set .. ith NBC ro~ Tue"da.y and the TodlLr show Wednesda )' 
morning. 
I would stl"ess the questions it .l"aises " nd insist on' full in"es-
tilation of the related companies, a nd the "t.h., .. conne cti.ons to 
govern .... nts. 
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aCe! '> u ... ery S ll"O"!!" " e l"lion~h,!'s in China and 's s~.<l b~ ~he br!l~~t rOt'-
L'i l' n b"nk ope r,,!ion in th ~ t country ? ~ rl 0[ the "~l- e ng'l, eI ,,, " e ialio n ship IS 
cased on lhe relation$hip be ,"'e" " th e Chinese a nd th e ;oak,sta"" and the politicft i 
connections betw""" Ab" di a nd Pre sident Zia ..... said thfl ' , .. he n Ab,,,1; IISd hLS 
heart " llllcl< Zia .... as told about it and l"ft his dinner IJibl e ~nd ! 'u e Sls to , 0 to the 
hoSp'["! to be .... jth h,m. 
_belie ves that there are ' '' lrional r ecord."; ,m t ."." 1", 11 " d" posit r~lation­
ShlP~ "Ihieh are kept in Miami beesu. " th., account e~eculi\'"s are p"id on a P" ,-
c ., ,,,age or the deposits .... hich the g e ne,."l.,. The region must know about the r e 
d ~P05it9 no mauer .... Oe re they are booked so that th .. indivldu" l ~ ,nvolved can be 
rew" ,ded appropriately. 
! asked~ the ope ration wan s imilar to tt,,, Kornf e l<!-I·e sco lOS SClI m of 
be 1970's and he "id that it was. The diffe,ence is tha t the ope ,Htion II" .. Lak<m 
th e fo,,," of a bank , .. ther th .. n a rout,,»1 fllnd a nd the l ecn:-llque a for ",ove ing 
mon ey have become more !!OphiBticateci that the salement c" rry;n \1 slliteases e",ploy~d 
b y Kornfeld. 
alulI! Observation: The S"nk appears to be bo th a r.'aJOr ,"oneY launderir. &" 
operation and to have n,lation .. hipa with the inte lligence community. Much of wha t 
waa ducribed by Calvo ClIn be verified b r getti", the Bank r"cord .. from the Miami 
office and from the individuals involved. 
The key players are: 
2. Bank of Credit and Co"""erce International Oversea~ i.imited, Mt..lIli 
Agency 19th Floor 1200 Brick .. U AVenue 
3. 8 .. nlt of Credit and Commerce, Latin ADlerican Re!lion. 15th floor 
iin and hiij family yesterday. He has two vtlry IItimctive;-lntelli· 
f~t. ~o~d~i~h~f[ee~s "h~~~r~hf~j~r;s t~t;n:~hsa"i;S s~~t~~isri~~;'~~ 
back of him. She is American. from New York, lind is also feeling 
the tensions and pressures of what has happened to their life as a 
consequence of this. 
Therefore, we rea!ly mad" a decision that because of the threat 
to physical safety, and because of his own personal feelings about 
the need to get this behind him, that we would proceed today. I 
IT::n!l~h t~~:~ lheSe;o~l~~ ~f!lp~~e!~i~nf~~~~:d.w~~d Sed;;t: 
Brown, who cannot be here because he is on a trip out of the coun· 
t" Let me just review quickly for the record , the BCCI road that we 
have travelled to this point, lind then Senator Cranston has ssked 
me to read into the record a few comm~nts of his, and he has sub· 
mitted some questions. 
i''irst, we have learned a lot about BCCl to date. We know that 
BCCI WIIS a bank whose senior officers created a web of corruption 
that extended literally around the world. Second, we know that be· 
cause of its unique status of being located everywhere but regulat-
ed no where, in the context that most of us think of bank regula-
tion, BCCI became a natural haven for the movement of narcotics 
money or the proceeds of crime, or even for nefarious deals. 
Third, we know that BCCl's chief officer, Agha Hasan Abedi, and 
others systematically developed ties with leaders around the world, 
:~~ro~o~l:el~ ~:~tifa~so~! ~nn~u~~~~fi~dor:'"l\i~~~ t~t:Jt;·~~I;i~ 
~~Il~r~~::~i~gh~~~r~~e~ ~r~~;;fa~~~nle!rs~St~ l~::a~i~:~~~~~a}~nd~ 
of the kind that General Noriega had. 
Fourth, BCCI used its political ties to obtain open control of 
ra:ciry,b:~~s ;~roe~n!~r!l wO~r~~h;\~~k~!hi~hP~: ~~v~h!e~nC?~ I the case of S number ofoonks here 10 the Umted States. Fifth, foreign and domestic intelligence agencies developed close ties to BCC!. We know of some of those ties, though not all of them. Knowing of BCCl's criminal acti~ities, the CIA and other in· ~~!ey~':\~tndl::io:d~e use of BCCI fo r a variety of purposes, 
Sixth, we know that law enforcement and regulators in this and 
in other countries had a certain amount of information, substantial 
~~i~r~al~~~e~:~:9A~d!~c:{~~t i~: e~~~~~~0:~1 tt~t~~~s~~u~~I~} 
~~~i~ i~~-\~~~~ hj~~henf;o~~ M;;:,\~hd~~~i\h;;;e~~l;"ed to haP.pen 
Seventh, we know that Bdb is a~ instItutIOn whIch lost bilhons 
of dollars, and we will hear somethlOg of how that happened this 
bt~i'sAre~J~~:~i~~ll~~~~ i~u~o~i~n~:sret~rsst~~:~\~~IYw~Und~~~~ 
that leadership and the extent of the knowledge within the bank of 
that. And that this loss or series of losses were hidden in part by 
BCCl's practice of obtaining substantial central bank deposits from 
governments all over the world. The collapse of BCCI has already 
threatened some of these governments, and it will be some time 
before the full extent of government losses globally will be under 
.too<!. 
Eighth, we know that the accountants a lawyers hired by BCCI 
wound up helping the bank to conceal the true nature of its activi_ 
ties for some time, and that that occurred even after Serious allega_ 
tions had arisen about criminal activity. The consequence of these 
facts, largely hidden until recently, is now demonstrated daily 
around the world. In India, money laundering rackets involvmg 
BCCl and aides to assassinated Indian leader Rajiv Gandhi are now 
under investigation. t In Pakistan, issues arise about B.CCl's involvement in its illegal nuclear arms development program 
In Egypt. the Government has closed HCCI on money laundering 
charges after a run on the ban k 
In Argentina, as a result of hearings which this committee held 
last we"k, allegations have been raised that ~CCI was brokering 
the sa le of ~'rench Mirage jetll to Saddam HusseIn. 
In Cameroon, a Government with few resources now has even 
less as a result of BCCI-related losses, 
There isn't an American who doesn't understand the impact of 
the drug problem in this country . It's a problem for all of us, bul 
~~~:M~ki~=og~~ ~~o~~~~n!i~~~t:~~'ndo:~eu~o~eT~:~~·r~addofr:u~ 
clear ,,:eapon~, ~e~dless t.o say, creates even greater risks of con-
criminals. A big part of this problem is that BCCI ca-me to believe 
that it could buy anything and facilitate everything 
We have learned a lot in re<:ent weeks, but I m~sl say. to you 
what sln kes me particularly is the degree to whIch thIS bank 
~~fnl;hia~scoau~j ~t;;.~!~;~~~ a~~r~b~~C~:~r~~:.t ~hyir ~~a~~~h ·B~eci 
thought it could buy everything_buy lawyers, buy accountants, 
l 
~~fet;,eg~~a~~~tec~~g'n, ~~dS:~e~u~u;o~i~~'e. b~~d ~h:ri~~~~id ~ldt 
buy or did not need to, it could facIlitate. \ 
You need a Mirage jet to go to .Saddam Hussein, BCCI .could fa· 
cihta~e it. If YO.u wanted weapons In the flI lcieast and possLbly even 
~~~~Icfr~~~~~~t~l ~~!osadf~ rl~~ec:.llJ&1~fl J~~e ~:~t ~~~~i~:~~Yt~~ 
te~r~d·~~,ll~:r~~~~t~~~ek·~'h[~a~~~~~\f trying to understand what ~ 
happened with BCCI and w~o was responsible. And hopefuUy, out 
of all this will come a s~ronger effor t b'y government and the pri-
vate sector lo prevent thIS kind of behaVIor from scarring the polit-
ical landscape, and the business landscape. 
Mr. ~ahman, we are very pleased to have you here today. You 
are an lIltelhgenl and thoughtful person who has spent a lifetime 
really in the field of finance and who understands this bank as 
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under very difficult circumstances to uncover the truth about BeCI 
in that country 
Yesterday I spoke about a Financial Times juurnalist whose 
murder a few days ago 10 Guatemala may be relnted to hl~ own 
probing of Beers ties to arms smuggling there. 
Now in Argentina Mellem has publicly ~ebuked the.rnllckrllking 
Buenos Aires daily new~paper, Pagina 12, In a way whIch appeared 
to harken back to the days of Argenbna's authoritarian past. lie 
has attempu.d in the crudest sort of way to smear Pagina \2 as an 
organ of terrorist and drug peddlers 
Pagina 12, which was recently written up in Time Magazine for 
its innovative and inci~ive reporting. has been giving o)(tensive cov 
erage to the BCCI scandal and its effecls in Argentina. It has 
sought to inve~tigate crUlrges already in the public domain about 
involvement by Menem family members and friends in the drug 
trade. 
Finally, it was Pagina 12 which unearthed the go·called Swiftgate 
scandal. an apparent attempt to extort an American company in 
Argentina. The attempt was aHegedly made by a top government 
official. 
I know how criticism, especially that from the fourth estate can 
hurt, but President Menem i~ way out of line. I urge him to stop. 
Before we begin I would like to place into the record documents 
just,received by .the committee as a result of a subpoena of nCCI 
records in MiamI. The 42 pages I am submitting seem to bear out 
some of the worst suspicions about BCCl's role in international 
arms trafficking. 
The pages describe in a luxury of detail French Mirage III1H's 
owned by the Argentine Air Force. From them we !earn that these 
planes were "modified to Argentine Air Force requirements follow. 
inl{ years of combat ell'perience " 
We also learn that tlwy are constructed with O"lte wings, have 
aerodynamic airf10w fuselage, are powered by an improved and 
augmented ATAR 9c5 engine, and have a maximum air speed of 2 
mach. 
According to these documents, these airplanes include wing odgo 
stations modified for Sidewinder and Shafrir missiles, making them 
very dangerous instruments of war. 
On page 34, why BeCI has these do<;uments, papers whose details 
suggest that somewhere they might be considered II militllry secret, 
comes in.to focus. All spares and r~pairs, the docur:nent on page 34 
says, "WIll cover 2 years of operatIOn at the orglllllzatlOnal and in 
tcrmediate levels. Long·lead items will be identified immediately 
afler program go ahead to flssur" endy procurement action." 
The next page tells us that "ground support equipment will be 
provided for all models of aircrart." Adding, "The AAF·'-presum· 
ably Argentine Air Force- "wil! provide an engine test cell-porta 
ble." 
tol~!~ec~~n~~~ct~:i~I*~~~ ~~~~~~;~, "!~:d1:~;o:~~ r~~~t5,i~'t~~ee ~A~ 
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"After completion," it goes on, "the flight training AAF is pre-
pared to provide a pilot in the customer Country as an ad"iser for a 
defined period of time." 
And concerning packing and crating, page 41 tells us that, "AAF 
will pack and crate logistic Support material and store it at Rio 
CUarto, Argentina, for picking up customer country." 
Mr. Chairman, these documents e:d9t. They are in our hands. 
They come to us from the liquidators of BCer in Miami. The .'Ie. 
quence of pages is as r read it. But in fact the best information was 
reveal.ed r!~~.t ~ere ~:m p'~e 2 down in the righyhand corner where 
whew these weaPons w'ere headed. 
But this is the 80rt of activity by this international bank that 
plainly cannot be tolerated. We have to understand all of its rami-
fications and then Cope with what it takes to prevent this sort of 
thing from happ(ming in the future. 
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 
[The information referred to follows:1 
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.. 
it; :;~~Mi.;BiIl>eiSi violated the laws of the CIJntral American coun 
: ,.tries--at le1lB~r Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. as weI! 
as'the United States. He has recently been indicted in the southp.rn 
district of Florida, and a copy of lhe entire criminal compleint and 
the indictment will be provided and made a part of the record 
That indictment relates to coffee smuggling and prep;'lratjon and 
filings of false income tax returns. Hi~ accountsnt was also indict.· 
ed. Mr. Bilbeisi. you should know, is presently residing in Amman, 
Jordan. As anno.unced to the world press, he does not intp.nd to 
return to the UnIted State'S. There is an issue as to whether or not 
he can be extradited 
His codefendant, Mr. Gruschoff, was active in the 
hi., tax returns, and the books and records which .C:,:.;:;, ,;"',C 
ped imenl to the unraveling of this task, as well as 
and record~ of BeCI 
Now Bank of Cr"dit end Commerce lntP.rnetional, S.A, and its 
affiliates had two branches: one in Miami on Brickel Avenue. and 
in Boca Haton, FL. Mr. Bilbcisi was a direct reason why the 
Rawn branch was opened to facilitatp. his commercial activity 
that bank. Indeed, one of his relatives, Yahkri Bilbeisi hilS 
and is, today_although the b,mk is in receivl'rship, flS we all 
~~ !~s~:o~r~~\l~:r~~~d;~c~c;~;tA~~ahn~vJeor~::~wed, hHs 
~uo:a hl~~~I~~~i~~~f~!'~~hn~h;;~i~:t ~~~~i~;~~: 
. .. ~~", cash pay· 
commod· 
~oy!U rejected-the underwntf'n; at LIoyd'!l---both claims, on 
groundll-- brieny-----(lf fraud, and false· swearing. The documen 
t"'lion supplied by Mr. Bilbeisi, particularly in 
claim demonstrated on its face that there were no 
there WeTe no contracts of sale; all that was given were a 
cashier's checks. 
I wish to stress that even though we were involved with litiga-
tion against BeCI as a nonparty witness, and Mr. Bilbeisi as a de 
fendant, we are not here to try our case, but rather to convey infor· 
mation we have learned concerning the operation of Bank of Credit 
and Commerce; and, the U,S. Government's response to what we 
oht"ined through subpoenas from grand juries 
We do not purport to have knowledge of all of BCCl's operations 
;n its network of 69 countries. We will limit our remarks to those 
trenaactions wh ich involve Mr. Rilbe is i in criminal conspiracy with 
the bank's operations in Miami, in England. and in AmmHn, 
.Jordan 
The documents produced in the litigation, since lnS8, that we 
have obtained from the hank at differen t times. from Mr. Bilbeisi 
and his corporations at differp.nt times, a!1d from third-party wit-
n~sses, exceed the size of a large warehouse 
We have attached 10 the variOllS records that we have, II frag 
mentary selection of SomP. of lhooe record5 in order to demonstrate 
the issues of coffee ~muggling and arms violations here today 
On thp. fir~t topic of arms dealing, you might ask: what is the rei-
evam:e of an arms dealer to contracts of i!1surance"! Senators, that 
goes to thp. moral h~w.rd of the appl icant himsp.lf, and the ohlign· 
ti?n and utmost good rai.th t)l.at an applicant for insurance disclose 
IllS trup. activi t ies. Mr. Ullbmsl did not do thut 
We have documentation that there are at least seven, separate 
trans.actions of major arms shipments in which Mun,thIJr Hilbeis i 
was lIIvolved with weapons either obtained Or s\lpphed from the 
~1:Aat~~~ll:~~~rsm~d a~n~lfo\5~~~~;~s~d El Sal-
vndor. During the brief, 1969 soccer war between Honduras and EI 
Salvador, Mr. Bilbeisi sold small arms or light armaments to both 
El Salvfldor, ll.!1d attempted, and did sell some of the ll.rmaments to 
HO!1duras 
The second transaction th.~~ ,!,e ar? awa~e o.r began in 1974. Th is 
'rhis becomes significant, since in 1978, Mr. Bilbeisi once again, 
became involved in a sale of the retrofitting of the entire core of 
British and American made tanks, which the Jordanian Govern-
ment decided to update to b<J on a position of equivalency with the 
state oflsme\. 
That contract resulted in a claim by Mr. Bilbeisi and his corpora· 
tion-and still one other shell corporation- to seek, in the Ameri-
can courts, in federal court in Michigan, commissions over $7 mil-
lion. All of these fI~cts were not revealed to the underwriters at 
Lloyd's 
We know that during the years when insurance coverage existed, 
beginning in 1983, and before the filin g of the false insurance 
claims in ~986, th.at Mr. ~~be.i;',i.,~.ad a lo~er op?~ati~e ~f. the Cen· 
there were attempts also, bi Mr. Bilbeisi to sell wuapons.-These 
proceeded, ultimately, in 1985 by further attempts by Mr. Bilbeisi 
to sell weapons to the Contras through Adlofo Colero. 
In 1987, in the midst of the litigation that, and the investigation 
that had resulted from the present claim, Mr. Bilbeisi attempted to 
~:!l g1~n ~hi~rfio~e~o?!l~te;:, J~~~'maa!~ ~~t~i~~~:Yl£O~ ~:~;~~; 
purposo bombs. 
Mr. Bilbeisi attempted to finance this sale of American manufac-
tured arms without the requisite State Department and user certif-
icates, through originally a $34 million letter of credit. This letter 
of credIt was initial1y issued, but was not completed by Beel in 
Amman, Jordan. 
Despite the efforts of several intermediaries on Mr. llilbeisi's 
behalf, including a former consul general in Miami, and several 
Guatemalan generals, all of whom-as of last week-are now 
under indictment by the Republic of Guatemala. The financing for l the complete transaction fell through Mr. Bilbeisi set up a $5,175,000 letter of credit, nllming BCCl Miami as the advising bank for three, of the quote, end of quote 
. "civilian helicopters" which were manufactured by 5ikorsky--S-76 
helicQpters, in the possession of King Hussein of Jordan 
Mr. Bilbeisi admitted that these obsolete, Jordanian helicopters 
were obtained for approximately $2 million, and were later sold to 
the Republic of Guatemala for some $5 million. 
Discovery has revealed various facsimiles from Mr. Bilbeisi, and 
his intermediaries in Guatemala contllin!ng a list of various Guate-
malan public and military officials, including the brother of a 
., . ,- . _ .... ~ ... - to 
These assumptions are corroborated by the issuance of BCCI ~heh~e;:~echae~~~~ anS~!dth;n~~~n;a~~ITe~s~~ i~e !rl~ti:~,li~cbI 
Miami received the $400,000 assignment of proceeds from the letter 
of credit when the $5.1 million sale of the helicopters was complet-
,d. 
In pleading~ whjc~ L.loyd's has filed se~k!ng s,a~c!!~n~ in the 
~~~t!,ill~~~an~hf~~im:l:~v~~~~~S~o~~~t!~:teg!le:a~nt%~~~~~~~~ 
switched, for which he sought insurllnce coverage. 
Our investigation of this insurllnce claim for a coffee loss cell' ~~i:1n i~/ful~=Fv:1~'r ~ii~c~a~I~~!~e~~I~hi~uEl~:t:;:l~. \~ t:~f p~r~ 
chased from Guatemalan brokers, stored III Guatemalan ware· 
houses, and trucked from Guatemala to Port St. Thomas de Cas-
tillo. When the coffee arrived in the United States, the marks on 
all of the bags were changed 
The greatest resistance that we received was when we began the 
gla~~h~~ ~avse~~ndt~~e:~e:ha~~~p~~t t~h~;:if;~~ea~ri~~u~f~~: 
coffee in Guatemala. We determined that the bags were falsely ~:~~~~~~tmt~: lc0Jfe~~d f~~:~b!~C~h~fi~'ri~d a~: li~~i~~!tS~ 
Bilbeisl and the ~ank had attempted to block this investigation by 
initiating and then completing a partial arms shipment 
His a documented fact in the southern district of .Florida that ~~~~~s~ethta~t~~;e u;:::~l~~egm~~~; ~~~ Brlb:"~i~~'J~~~~I~i~i~t 
torneys to bribe our attorneys in Guatemala City, which led to-~i~ha~~e a~~is~~~t ~r:-~ t~~:t;:C~;drn;t:::~~:Yb;~~e;~s ~f~~~tib~~: 
Department of 1ustice, the Drug Enforcement Agency. Those tapes 
were filed, of record. 
The fallout from the completed sale of these three, overpriced 
and obsolete civilian helicopters, involving kickbacks to Guatema-
lan generals and other officials, has now resulted in widely report-
ed, national scandal in the Republic of Guatemala and, the indict-
ment not only of the former prtlsident of Guatemala, Vinizio 
Cerezo and his brothers, but other members of the military 
I would like to turn for one minute, now, to an explanation of 
the coffee-smuggling scheme. As we all know, coffee is one of the 
most significant, important commodities in world trade. Because of 
the existence of the International Coffee Agrecment, Senator 
Brown, in 1982 through its termination .in February 1986, there 
. ~ . . er __ "'-- ~t~~e~I~~~i!t~~=i::~d 
Orion Systems, inC., 
_ buy coffee in Central 
as nonagree.ment coffee, and then sell it in the United 
States as mOre expensIve agreement coffee 
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tu~ga~rall~t::~e ~t~~~:X~u~·:~~n;~t~~t~O;~p~ ~:~heab~~p~:~ 
well all some of the lawyers 
Mr. DoUGHERTY. I think, Senator Kerry, one of the problems that 
we've had has been the blocking of our investigation, as your com· 
mittee, with records that have not been produced or represented to 
be ~~~t~~e~:Il~~a~~lrili!~eji~~~a~~!~;~o~ 1~~aSt~h~~~ghout this 
hZ~;\:h~ ~::ew~;~~t~~rorl~:~::t ~o~~l: ~f~e~~~s ;~;~~;t:~ 
some of those records. And we understand the stonewalling. 
But it is very, very hard. There has, indeed, been a sort of insti· 
tutional a\.Qnewalling. Because you are running into it with the liq-
uidator!!. You run into it with the court. You run into it with the 
bank, and with a lot of law firms 
One of the great difficulties is that obviously a law firm can say 
~:~~~~J {h~ y~urtk~?~~;:~::e fe~~~~~~n':~A~'d\~~uW~~eg!i~ 
ting there. Ani! unless you have an in8ider or somebody who is spe-
cifically telling you what document you are looking for, or where it 
is, you do hot know until vou get further down the document trail 
that there may be more documents, or that it has not been fuJly 
forthcoming. 
Or,that they have been shifted, cleverly and quickly, from BCCI 
Miami branch, to London, or to Amman, or somewhere. And I am 
convinced, at this moment, that there are an awful lot of docu-
ments out there that tell an extraordinary story that are sitting in 
foreign countries, liS a consequence of the delay here in seizing and 
in moving, and in investigating. And you are paying some of the 
pr~~iSO~~~;yWdirfrc~rtr~~~t~ileOf~~~:e:rice of it. 
Mr. DOUGHEllTY. Senator, can I make two points with you? 
You, on opening statement, referred to the issue of Iraq, and 
arms transactions. I did wish you and Senator Brown to know that 
~ ~~~ds ~hs:tre:wrt~i5~1~'!1 r~sin~ls~v~d~l~c~~~b~~~'r w;er~is~ sian-to. show that Mr. Bilbeisi attempted to sell pllrts for F-14 jete, American-made Grumman F- 14 jets to Iran; that there are records that show that Mr. Bilbe1Sl,1n Hollywood, Florida, during 
the Iran-Iraq year, Senator Brown was receiving inqujrie..~ from the 
first minister of Iraq to attempt to buy. American-made red-nye, 
side-winders, other surface·l.o-air missiles, tanks 
We even knew- when we were investigating early-the telex 
traffic, to show the coffee shipments, We came across a telex that 
showed-an incoming telex to Mr. Rilbeisi 's office in Boca Raton 
from South Africa, offering to sell enriched uranium to a Middle 
East country. 
~i~a~;\',~~i:T~'.1~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ i~ewi~'~~~i~;:t~l:xes, it would 
hiwe ,to be argued that it was either Irllq or Iran. That informlltion 
was given to two FBI agents who looked at it before our involve-
ment and confrontation with Iraq 2 years ago, And there didll't 
really seem to be any interest to tlike the totality of all of the 
pinel'S of n mlln who rI~ims to \w n r"rrr" Hw",'h,""l 1','1; ,('<1 who ;s 
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receiving incoming telnx traffic for each coffee transaction in Cen-
tral America, IIny interest in 20 mm cannons, armored personnel 
carriers, tanks-none-with a man who did have a former CIA agen~ working for him in the coffee busines~; and at different times 
a retired Three-Star Army General travellmg with. a coffee smug. 
gler to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, dunng the times of 
the-what is called and referred to as the-Iran Contra Affair. Senator BROWN_ Y"",j,, nnl _ A __ "" .' • - J 
"I 
--._'" ... "'"'" U"~'" c. InaL was his pla-n~--"" ... ,~., " ' " ""J~ 
That that man, upon his retirement from the U.S. Army, who 
went .from an NCO to a Three-Stllr Army General, from South 
Carolma, suddenly appears at Mr, llilbeisi's residenc~, lind· at-}{~~;;'_~a!eO j~!OFo;:~r~~.r.i~.leB:lbci~PRd e~~lo~'~:,~kii~h H~n~~~;; 
GUatemala, and E Salvador 
We have his SWorn statement here. The folJowing year, Mr. Bi!. 
beisi attempts to sel!-{)f listens to Adolfo Colero's shopping list of Soviet·made weapons 
Now, the question is, when this information is. hrollght to the 
Justice Department, and there's absolutely zero mterest; with a 
man who flagrantly violates the U.S, COOt" who U,S, Customs 
knows is violating sections of the U.s. Code, why? And we even ~:l:~d~~w~h~~hiv:~o~sc0&r. o~ii~~p~~t ;f ~~~a~~~i;~,m(~t o~~ 
issued by the Salvador!!, by the Government of E! Salvador's em-
bassy in Geneva, arising out of his activities in seHing weapons to EI Salvador. 
Now, what is a Jordanian in a false name using a Salvadorian 
paSsport today? How did that happe~? How could that all happHn, 
without the United States ImmigratIOn o.:.partment, the U.S. CllS. ~~i~~~! ~~~~i;~yD~~~~In!'lIth~r:gnt~~~~at:~~igit"cdt!gj~~{' ~~~ ~ab~~ke~h':!a';,o~i:.tingUiShed United States Army officer attempts 
&mator Kf:RRY. Do you IUl\'e any idea how-how do you know 
that a CIA man or former CIA person went to work for Bilbeisi? 
Mr, DOllGHBRTY. His name is William Toten. He lives in "Iexan_ dn~e was subpoenaed' to glVe testnnony I year ago. I con. ~t:J~f~~(lO~:~~ ~~d~i;ea~t~~Z:Ya~~;~~;Ut~~~: 
worked for the agency, and staled_to save a lot of time-that he 
would not permit me to ask any questions concerning the length of 
his employment, ,what he <:lid with the Central Intelligence Agency, 
or what he did With Mr. Bllix,isi selling coffee shrimp. 
And Senator Brown, there is a-in a record that we received last ~eek_a very simple document called Decodin~. And it's a vertical 
hne that lists commodities like coffee and shnmp_ And you corre late it to weapons 
Nnw 1I'lml il; n 
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qu!:fi~~~ta3!~i t::r~::d at~::!'ikr~n w!a~~ng~~'te1 rh:wct: 'fw\~: 
and were informed that the report did not exist. th~~;~~t!fh~a~~~fW;Jde~~~~r!r~Ct~~tl~~~~ CI~~;f:~~ 
Committee in n classified form, on the ground that it contained 
"extraordinarily sensitive information." 
When I received the report-and I say this as somebody who TR< 
spt;cls the notion that there is incredibly int.elligenco-oriented, sen-
sitive information, and it doea exist-but when I reviewed the 
report, just 85 a matter of common sense and some basic judgment, 
r must tell you I found nothing, in mr. mind, in it that could be 
c\aasified as "extraordinarily sensitive, ' let alone anything which 
justified it being clo.saified Ilt all. 
It contained the revelation that the CIA knew back in 1986 that 
BCCI secretly owned First American and had told Federal lawen· 
forcement of that fact. That fact has since been declassified by Mr. 
Webster prior to his departure at my request fi~ fohre r,::!~~n;h~~~W!:~~, :;l~ ~~s~, o:r!~k\y~fO~de:~~nh~~t; 
understand. 
Subsequent to that, my staff, who were cleal' 
level, requested a. br~~,fi~_g,~~_~h~\:h~ .. ?!:'-.~_~i':. 
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working with him that there. had been some 90rt of relationship 
that had been created 
Mr. Sakhia, one of the top oflicers of the bank in this country, 
also testified that he was contacted by the FBI for help in unravel· 
ing the involvement of Beel in arms sales to Iran as part of the 
Iran-Contra Affair. • 
There are documents which we have obtained independently 
from BCCI that confirm a participation in planned arms deals in 
ellterday, we learned for the first time from Mr. Altman that 
his bank, in fact, was a depository of the CIA, despite the fact that 
the CIA knew that First American was secretly owned by BCCI. 
These are the connections that obviously raise questions. 
no~f;;~~~a~~;e ~n~!ow~e~te~~~~~~t ~r t~~icr1~9mna:~y~~:~ 
bank accounts and to maintain secrecy. This committee respects 
that concept, the chairman respecta that concept, and I understand 
that there will be a need to have Borne testimony in private session. 
We wi!! do 90. 
Th~~i~;r~':ne:~~n:i;~f: i:i~a~;sSffi~r~tt~~u~:i~s eifhrr~~~c\ 
to the "culture of criminality," as it has been referred to by the 
Bank of England though the Bank of England, obviously, didn't reo 
spond t6tfi"at any too soon, either. Ihe qliestion is whether or not 
in the course of State Department efforts and 90 forth there was 
BOrne knowledge of the bank's criminality and some failure to act. 
th~;r:d!r atlfef~~~9!;;d i£.s ha11c\~~rt= aUb~il~~r=p~ ~t/! 
~v~f ~~fe";rn~:~o~ta~~i~d~h:~ ~ a~i~~ia~~i~i ~~t~~~or~: 
retrospective made available. 
So, this is fact finding and not finger pointing. I hope all of you 
will help us to understand exactly what took place here so that we 
can try to make some judgments down the road. 
I welcome all of you here and look forward to your testimony. r 
understand you will have some opening statements, and after that, 
we';h; ~~~~~e i~~hd t~;, ~~~W;ri;,g~ith you, if we can. Then, after 
your opening, I'd like to get the openings from the State Depart-
ment. Then we will come back. 
Does that empty chair represent the gulf between the CIA and 
the State Department? 
Mr. KERR. No, I think it's an accident 
Senator KERRY. It's an accident. like most. All right 
Mr. KERR. Quite simply, I didn 't know that we were going to 
haS:n~~~ ~~~R~r\~err:c~~:lI;,Tljr!~'t, either. But we welcome 
you. Thank you. 
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,. it" V8/")' mixed emotjon5. I'm writing you thjs l "tter to 
inform you that I h .. v", ioppllo!,d for a position wi th eh" Drug 
Enfo,-cement AdminiSltretlOn lind h .. ve inform.ally been advised 
ot my 1mm1n .. nt "ppo.intl7lent. Although I -am "excitedabout 
embiilrking on J!a neWC8reer 'IIith the CiA.-· I regroat that "th.a 
c"nditl"ns th .. t c .. u •• d .lIIe t" con.ider optIons to my c .. reer 
w.lth Custom .. still e)<I511;. AS! I prepJ!are to le""ve the lUorld of 
U. S ,..." <= .. 'C~ 'O, : r"pe -:,-: .. -: 1 1'1 5;:;':';: ii:;, .. :: wily <r,y : .. ;;,.~,,~ ene 
s .. rvic:.; .. "'Ill 8iv€i you .lind. m""ny oth .. r~ the strength to 
confront: the inad .. qu.,cl .... nd injustices that have led m'l, 
and i~ l ... ",dlng other respected ag1;!nts, to I"av'l th .. U.S. 
CUgtomfl Service in North Fl"rid.!l. Due 'to thll natU:-1I of the 
p:-o~lllmg i. n Tam.,a, 1 Qnd ot"lIrS f"el 1;n«l . "v"lI"ity of Tampa ' ,,; 
r- ... " ..... 1"'m .. w ~ll ., .. <;- ,:>" ......... S ... I.,. .. .-I '..,10""., "' .......... i f ir., .... , ' ,-
<:::a.t'8er,. ",I t h Cullitoms . 
i am not ,a dilllsrun tied agllnt I have received outo,;"tanoing 
.. valuati.onll throughout my nInt_ .. n (19) year car@<'!'r as a 
Spec".,l Agent. I 've recilived innumerabJ e awards, and I hav,," 
t"'icil! be lin recognized ""ith national a .... a/"ds from the 
ASS<':Ic lation of Feder;al Investigators. I don't re:fer to my 
rllcord tor any reason ot"er 'Chan 'CO al;1;empl; 1;0 lI ... t.ablilOr. .. 
b ... ls 1rom whH:h an impartial Judaa of tact&: car. weigh my 
credlbil.i";y. 
There are •• v.ral key perlllon".l ... 1thin· and outSide of Customs 
",ho are net Influenced Oy the "1"IIIIt.oorkil"lll" ,and m .. nJp· ... lat10n 
in Tampa; lIlr'ld I .ncour;age you to expHJre these mat:ters: \Ill th 
In ,;.11vJdu .. ls 1I.KIII U.S. Cu8'toms ano 
~:~~~t;:~e~~ ~ ~o~t~~r~~~ ~~~~a~:C:~~~~~ i-tor ' ...... _ ... , ;21 ••• '.. ' ... ~ 
___ His sup",rior prof.Sllllona'li~m_ ' .. nd -1II.l'las.ment .1<1111;0 
.. re the major r ••• on fQJ" our successful tr181 preparation 
concerning thl! C-Chas,," defendants. - Jotr . . -Jackow.kl WIIS -the 
A91!1i5tant O. S .. Attorney that 1iIuccessfully ,Ruldl!d.-' C"';'Ch.l!l!!!l1! 
through i1:''!! .::over1:. ",.. .. -trl .. 1 and ·trial ... tage. ov.r • four 
(4) yea/" pert<;>d. 
r k"o,," th .. t my formally .. dvlGing you of th .. dClp~or .. bll! 
conditi on . In T.,moofl eQuId ClOY .... s;ome ind.tvic:!Yal~ 1n my ne\ll 
prof ws5_1o" ... 1 ,;::lrcl. to qUll5tioro my loyoit:r, but it is Si,~ply 
ou': ot my lov", for thi!!! country and .our cr1tlcal need for 
atl"\1c .. 1 government that I think 11::5 appropriate to r",,.pond 
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~o ;~n., ~~"~ll!!y-!I request: fe~ my candor. 
""'~';' '-otl""8 OUt l:he arQ .. t~,.~ r~"'PQc~ for tI">9-",i5$"'"'' of 
~ne U , '5. C"5tO",S S .. rvlc", ".,d 1 am espec,ally proud to have 
s~rv\l.d In -1:"" "'''. on dru8s" with many tin. ",.n ~nd ,"omen 
_!thin CuS:t:om!< Tn .. aChl"""mGnts th .. t .. -e heve ", .. de in r"mp<I 
~v""- tl'it odst tl-r ..... 1' •• ". hill"" 0"." ",..,d. d."pit_ '1:1'>. reoeat .. d 
,,"d"""""'''1 of our worl< ·by certa,n 
;:>""50",...1 ",he a ........ ell kno",'" within the Custom," S.rvlee to 
-, ... ,'! :;.llo",ed ~ "eir actions to tll!! eorn.lDt:ed til' a number of 
~ ~ f~r,~~~::~!::~ :~:D~~~:!~~"~~~~ n::n~~~~~;.~~ :~:O:t;7 ~ 1i ~~-'''~ 
,,"orality and legality of the Custom!l S.rv,c. In North 
Flerid... Mor"l~ .. nd ", ... ningfu) productivity in the effie. is 
at an all ti "'" 10",. int."-"'jency relatio"!ll'Iij:l!l ar!l !lP'la~e" Oy 
"",ser""""t, lI"d \:1'1", r~l=l .... tatio" C .... stom~ 0""', had .. '" • pr.mi.r 
~ .. c .. r .. ; ag"""'y P'I "5 ::lee" de~'troy"d 
~::~l~~:/~:~n OP"I".tiO,", cililed C-Chaiie "'a5 t .... o-tWs 
t,...,n5for",ed tP'le "'otives of managem'!!nt deci!!ion!l !rom .. 
., ... lthy rIIentali'ty SUidl!!d by tl'l. i."t.r.lOts; of the iovernment 
':0 .. dystu""'tional leadership gUided predom;na"tly by 
oer~on .. l OIg",nd .. ;; if it P'ladn't been for tr.e " ... rly t ... o y .... r" 
o t ..,eP'l,evem"""t prior to MarcP'l 1988. 'the ultima't. ou'tcom. 
,"auld .. 1;;0 P'I .. VIi I:> •• n losot. TP'le outcom!!' at the CJl"' •. ","'1 1. 
,", c'tatll"" . "'CI!I considerably less tl"la" what it. could. hllv. be""n. 
T~, .. indlc'tm.nt. of addition""l d ... t."da"1:. and 'tl"l. ~ .. lzu,- .. of 
'!iu tlst<lntially mar .. drul ~roceeds was los't. directly .as a 
res'~lt of th .. OIPplic.tlc",: of Inadequate resourc •• by _ 
___ ro ·the inv .... t1aatlon. Tl"lls o~lnion 1s !!Il"lared by 
i"divlduals meaninaf ... lly involved in "tne suc;ces ••• pr' •• l"v .. d 
." ~r-,in O"eratlon C-C" •••• · includlnJil the lead , prosecutor (See 
"'':t''cP'l'''en't A, ... eroQ or AilSA l.ekow",kj page 4). 
Th~ .!!rO"~.Jnad"Qu.cl.'lii! I"eallzed vi~ the ov .... t in ..... tJ.,_tiv, 
':'1-'"'.: .. 85 ",i"':"l,' O~.~ ... a1:1.:Jn C-Ch .. s;.;, "''''9 fOreC!J91:, i " writing. to 
~'c"'!",·,,·,"!',"-.'!',,-.-, ~~~~~~~~l ~y~~j~ tr-,~,.,~"~~t~~~:<lo:"":~~ a~~ others 
:0 p .. ~fe5sionally Q"press ': 01'1':"""'''5 aoout O".,-.t.lon C~Ch_ •• . 
v, ... n,e ,;,.,aln of <;ommand. III ... r" unforrun ... taly "'i.interprs"':s::! 
by <1.5 a per~onal affront that b.c.me 50 
"· ,",'-·.,"".;,li::t~,j "'"."" j1: ",r .. cipita1:o'":d "OthtnlO bur "indict.ive a" ·.oj 
:-::·~i" .. H =~;~~~~~~ ~~~~~"~_~:a:~ci .. ~~~':~ .. ~:~. "! ';~;~:r~.~~.., 
- ':Or."" "'''''';'';r'"m"",..,-:: at c.,t;.:ai mat"ters to .... nq ..... li.f1"ci 
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,"i-"'"!::!I to,' p .... rso" .. l r ••• o!'._, ti'\us unde:rfll1n1r"1B eastly 
a'C'!:alnable ",ajar goals, 
- n" •• c:rat:a.-y ror 1:"'0 y ... r_ ,. . 
- the dril.t1<; un d ... rs tattina ot serHor "'isn't:,. 'Or .... ly 
_ ~~~~~=:~~~d j:h~~~i7~~ iI ~t i ~~~~!~!~~ i:::~r~7~or . aClC 
acti.ng supervisor •• '1;1"" .... tll!p.d.lnll. eonslstency . 
lilth ("!!II,.""';!: t:Q mylOe!! . , hOI .. : 
1 ) ~~~~~P:~~~r;~~a~~~~:f OM, :!I .mpt bee_use ~ g~~d O~ai tn 
,1I"d ;;oppropri .. tg actlOns conflIcted ",it;h _ PQr'ion~l 
, "' ,. ..... goal .. 
2 ) attempted to cO<lr.; .. manasltm<'!!lit; pars';>nnel to 1 mpro;Jerl i 
.. ri d , .. ,,'1t .. ir!y ", .. It'::"'!:,, my .",ploy ••• ,,;l1u<l1: ion . 
3! att"mpted to Illegally br-OiI.,.;h thQ doc'tor-pOi t i lt n t 
1",,',,1:'\o"."i;;> bet", •• n .. do.;1:o.1' ilnd ""!!, a. well ... tr.. 
relationship be'!:"' •• " thili same dOC1:or and my wIf .. 
4) i mpropot .. ly prevented '"'I super"lsor t ... om "Ubmittlng me 
fa ... a fJnanci.l i1", .. rd. 
~l Jie~ '=0") CU"'I'::om"'l o ....... on"ei .. nd a fo ... eign afficl .. ! ,~ 
., ::<:: or~"ent m ... t ... om r .. oreo: .. nt~nE! U.S Cu"",=oms 
-'t an int.rnation .. l seminar 
S) made talse and c! ... r og .. t:ory staterne",=" to C ... lOtom'ii 
emplo)/<!!'es and to .... lin l .. w enfOrCerM!!"': .... u'tl"lorl'tl." 
rel.!!tl". to my mental he.!!I,::". d .. sp, te having soee; tic 
inform ... ti on to t"e co"trary from a Qualified 
professi anal. 
7~ denied mli! 'trle r","'OU"'CIUI and p ... iv!edge .• nor", .. lly 
extended to S/A''!I , thu" ;mp"ding my abil i ty 't:o p,.rform 
my dutili!I> proficiently. 
liI""'_'O-,-t ·O~th-.·r ::~l ~;~:~. 5171 ~:~e ! ~~~~P~~t~~~~~! ~~ !~tl0 n5i 
co-wo!"l<er ... '::h,, ':: .. o ttons. navo! incJuded: 
- .butiing __ po ...... by o.usini an IImoloyee to be 
audtt<!!'d by th. IRS for ,.mju5tJfied r ••• on •. 
- unt ... irly oureuln, a c tions concerning al l eaed 
mi50COno.UCt. 
- , 
, - . 
- --
~ 
- - . 
i="Or the ·sal<e ot my r;u'iitQmS cOlle.luliI,", I wist'> the ",nUlar,a"'''' ''' 
",etion'" Infl.l,;;t .. d UC>Oli ,he C-Cl"la!l" InvliIstig ... tic" were 
:~:~~::~7c ~~~t~:::r:::Jt°!~~~~~~~~~~7~~~:: I :~:::'~~~!;~~:~~ ,:n ~ 
dY!lfun':l:ional'" I .... dersh,p 
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APPENDIX D 
FY 1994 SEMI ANNUAL REPORT 
This is the Second 1994 Semi-Annual report issued on nonproliferation in Russia 
Its focus is upon the destruction ofnucJear weapons in Russia and the NIS . It is used here 
10 show the minimal effects this program has and its short-sighted nature 
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SECOND 
FY 1994 SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT 
Submitted in accordance with Section 1207 of the "National Defense Authorization 
Act of FY 1994," P.L. 103-160 and the "Department of Defense Appropriations 
~Y1994,"P~ 
October 30, 1994 
INTRODUCTION 
This Second FY 1994 Semi-Annual report provides details on the 
impleme nt;uioll of Cooper;ltive Threat Reduction (CTR) program activities to 
facilitate weapons destruction and nonprOliferation in the former Soviet Union. 
The report is submitted in accordance with Section 1207 of the "National Defense 
Authoriz:.ttion Act of FY 1994,", P.L. 103-160, and the "Deparnnent of Defense 
Appropriations Act of FY 1994," P,L. 103- 139. Commonly referred to a<; the 
"Nunn-Lug:tr" program, the report addresses the activities initially established 
under Section 108 of the "Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and 
Transfers for Relief From the Effects of Natural Disasters, for Other Urgent Needs. 
and for Incremental Cost of 'Operation Desert Shield/De..<;el1 Stann' Act of FY 
1992," P.L. 102-229. as amended, and Section 9110 (a) of the "Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act for FY 1993," P.L 102-396, 
This report covers the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program 
activities for the period of April I, 1994 to September 30,1994 and cumulatively. 
The number of eTR projects has not increased significantly over the period, thus, 
the focus of this report is on the activities undertaken to implement existing CTR 
projects. 
CI'R prognull activities,include Dep~ent of Defense .assistance to fonner 
Sovierr~publics,[O: ;" 9 . ~t{(),ynuc1ear. ,cherrucaland weajJOnsofmass 
:::i{~~lJl:~~'~~1~~t:~i~~~ti~it1f~' 
such--:~~p~~." . _iniual 
\ 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
sUn-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, l!HI~ - september 30, 19"4) 
ON THE PROGRAM E:STABLISHE:D UNDER P.L. 102-22'> SECTION 108 
(By Project) 
($ in Millions) 
DolERGENCY RESPONSE TRAINING!EQUIPMI:NT (a!:LARUS) 
Anpronririoo 
Research, FY92 
Development, ,'Y93 
~~~i~a~ion 
Military 
construction 
Union Threat 
Reduction 
FY92 
FY'13 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~. ~
PROJECT pr:SCR"TPTION: The Agre"ment Be tween the Department of Defense of th" 
United States or /\merica and the Ministry of Defense of the RepubLic of 
Belarus Concerning the Provision of Emergency Response Equipment and Related 
'{'raining .in Connection with the Removal of NUClear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons 
Delivery Systems waS signed on October 22, 1992. Assistance, up to $5 
million, provided under this agreement will facilitate the expansion of 
emergency response capabilities in connection with the removal at nucl.aar 
weapons and nuclear weapons delivery systems from the Republic of Belarus for 
d.astruction, and thei r r.alated temporary location on the territory of the 
Republic of Bel«"us pending th.air final removal. 
COOPE:RATIVE THREAT REDOCTION ?R.OGRAM. 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1991) 
ON THE PROGRAM. ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 106 
(By Pro ject) 
Appropr; at; on 
Research, 
Development, 
Test. ~ 
Former Soviet 
Union Thre"t 
R.eduction 
($ in Millions) 
Total Proposed 
Oblig"t i ons Obligational Obligations 
~.QD.U!~ ~ ~
PEQUieT DESCRIPTIQN; The Ag~eem"nc B"cween the Depa~tment of Defense of th" 
Unic .. d SC;lces uf J\.me~ica and U,e Min ist ~y of Det'ense at che Republic of 
Belaru s Conc"~ning the Provision of Assistanc" Related to t he E:stablishment of 
E:xporC Control Systems to P~<lvent the P~olireration o f Weapons of Mass 
Dest~uction f~om the Republic of Belarus was signed on October 22 , 1992. 
Pursuant to this ag ree;"ent the Oepa!:tment of Defense is to provide up to S2.26 
million in assistance in the deveiopment of Beiarusian expo!:t controi 
institutions and inf!:astructu!:e to prevent the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction. The Agreement wa~ amended Ap~ii 29 and July 22, 1993, 
increasing the level of as sistance to a total of up to S10 .26 million. 
Assi~tance will encompass fou~ a~eas of activity; policy consultations and 
project deveiopment; export control technical inte~action; training and 
teChr,ical assistance; and equipment. Funds to date have been obligated for 
p~oject development, technical eXChanges, t~aining, and aSSessment of 
equipment: needs. Major procurement actions pending funding include a 
l.icen!ling 'automation syStem, nuclear ma t elOial detection equipment, a customs 
automation system, customs enforcenLent equipment, f~ontier forces interdict ion 
... quipment, automation of two cldssrooms of the Belarus government expor~ 
control center, non-governmental. non-proliferat:ion center support for the 
training center, and st<>tioning of two US CUStOlns Service Advisors in Belarus. 
COOPE:RATIVE: THREAT REDUCTION PR0GRAH 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P. L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(By Project) 
t$. in<;<Mi·l..rions) 
CONTlNOOUS C~ICA"1'IONS LINK (B!:LARUS) 
;w"ropriarjOD 
Research, 
Development, 
~~=i~a~ion 
F"Y92 
F"'l93 
;-'l92 
f'l93 
;-Y92 
fY93 
;-'l92 
,'l93 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligat;ional Obligat;ions 
~ ~ !("m,lat;yel 
.692 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION: on January 15, 1993 the United States Department of 
Defense and che Ministry ot Defense of the Republic ot Belarus signed an 
agreement concerning the proviSion of material and services for the 
eStablishment of a Continuous CO[l"iTl.unication Link. This implementing agreement 
provides for assistance to Belarus in the establishment of a continuous 
communications link between the United States and the Republic of SelaICus that 
will be used to tICansmit notifications requiICed by the Treaty on the Reduction 
and Limitation ot Strategic OffenSive Anns (START) and the Treaty on the 
£lim.ination of Intermedi.ate-R3nge and Shorter-Range Missiles (IN~'). Technical 
expeICtS met in April 1993 and agreed on cechnical details and a ",ork program. 
Equipment was deliveICed to S",larus in ,July 1993 and operational ... nd 
maincenance personnel received training at the same time. An interi.m system 
became operacional on August 31, 1993. A delegation frOIll Belarus visit:ed the 
U.S. in July 1994 to see a demonstration ot the new equipment. ThiS 
configuration has been approved. The new equipment: will be shipped, 
installed, cested and finally operational in late 1995. CostS of m.1terial, 
training, seICvices and associated e:·:penses, including costs "",laced to the 
cransportation of m.:lteICials and personnel, will not exceed $2.3 m.illion. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMi-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - Septembe.- 30, 199~) 
ON THE PROGRA."I ::STABLISHED UNDER P . L . ~02 - 396 
(By Project) 
($ in Millio;].s) 
SIT!: RESTORATION (PROJ]';CT PO-CE) 
BELARUS 
rwprQD~i!ltiQn 
Resca.-ch, FY92 
Development, FY9.3 
Te::;to, & 
Evaluation 
FY92 
,'Y93 
Milita.-y FY92 
Const.-uct.i.on FY93 
FOL"l\\er Soviet 
(.·nion ·l"h.-eae 
Total P.-oposcd Cu.-.-ent 
Obl.i.gat.i.on,; Obligational Obligatl.ons 
~~..L~
PROTECT D!:<;CRlrTION: On July 22, 1 993 , the Agreement bet .. een ehe Depa.-tment 
o£ De(ens" of the United States of America and e!'.e Ministry of Defense of the 
Republic of Belan,::; Conce.-ning tIle £nvi.-onrnental Resto.-ation Of FOL·mer 
St.-ategic Rocket Forces !ac.i.l.i.ties and Sites to ".-omote the "revent.ion of 
P,-ol.i. f eration of. weapons ot M3ss Destruction ",""05 s.i.gned. Pursaant to this 
agreement., the Gepart.ment of Defense may provide up to 52"> milL.on in 
assi.stance, including materi'll, t.rain.i.ng, and services, to faCilit.ate the 
environm .. nta.l restoration of fo.-rner Strategic ROcket <orces (SIU') faCilities 
a nd s i tes in the Republic of ~ .. larus. 'I'he ob jective is t.o p.-ovide the 
Gq uipment and trai ning necessary to transf.e.- to ehe Belal."l.lsians the expert is .. 
to perform environmental restoration of SRF facilitie s 0'- sites. In order to 
e[f",r.::t th.i.s sk.i.lls t.-ansf .. r prog.-ilm, the D .. partmen::. of Defense will. assist in 
the performance of studies 3nd desi.gns re lated to environmental resto.-ation at 
towO forme.- sm' bases, postavy and Lida. Technical e"per::." held discussions i n 
August 1993 and in Ma.rch 1994 and agreed On t:h" equipment to be provide d and a 
c'.ef ined plan of work to be accomplished. 
The project has been divided into three elements [or impl~entation: (1) 
a n analytical chemistry laborat.ory, (2) remote senSing and g .. ograph.i.C 
information systems (RS/GIS), and (3) remediation planning, technical 
assistance and training. The contract to p.-ovide analytical chemist.ry 
equipment and t.-aining, and prep'l.-e the anal.ytical chemist.-y labo.-atory, was 
" warded to Environmental Cl,emical Corporat.ion (ECC) o r Burlin,)aIne, CA, on 22 
Sepe..rnbe.- 1994. Planning calls tor 3n .operation«l laboratory in Belarus by 
the end of January 1995. "!'he Cold Regl.ons Resea.-ch 3nd £n,)inee.-ing Laborat.o.-y 
(CRR£L) is the performer fo.- RS/GIS and has provided initial orientation to 
Be larus officia ls at lIanover, Nil, and Ancho.-age, At< ",he.-e the officials 
observed and received det.ailed briefings on t.he equipment. and training that 
would be provided. CRREL has also initiated action to purch<lse the required 
RS/GIS equipment and has developed associated training plans and schedules. 
In addition , the Air Force Sensor I::valuation Center (AFSE:C) conducted 
measurements ot the environmental characteristics of t he 8elarus supplied 
aircra ft (AN-26) that will be the platform for the aerial camera anei the 
digital multispectral scanning video (DMSV) system to be provided under this 
agreement. DNA released on 26 August 1'>'>4, an RrP to provide lor the remedial 
planning, technical assistance, and training described above, and to integrate 
all the elements into a cohesiv", remediation plan . An initial, scoping site 
aSSeSSment was mad", of the Postavy SflF base 23 May - 3 June 19'>4 with the 
assist<>nce of the US Army £nvironm",ntal Hygiene Agency (A£HA); the results of 
this assessm",nt indicated nO radiological contamination and the major chemic<ll 
contamination is in the form ot spilled/leaked heating fuel oil at fo u r 
locations. An In- Process Review (IPR) ... as held on 22-26 August 1994 at CI<RE:L 
(Hanover , NH) and. tile WaShington, DC area for three invited e",larus officials . 
During the !t'R. the BelaruS otficials confirmed that th., Belarus government 
considers the env~rolllnef\tal r estoe<ltion project one their top priorities and 
~~~~irmed th",ir concurrence \.lith the implementation plans presented by the 
Under element (3), a second, detailed site aSSeSsmen", at Postavy is 
scheduled for :-Iovcmber 1994, to determine the precise exten t of tne h"<lting 
~uel oil contaminat.l.on , assess the heavy metals contamination prob1ew, and 
detenn.l.ne .I.f hazardOUS materials resulting from liquid rocket fuel operations 
aee present. A maJor goal fo r Chis aetiv~ty is to meet a ceiti.eal m.l.lestone 
of 1 April 1995 when weather condition s shoul d be suitable to implemenc the 
remediation plan that is to be developed by the performer. Tile US ... ill lead 
the remediation accivities at I?ostavy witn Belaeus providing tne required 
laboe support and the Belaru s e,eperts will lead remediation activl.ties at a 
second SRr base ~p.cobably Lida) ... ith the US peovl.di"9 consul1:ativ" technic"l 
assistClncc as requiH.ld . 
COOPERATIVE THiU:AT REDUC':'ION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - Sep1:emtler 30, 199~l 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-396 
(By Project) 
(S in Millions) 
STRATl:Gl:C OFFENSIV!: ARMS ELIMINATION (PROPELLANT ELIMINATION 
(EE:L.ARUS) 
Aprror r i1ti oo 
Research, 
Development, 
~~~~~a~ion 
:'/92 
F'/93 
Hili :ary FY92 
Construction FY93 
Fonner So"ie~ 
Union l'hr"at 
Reduction 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligational Obligat.l.ons 
~.lI..I.l.t...!l_~ 
pRoner RESCRIPTION- Congress has been notified of tt,e Department of 
ueten",,,,',,, .l.nten~ to provide Belarus up to :;6 million in equipment and 
teChnical assi"'tance to eliminat'" 55-25 fi>:ed structures i n accordance with 
START I elimination procedures. As yet,there is no implementing agreew.ent in 
pl.ace. Discussions contin<le to fu rther define this project. 
COOP~RATIV~ THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SE:MI-l'.NNUAL REPORT S\JMMARY 
(April 1, 1<)<)<1 - S~pt~mb"r 30, 199<1) 
ON TH~ PROGRAM ~ST1\BLISHeo UND~R P.L. 102-396 
(By Project) 
($ in Mil l ions ) 
oz:n:NS£ CONVl:RSION/ INDUSTRIA!. PARTN£RSHIP (BELARUS) 
Operations & FY92 
Maintenance FY93 
ReSearch, FY92 
Development, FY93 
Test, & 
Evaluation 
FY92 
FY9 3 
Military FY92 
Construction FY93 
Total P roposed 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~~
PROn;CT Q£SQlTPTlOO' The Agreement Between the Department. of Defense of the 
Unitt':ct Scates 01' America anct the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of 
Belarus Concerning the Conversion ot Military Technologies anct Capabilities 
Into CiVilian Activities of July 22, 1993 provides for up to $20 million of 
demilitari;:ation re l ated ctefense conversion assistance. Up to $10 million 
will be used for industry conversion, and up to $10 million will be usect to 
COnstrUCt housing necessary to facilitate the demobili:z;ation 01' StrategiC 
Rocket Forces officers. Technical teams viSited Belarus in September 1 993 to 
diSCUSS industry conl1ersion candidates and housing requ:irements. Following 
t.his, the Department of Defense responded that it would beg:in procurement 
actions to provide materials, training and services to three .canclidate 
industries; Belomb Optical (which formerl y made optics tor satellites, gun 
sights, night. v:ision and miSSile detense systems), Hins): Computer (which made 
computers for the military), and Integral Electron:ics (which made nuclear 
hardent!:d chips for every element of the former Soviet COlmland and control 
system). In ad<tition, t.he United States will prOl1ide equipment tor the 
otficer retraining facil:i ties at former Strategic Roc):et Forces base:> in 
Belarus. The junior ofticers being demobilized from the Strategic Rocl:. .. t 
f"orces will take a nine month course on business and trade so they can see): 
employment after being demobilized. The US GOl1ernment will prol1ide computer 
equipment for business educat:ion, an automotive repair training center, 
~nglish language t.raining and wood working equipment. 
The first tra:ining center equipment (computers and business equipment) was 
dell.vered to Lida on DeCember 22, 1993. The auto repa:ir retra:ining center waS 
d e ll.vered to Ml.ns): on 3 July 1994. Subsequent deliveries are e'·'pected in 
Octobe r and November 1994. 
Tne firs::: :::",0 industry awards were announced on March 23, 19'j4 involVing Kras 
Corporation of Fairless Hills, FA (to work wi.tn Integral) and Byeiocorp 
SCientific Incorporated (to work wit_h BelomO) of Ne .. York Cit_yo Kras wOn a 
$5. ?5/"! a .. anl, while BSI WOn a $0 . '16M " .. a rd. All the ?rOpOSalS included COSt 
snaring by th.., ;'mericil.n Company, .. hereby they proposed to absorb .'10m<.> ot the 
of the venture. The last industry a.ward · ... as a renounced on September 13, 
to ,ederal Systeres GI:OUp (to .. ork witn Minsk Co"'.p"ter) of ,-alls Clmrch, 
,SC's "ward was $2.{5M. 
Kras proposed to retool and technically assillt Integra.l so it could compete in 
tne low end integrated circui t fie ld no .. doml-nat_ed by Asiil.n companies . Kr"s 
would r"tool a pl"nt formerly used for defense work into a facility used only 
ror commercL'l.l applicil.tion . Several h u ndred fOr.ller defense workers would then 
oe redirected by (nteg:::al towards commercial work. Kras pI:ovided a market 
"nalysis sttO .. in9 a poten:::ial :our to one return on inv"st_ment. In Septe.nber, 
1991 Kras and r ntegra. l foemed " joi nt venture called INT£KRA$, and are 
"ttractl-ng bO ~l\ custorners and investor ... :::hat will prove t:-tei" market aWlly ... is 
Kras was Lmded for the first st"ge 0: retooling 3nd tec:-tnical 
and agreed to make "-ny follow-on funding contingent On tr.eir abili~y 
10'lg teL"!fl orders from" third party ~o !n~egr.,i; coupled .... ith "-
agreemeflt on this cOllrS" of action and the "vaiLlbility of iJSG fur.ds . 
ilyelocorp $CiNltific incorporated (SSI) of New "torI< :oz:med a joint ventcure 
.. :.. th Belol"G Optic"l, c"lled IDIX. "L"r.ey wil l rnan,,[;;.ct:lre <-.n<:! sell las"r 
pointer de\l l.ces for briefing and audio visual use. Thes" devices a.re 
cureently ntade in :'atin /\merica and Asia . This would in\lolve about 200 Belo",o 
"",ople forrr.a lly involved in defense work "t a converted C!efens"" plant. The 
l1SG r.egotiat"d an unfunded option :or high eud optic~ worl< (incilldiflg mon.ey 
[or re,-001in.9 def"nse equl-pmentl. Funding is contingent or. per formance, tne 
availability of tunds, .. nd )oi ntc US/Belarus Governmer. t_ ag L'ee,"ent . . 
fede"al Sy st.eJn" Croul' (FSG) of Fall s Church, VA assembled a team of companies 
<ollat ",:..11 create <ohree ;nic"o- industri"s within Minsk COl:lputee l\malgamatlon 
(MCA). FSG ,",l- ll fo= a j oint venture with MG'\.. The oth",r corr.par.l-es involved 
il.~" " joinc ventu"e between ~he Russian firm £LV:S+ il.nd Sun ~icrosyst_ems, 
James E::lect~onic, and Roy Intern"tional . ELIJIS+ 3r.d Sun will fonn two mi c ro-
l-r:dustrl-es. FSC/I'.CA .. ill be licensed to manufacture cadio cont_rolled moderns 
E;;;;, the ELVIS+ and Sun vent_ure, with Sun purchasing the fiest o:;der . The 
"lOd«<I" wi l l be sold to other vendo"s aroun.d Ute woeld. In addition, FSC/I1CA 
.. ill manufacture small antennas for the modems 3nd other elect"onic use. Once 
"gain Su" .. ill purchase the first ord"r. Under licens,"" to James, FSG/t-'.CA .. ill 
" ,anufacture automobile battery ch"rgers . ,SG/MCA wi ll also tle fr..,e t o retail 
them to others . Roy International will redesign the MeA tacil i ties from 
detense applJ.cation to the ne .. micro-indus t ries . All three miceO-industries 
a:::e craditionally located outSide the Unitoed States. 
Belarus needs housing tor 602 demobili z ed officers (by ByeloCl.:ssian law the 
gov ernment n,uSt provide t:ousing upon their retcirement) . Tha U.S . will 
construct as many units as pOSsible for $10 million, although a figure between 
!50 and 200 is likely_ The llyelorussHl.Ils are providing site survey and cost 
l-nformatlon, infrastructure and utility hook-ups up to t .he Site, as well as 
all local const-ruction documents and otoher tceclmical suppoet:. The United 
States, with S"larus assistance , developed a dasign in e arly Mdrcll for the 
OUJ..ldir.g site . This design was issued for bid in " p~oc"'rement ,;,c t ion in 
AugUSt 1994. This p:;oject WaS to be funded trom funds in t he F"(~3 
Reprogralnming request. Aw"",,d is e",pe cted in December (SubjeCt to availability 
at funds) , "ith cOlupletion of the project by summee of 19.,,6. 
~On Septenlber 6, 1994, $10 million ini:::ially proposed to be obligated "nd 
notified to Congress to" this project_ was renotified to suppo"t the R.esearch 
and Development Foundation to oe established in Russia.. 
COOPERJl.TIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-1\NNtJAL REPORT S\JMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM EST~BLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(8y Project.) 
($ in MiLlions) 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING 
(UKRAIN!:) 
8ppropri iIt i on 
Research, 
De\lelopment, 
Test, & 
Evaluation 
fY92 
fY~3 
n'92 
FY93 
Military FY92 
Construction FY93 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligation~ Obligat1onal Obligations 
_~ ~ (C'IIDI'atjye) 
PBOD"C1' PESCRIPTIQN: The Agreement Between the Department of Defense at the 
Unit.,<i States of America and the Ministry of Detense ot Ul<.raine Concerning u\e 
Provision to Ukraine of Emergency Re sponse Equipment and Relat.ed Tra~ning in 
Connection with the Removal at Nuclear Warheads t ram Ukraine tor Destruction 
in the Course of the £limination of Strategic NUClear A...,,,s was signed on 
December 18, 1993. Assistance provided under this agreement will facilitate 
the expansion ot' emergency response capabilities in connection with the 
r~val of nUClear warheads trom Ukraine for destruction and t.he elimination 
of ICBM's and their silo launchers. TOtal costs as notified are not to exceed 
$S million. A technical e;,;change was conducted in the United States in August 
1994. An emergency response pacl<.age was jointly agreed to by the experts of 
both countries. Pr ocurement action was initiated in Septeml)er 1994 . 
I!:qu:ipment deliveries should be complete by June 1995. 
COOPERATIVE ·fHREAT REDUCTION PROCF.Af.: 
Sf.!.'!I-ANNUAl.. REPORT SUMMl\.RY 
(April 1, 199,1 - Septemt>eI: 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER <'.L. 102-229 SECTION lOa 
(By Project) 
(S in Mil l ions) 
&Xl'ORT CONTROL (UKFAJ:m:) 
IIpproprj i!.t ioo 
OpeI:ation~ .. FY92 
ReSeaI:ch, 
Developmenr., 
Tes";:, & 
Evaluation 
FormeI: Soviet 
Union Threat 
~" 
F"{92 
FYSJ 
rY92 
FY93 
1'otal proposed 
Obligations Obligat iona l 0::'11gations 
~~J~
PR.OJJ:C!' QESCRIPTION' Th", Agreement Between the Department of De f ense of the 
United. States of i\meI:ica and. the E:.:pert and Technical Committee of the Cabinet 
of MinisO::I:ies ot: Ukrain t!: Conc"I:ning o::he PI:ovision of Assis";:ance to Ukraine 
Related to the £stablishment of an E::.:port Control Sys tem to Prevent tile 
ProlifeI:ation 01' Weapons of Mass DeStruction from UkI:aine was signed on 
December S, 1993. PUI:Suant to ";:hi s agreement, the DepaI:tment of Defense is to 
provide up to ~2.26 million in assistance to Ukraine in the development of 
UkI:aine's e:.:port contI:ol· institutions and infI:astI:uctur:-e. This .. greement "'as 
amended March 21, 199~ add..ing up to SS million for additional assistance. 
This program of assistance ·"il i encompass four areas of activity: policy 
consultations and project development: e:.:port contI:ol technical inteI:action; 
training and. technical assistance; and equipment. The goal is to enable 
Ukraine to e ! tectively control the expoI:t of materials and t echn ology and, 
t hereby, contribute to interna tional eftorts to halt the proliferation 01' 
weapons of li>3SS destruction. The first tecl'lnical working group meer.ing '"'as 
conducted in April 1994 and the program plan identifying requir:-ernents WaS 
completed. An e-"p0I:t licensing automation system and a customs auo::om<ltion 
system a re being procur"d. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994. - September 30, 19'14) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-22'1 SECTION lOa 
(By Project) 
($ in Millions) 
MATr.lUAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY (UKRAINE) 
I\pproprj at iQO 
Research, 
Development, 
~::i~a~ion 
Military 
Construction 
n92 
,Y93 
FY92 
,Y93 
,Y92 
FY'13 
Total Proposed 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~.. .~
1. 969 
PRO.ItCT P'':SCBTPTIQN: The Agreement Between the Department of Defense o t: the 
United States ot" America and the ~nistry of Det"ense of Ukraine Concerning the 
Control, Accounting and Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to promote the 
Prevention of proliferation of Nuclear Weapons from Ukraine waS signed 
December 18, 1993 3nd amended on March 21, 1'194. Pursuant to th.l.s agreBment, 
the Department of Defense may provide up to $12.5 million in aSSistance to 
Ukraine f.or the development of systems to provide for contrOl, accounting and 
phySical protection of. nuclear materials in order to promote the prevention of. 
nuclear weapons proliferation. On AugUSt 29 - September 1, 1994, 
representatives of the US and Ukraine met in YOUl:hnukrainsk to discuss 
specific plans f.or .implementing the agreement. U.S./Ukrain.1.an joint teChnical 
working group meetings and site su"veys at: nuclea" f.acilities have been 
completed and the final reports are being cmllpleted now. The. U. S. Department 
of Energy and Nuclea" Regulatory Commission are under cont"act to conduct 
studies, develop regulations and safegua"d p"ocedures, and build a viable 
nuclear security program in Ukraine. The US side will "ende" assistance by 
delive".1.ng, by 15 December, 19!H, a report sumnaril:ing the results of the US 
side's analysis of ttle site survey data; computer ha"dwa"e and software to 
support the development of an automated, near real-time nuclear material 
database; "epresentative, IA£A-acceptable, tamper-indicating devices and. 
p"ocedures fo" control~ing, accounting for, applying .. nd removing them; 
equ.l.pment necessary to meaSUre fiss.l.le "13ss and enrichment of {"ash t:uel; 
equipm"nt and training necessary to characterize fo" safeguards purposes 000-
fuel nuclear material items to identify and quantify nuclide». 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April. 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM E:.STABLISHE:.D UNDER P .L. ~02-229 SECTION 108 
(By Project) 
($ in Millions) 
GO'I!:RNHEN'r-TO-GO~ Q::H.ruN:ICAT:IONS L:INK 
(UKRAlla) 
FY92 
FY93 
To!:al Proposed 
Obligat ~ons Obligat ional Obligat~ons 
~~~
PROTEM DESCRIpTION: On December 18, 1993, the Agreement. Between r.he 
Deparr.menr. a t Del'ense of r.he Unir.ed Star.es of America and r.he ~inisr.cy of 
Defense of Ukcaina Concerning the Provision at: Assistance Related to the 
),;stablishment of a Governm.mt-to-Government Coamunications Link was signed. 
Pursuant to this agreement, the Department of Defense wi ll provide assistance 
to Ukraine in the establislu~nt of a government-to-goverrunent communic3tions 
link that will be used to transmit notifications required by the Treaty on the 
Reduction and the Limit.ation of Strategic Offensive Arms (S'1"ART) ",nd the 
·1"",e"'ty on the Elimination o f Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles 
(INF). The Department of Def,mse w1.ll prov1.Cle specified equipment a l ong with 
related teChnical manuals and training. CostS of mater1.al, training, and 
services and associated expenses, including costs related to the 
transport;ation of material and personnel to and from Ukraine, will not exceed 
$2. 4 mill~on. A Technical Dtperts Meet i ng was held in Kiev in A"'9"'st 1994 to 
d.iscuss details of i.mplementing the agJ:"e ement. Cutover of the interim 
configuration should occ",r by JanuaJ:"Y 1995 to send and receive messages. A 
delegation from Kiev will vis1.t the U.S. in early 1995 to see a demonstration 
of the new equipment (both hardware and software). The interin1 eq",iprnent will 
be replaced with new equipment to be sh1.pped, installed, lested and finally 
operc.tional by late 1995. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - Septemher 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L . L02-396 
(By Project) 
($ in Mil li.ons) 
STRAT£G:lC NUCLEAR AfIMS .o.DUNAT:lON (\1KIUI.un:) 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
i\nnrnnO ',rjoo 
Operations' .. Y92 
Maintenance "Y93 
ResearCh, "'i92 
Development, fY93 
'fest, , 
Evaluation 
"yn 
n93 
Military "'i92 
cOnstruction FY93 
~~~
"ornler Soviet 21.926 
75.034 
PBQn'cr Qf;SCRXPTXOW An Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the 
Unitea States of America and the MiniStry of Defense of Ukraine Concerning the 
Provi!:ion of Material, Services and Related Training to Ukraine i n Connection 
with the Elimina t ion of Strategic Nuclear Arms was signed December 5, 1993. 
Amendments Land 2 to Annex C thereto were signed December L6, 1993; and an 
Amendment to this agreement was signed on March 21, 1994 . Pursuant to this 
agreement, the Department of Defense will provide up to a total of $16S 
/:,il1ion in assistance to the Government of Ukraine to facilitate the 
dismantlement of their Strategic Nuclear AJ;TIIS (SNll) under the teJ;TIIS of the 
Start Treaty. Assistance is also being provided to assist Ukraine to 
deactivate SS- L9 and 55-24 missiles loca ted on its territory in accorctance 
with the Trilateral Accord. "unding supports procurement of a wide variety of 
heavy industrial equipment, SUCh as cranes, excavators, and graders, emergency 
support equipment , intennodal containers to transport oxidi:z.er and support 
ana equipment for an ICB."i Neutralization FaCility. Also, funds will support 
aesign of the neutralization facility and an integrating contractor 
responsible for bringing the faCility on-line . As ot 30 September 1994, 24 
out of 30 large procurements and all small industrial equipment procurements 
!lad been awarded . Three large cranes, Ii off-road capable vehicles , ra<:lio 
CO:Mlu oication and emergency support equipment, and some small industrial tOOls 
were del i vered to Ukraine between ~.arch and May 1994, in add.i.tion to fuel for 
early SS-24 d.i.sma.ntlement. Other equipment will be shipped in appropriate 
groupings to the dismantlement locations on a mutually agreed schedule. Most 
of the equipment will be in place by early swnmer 1995. The U.S. will also 
prOvide the Ukrainians with three years of maintenance materials and initial 
trai.ning related t.o the operation of equipment provided. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REOUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHEO UNOER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(By Project) 
( S in Millions) 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CE.NTER (UKRAINE) 
Appropri a tioo 
Research, 
Oevelopment, 
Test., , 
Evaluation 
f'Y92 
FY9 3 
FY9 2 
FY9 3 
f'Y92 
FY93 
Military FY92 
Construction FY93 
Total Proposed Current 
Ob l igat ions Obliga t.ional Obligat.l.on~ 
~lw.t..l:l..Il.I~ 
Former Soviet 10 . 0 00 
10 . 0 
PEQner p e scRIPTION: The US, Canada, Sweden, and Ukraine signed an agreement 
to establish a Sc i ence and Technology Center in Uk"aine (STCU) on OCtober 25, 
1993. Til .. STCU will be headquartered in Kiev, with the possibility of branCh 
offices in other l ocations. The STCU is s upported by S1 0 mi llion from the 
United States, S2 milli o n from Canada, and $1.5 million from Sweden. The 
major ob j ective of thiS multi-national effort is to develop, approve, fi nance, 
and monitor SCience and technology projectS for peaceful purposes, which are 
to be carried out prl-marily at institutlOnS in Ukraine. 'rhese pro jects will 
provide weapons scientists and engineers, particularly those who pos s ess 
knowledge and skills related to weapons of mass destruction and miesi1", 
delivery systems, opportunities to redirect these talents to peaceful 
activitleS. The overall goals are to prevent the p roli f eration of 
technologies related to these military capabilitieS, t.o minimize t.he migration 
of personnel involved in these activ i ties t.o potential proliferent nations, 
and to assist in the transit.ion to a market-based econOlQy. 
The program is being e,.ecuted by the State Oepartment using the 
e~perience gained through tOe International Science 3.lId Technology Center 
(ISTC) in MOSCO w. The Ukrainian government named the National Space Agency of 
Ukraine tNSAU) as the implementing organization in Ukraine. The Ukrainiar, 
Government al~o tonned an intera.g"ncy advisory board to work with t he NSAU. 
£nt.ry into FO&Ce came on 16 July 1994 . High-level meetings to establish the 
overall frame work for the organ:lZ,ation were held. in Kiev at the end of August 
1 994, and working group meetings are on-gOing during September and October. 
The STCU E,.ecutive Director, a Canadian national, has been chosen, and is 
serving as Executive Oirector - designate, pen ding approval of his appointment 
by the governing board. The U.S., Sweden, and Ukraine are ir, the process ot 
selecting their deputy e}:ecutive director candidates. 
State and DoD representatives continue to urge other contributors to join the 
STCU a nd provide a broader mu~tilatera1. base tor t.he program . MOSt. r e cent ly, 
b"sed on their e:.<perience with rSTC, the Japanese have e"pressed an interest 
in joining the STCU. 
COOP£.RATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
{April 1, 199~ - September 30, 19941 
ON THE PROGRAM i:S'rABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-396 
lBy Project;;1 
lS in Millionsl 
MULTlLATI:RAL NUCLC.I\A SU'£TY INITIATIVE. (UlCRAINJ:) 
ResearCh, 
Development, 
T~~;.i.u!tion 
Mill-tary 
Construction 
Former Soviet. 
Union Threa t 
FY92 
FY93 
FY92 
FY93 
f"Y92 
FY93 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obl i gational Obligat ions 
~~~
PBQn:CT pr;SrarpTIQN : On OCt;;O!)el" 2~ , 1993, t;;he Agreement;; Between the United 
:;tat.:.s of Nnerica and the Governm.:.nt ot Ukraine Concerning Opera t ional Safety 
!:nnancements , Risk Reduc1:ion Me,,!)ures and Nuclear Safety Regula1:ion for 
Civilian Nuclear Facili1:ies in Ukraine was signed . Tile US will provide the 
Republic o f Ukraine a nuclear reactor sinmlatar far tile training center at tne 
Ktnelnitsky Nuclear Power Plant ~n Uk.raine. The Simula t or 101 1.11 be used to 
train nuclear power plant operators , engineers, inspectors, and o t ner 
regulatOry personnel. The primary goal of this project. is to improve reactor 
operat.or training and thereDy, tne satety of nuclear power reactors in 
Ukraine. Tne simulator contract will be awarded as soon as funds included in 
tne 000 FY 93 reprogramm.ing reque:>t are available. Planned delivery o t l:he 
s imula1:or is currently for November 1996 . 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM. 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMHARY 
{April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM. ESTABLISHED UNDER P . L. 102-139 
(By Project) 
(~ ,n Mill i"n!}) 
D£f"ENSE CONVERSION/ INDUSTRIAL PARTNERSHIP (I1XRAIN"l:.) 
"pproor; at iDn 
Research, 
Develop,nent, 
'~~~i~a~ion 
f'Y92 
f'Y93 
Military f'Y92 
Construction ,Y93 
Total Proposed Current Actual 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~~
PROJECT PESCRIPTI0N- On March 21, 1994, an Agreement Bet .... een the Department of 
lleiense oi tne United States of America and the Ministry of Machine -Building , 
Militacy-Industrial Comple;,: and Conversion of Ukrain., '::oncerning the 
co. ""orSi. 0". 0' . ent. erpr. i.l::es of the. r:ilitar. y~I. ndustrial comP1e. :-: wa. s Signed. 'O'."P \ to $~O mll1ion I n defense conVe"Slon as,!l.stance. These funds are to be u.sed 
for twO types of proJects. Up to $20 mllllon is planned to su.pport j Olnt 
busines.<; lnltl.atlv",s between Western induStries and Ukrainlan defense firms 
convertlng to prOductlon of civJ.1ian goods; and up to the "elfwHning S20 
ml1llon w1.11 be used to fund a specialized effort to convert seve"al Ukrainl.an 
defense companies to the prOduction of prefabricated hOusing fo" fonner 
military officers . 
A SSM awa"d was announced on May 9, 1994 to Westinghouse of Pit t Sburgh, 
PJ>. to create a joint ventu"e with the Ukrainian def",nse firm H3rtron (whiCh 
::~d s:~: ~~~t~~!~~~i~n~SSile ?~i~nC~a ;r!t:-m:~~iP:~t new In~/:;:~~ 
is tor Qkrainl.an nuclear power plants. The instru.ments would improve the 
safety and re.liabi.lity o f the equipment, reducing the cisk of a nuclear 
reactor mishap. Westinghouse provided I:heir own cost sharing conl:ribul:ion. 
;.. $':I.':I8M 3ward was announced on June 14, 1994 to Bi.ll Harbert 
International Company (BHIC) of Binninqham, Alabama. BIlIC fonned a venl:ure 
with Freqate of PervomaY3slt , U):raine to manufacl;ure modu.lar homes. f'regate 
formerly made n.acllinery and equipment for Navy Ships. the t:LtSt pd>c1uction 
run o f the new homes will go to demobilized Stra1:egic Rocket Force", personne.l 
in Pervomay3Sk.. The Ministry of Defense will p~ite and 
infrastructure , while BHIC/Freg3te will provid nit!>· th foundations. 
Factory conversion is underw3Y, and ground clearing gl.ns this f'all. BHIC 
p:;ovided their own cost sharing cont:;ibution. 
A $16.1M award was announced on September 26, 1994 to a joint venture 
between the Nne::ican firms ABE SU$A of Morunouth Junction, NJ and Am .. rican 
Services rnternational.., <lnd the Ministry of Defense f.l..nns Mont"~hn-,-k "K" anO 
th'" Cent:,al Design !n9titute. Both UI:.".i.ni.;t" fi.rms ..... ,." fonnerl..y inVOlved -,-n 
the desi.gn and construction of b"l..liscic )"iS5 i ':'0 silos nnd oChec CO~Ifll3nd ;;.nd 
con1:.ol structures. Togethe., che ne .... ventuce will. form a c~vii enginee:;-,-ng 
and con!!truct-,-on f inn, whO!!" fir!!t P:;O)",ct. wJ.. l l be a hou!l-,-ng comple:..: f o:; 
demob~lized Strategic Rocleet Forces personnel in Kl'i.",e:uaCSkY. .he complex 
will produce up t~t~ 
The Ukrainian~ and. American!! agreed to -,-"clude 33 Ukrainian defense 
indust::ies (formerly engaged in weapons of mass destruction work) in a 
competitive p::ocu::ement involving w .. st .. rn partners , ... ho sub:r.it proposals for 
commercial eute::prises. "the f(~quest fo:; .,ropos;]," (Il.FP) for t~~ U,,-rainian 33 
was released on June 27, ~994, along with a OEop"rtn,ent of COfM'l<!!rce pro::'iLe on 
each Ukrainian company. t'coposals we:;" submitt .. cI on September 1;1, wir;h f.lL·st 
"· ... ards e><pectecl in late November 1.991 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT S UMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 199 4) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102 -229 SECTION lOa 
(Sy Project) 
($ in Mi llions) 
PROJECT: EMERGENcY RESPONSE TRAINING!t:QUIPMENT (KAZAKHSTAN) 
Anprooriation 
ReSearch, 
Oeve l opment, 
Tes t, & 
FY92 
FY93 
FY92 
FY93 
FY92 
FY93 
Military FY92 
Construction FY93 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obllgational Obligations 
~ ~ rC,mll\ atiye l 
PBQTljCT PESCRIPTION: The Agreement Between the Department of Defense o f tile 
United States of fl.merica and the Ministry of Defense of Kazakhstan Concerning 
the provision to the RepubliC of Kazakhsean of £mergency Respollse e:quipment 
ana Related Training in ConneCtion with the RemOval of Nuclear WarheadS from 
the Republic of Kazakhstan for Des truction and the Removal of Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles and the Destruction of Their Silo Launchers ... as signed on 
December 13, 1993. Assistance provided under this agreement ... ill facilitate 
the expanSion of emergency response capabilities in conneCtion with the 
removal of nuclear warh<'!adS and ICBMs from Kazakhstan . A technical exchange 
was conducted in the United States in AugUSt 1994. An emergency response 
package to be provided was joinely agreed to by the experes of both countries. 
Procurement action was initiated in September 1994. e:quipment deliveries 
Should be complete by June 1995. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SOH-ANNUAL REPORT S1JMMARY 
!April 1 , 1994 - Sept;ernI>e" 30, 19941 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
IBy Pro]ectl 
($ in Millionsl 
EXPORT CONTROL (KAUlKHS'l'ANI 
!\ppropriatioo 
Rese3rCh , 
Deve l opment , 
·rest;, , 
F.:valuation 
FY92 
f"Y93 
f"Y92 
FY93 
FY92 
f"Y93 
Milit;ary FY92 
Construct;ion FY93 
Total Proposed Cu"rent 
Obligat1.ons OCligation31 Obligat1.onS 
~~~
Formi'lr Soviet 2.260 
2.26 2 . 260 
pROmeT pESCRIpTION; The Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the 
Ul\it .. CI. States of America and the !oIin istry of Defense of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan concernin';J the provision of assistance to the Republic of 
Kazakhstan related to the establiShment of Export Control Systems to prevent 
the pcolifer3tion of Weapons of MaSS Destruction was signed on Decernl>er 13, 
1993. !?o.lrSu3 <>t to thiS agceement, the DeP3rtment of Defense may provide 
a ssistance up to $2.26 million in th~ dev..,lopment of KazakhSt3n' S expoct 
control institutions and l.nfrastcucture . This program of assistance ... ill 
encompass four areas of activity: policy co(\sult;ations and program 
development : export control teChnical interaction; t;rainin'1 and technical 
assistance; and equipment . Export cont;rol talks were held wit;h Kazakhst3ni 
officials in Washington in July, 1994, and were focused on developing pcoject 
plans for .. xport control assistance The '10,,1 is to enable the Republic of 
K3Z;;.khstan to e1'fectively control the export of mat;erials and technologies 
and, t;hereby , contribute to International etfo~ts to halt the prolifer3tion 01' 
weapons of ,,,",ss deStcuct ion . 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REP ORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 19'H - September 30, 1994.) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L . 102-229 SECTION 106 
(By Project) 
($ in Million::) 
W\.TEaIAl. CONTROL AND ACCOUN'l:AaILIT'f (KAZAKHSTAN) 
i\pprppriariQP 
Research, FY92 
Develop,nent, f'Y93 
Test, , 
Evaluation 
Mi.lit:ary 
Construct ion 
Total Proposed Current: 
Obligat:ions Obligational Obligations 
~~~
.524. 
PBOn;CT P]l;SCRIPTION: The Agreement: Bet:ween t:he Department of Defense of t:he 
United States of America and the Mini stry of Defense of t:he Republic of 
Kazakhstan Concerning t:he Cont:rol, Account:ing and Physical Prot:ection of 
Nuclear Material to Promote t:he Prevention of NUClear Weapons Proll.feration 
was signed on December 13, 1993. Pursuant to this agreement the Department: of 
Defense may provide mat:erial, tra ining, goads and servi ces to Kazakhstan in 
order to improve material control and accountability of nuc lear ""'t:e"ials 
capabilities and infrastructure to prevent nuclear weapons ""'t:eria l 
proliferation. U.S. and Kazakhstani joint t:echnical wor king group meet:ings 
were held in July 1994 and t:he site surveys of nuclear facilitie s were held in 
September-October 1994.. The draft programs have been developed and t:he U. S. 
Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission are under contract to 
conduct studies, develop regulations and safeguard procedures, and t>uild a 
viable nuclear security program in Kazakhst:an. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SF.MI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(Apri l 1, 1994 - September )0, 1994) 
ON THE:. PROGRAM ESTABLISH£D UND£R P.L. 102-229 SECTION lOB 
(By Project) 
($ in Mill i.ons) 
GO~-TO-GOV!:RNMENT ~ICATIONS 
LINK (GCCl.) (KAZAKIISTAN) 
Tot al Proposed Current: 
coli')"'t ... '''',.., Oblj'F,r" <>n . • l Qbl:"Jcotions 
~ ~l:i-.L'~~ 
Research, F,(92 
O"vel oprnent, "Y93 
~~:i:,a~ion 
PBQn:Cf PESCRIPTION: Tn" Agre~n~ Between the Dt'part:nene of Defense of ehe 
Ur.it"d Sea.:e:) a t Alnerica and the Minisery of Oeft'use of the Republic o~ 
K3'Za);r.star. Co",.:crning the Provision co Ute Republic Kazakhstan at Mate["ial ::Ind 
Ser'.rices '-0[" the Establishment of a Governrnent-to-Covernment Corrmun ieations 
Link was sig"ed on Oecembe[" 13, 199 3 . Pursuant to thi~ ag["eement, t he 
Department of Defense will provide assistance to Kazakhstan in the 
establislunent at a government to· "overnment communicdtions link that will be 
used to t["::Insmit notifications required by the Tre<lty 0 " tn" Reduction and 
Li,~itation of Strategic Of f.msive Arms (S'!'ART) ::Ind the Treaty on the 
Elimination of Interrned.i::lte-Range and Shorter-fl .. :",ge Mi ssiles (INF). The 
Oepartruent of Defense wil l proviru. specified equipment dlong with ~elat ed 
tecnnical manua.!.s and training. CostS o f material, training, and se rvices and 
assoc~ated e:!penses, including casts related to thO t ransportation of material 
and ptorsonn"l to and from Kazakhstan, will not. e.:~ceed S2. 3 million. A 
Technical E:~perts Meetin" was held in Almaty in May 1994 to discuss det ai ls of 
implementing the agreement. Subsequently, inter im e<,]uipmcnt w .. s installed in 
the =CL 1:ilci..Li ty, ", nd training condUCted. Cut over of ttle inte rim 
contiguration should occur Oceober 1994, providing .. n initial C<lll<lbility to 
send and receive messages . A delegation fran, Almaty will visit: the U.S. in 
early 1995 t:o sec il demonstration of the new equipment Iboth hardware and 
so!tware). The interim equipment: will be rep l .. ced with new equipment to b" 
shipped, installed, and t:est:ed by late 1995. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SE:MI-II.NNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(Apdl 1, 1994 - Sepr:ember 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-139 
(By Pro ject) 
($ in Mill.i.ons) 
DEFENSE CONVERSION /INDUSTFlI.II.l. PARTmRSHIP (KAZAKHSTJ\.N) 
T1ppro p ri arjQo 
Operations' FY92 
Ma i ntenance FY9J 
Research, FY92 
Develop,nenr:, FY9J 
TeSt, ~ 
Evaluat ion 
FY92 
FY93 
Militilry FY92 
Construction fY93 
Former Soviet 
union Threat 
Reductl.on 
Tor:al Propo".,d 
Obligations Obligar:ional Obligations 
~~~
PBO.Itct Ql;SCBTPTION: The Agreemenr: Between the Department of Defense o f the 
Unir:.,.:! Star:.,s of America and the Minisr:ry o f Defense of the Republic o f 
KazakhStan Copcerning r:he Conv~rsion ot Military Technologies and Cilpabilities 
i nl:o Civilian Activities wa" signed On Marcn 19, 1994. Pursuanl: to r:his 
agreement. the Department of Defense will provide up to $15 million for joinl: 
bUSiness initiatives ber:ween West.;!rn and Kazakhstani companies for the 
conversion to civili .. n production Of K .. zaknstani de fe nse industries f ormerly 
associated with the production of weilpons of mass destruction. The projects 
would support industry convers i.on from defense related f ields to comnercial 
production, and woul.d ask US indusl:ry to undertake a cost shari.ng arrangement 
where the USG only fundS part of the program. 
In late April 1994, the 11.st ot 29 Kaz .. khstani comp .. nies the United 
States was considel'ing ... :'1 candid.lotes was publ1.shed tOl' public informatior, in 
the Commerce Business Daily. other COlIII1Ierce Department soul'ces and ar: the 
forecasr: r:o Industry. In the first week Of July, both the USG and GoK .. greed 
r:o a list of B Kazak. defense comp .. nies for this ~ffon;. This 11.st was 
publiShed in the Commerce BUSiness Daily on July 11, and the I'equest t Ol' 
proposals (RFP) was released on July 26, 1994. A preproposal conference ... a " 
held in Washington on AugUSt 9, and represent .. tives fcom the eight Kazak 
companie.t\ remai.ned in I:own fol' tne week to ,neet pl'ivar:ely with US businesse~. 
US indusr:ry proposals are to be tUl'ned in by Octobel' 12, 1994, with f icst 
awal'd expected .lround the end of th., ca1.;!ndal' year. 
COOPERATIVE THRE:AT REDOCTION PROGRAM 
SE:MI-AN!lU,\L R£POR'r SL'MHARY 
IAp::il 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRA.'1 ESTA8LISH£D UNDE R P.L. 102-39 6 
(By Project) 
I S ~n Millions) 
STAATEGIC OiTENSIVE AIlM.S ELIMINATION (KAZAKHSTAN) 
"PRrop"; )t i oo 
FY92 
F''f93 
FY92 
FY9 3 
Total P.-oposed ACt ua l 
Obligations Obligational Oblig"t10ns 
.~~. .ID;a:uU..u~ 
PROUCT RESCRIPTION, On DeccmlJe. 13, 1993, an Agr-eement Between the 
Oep ... tnocnt ot D"'te nse of the United Stc .. tes of America. ",no elle Ministr-y of 
Def"nse of the Republic of Kazakhstan Concerning en .. Provision of Material, 
Set"viccs, .. nct Related Training to the Republic ot KazakhStan in Connection 
with the DestICuction of Silo Launch .. "s of lntercontinental BallistiC M..issiles 
and Associated Equipment and Components "as ,ngned. P"",, '.>an!; to this 
agreement "? to S?O million in assist.ance \.Iill be pr-ovided to K,;,zakllStan for IdO'. truction ot. ". -'. B. silos and La,,". co. COlll:."O.' Fa cil:H.ies (Len on Kaza.khstan  territory. 1')1., U.S. "ccDllulIended USe of,an .l.l\teg"at~l\g Contr3ctor to supply equl.pment and f"'"OV1de ntan3gement for tIns et roct. fioweve.-, due to object.i.ons rai~",d by Russ~a ::ega::ding respons~bJ.ll-ty fo.- d",,;t,.-oying silo neaClwo.-ks .. nd 
concerns Over US access to sen.'atJ.ve design information, action to implement I, thJ.s ,.-ecommendat~on has been postponed, penCll-ng furtner negotiation,; between 
U Kazakhstan and Russ~a, A procurement package lias been prepa::ed for 
acquisit~on of an integra ting contractor, and will be released as soon as the 
Ru~s~ .. n objections are resolved. The ?roject ls to enable and facilitate 
K"z"",,,hst311'S eftorts to·rulfill its commitments under the START 1 'r"", .. ty and 
the LiSbon Protocol and to become a non~nuclear state. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMAR'f 
{April 1 , 199 4 - September 30, 1994} 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 106 
(By Project} 
(S in Millions) 
D!&RG!:Ncr R!:SPONSI: TRAI NI NG/EQUIPMENT (RUSSIA) 
Total P"oposed Current Actual 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
Appropriatign ~~~
f"f92 O.OO~ 0.001 
F''f93 2.851 2.629 
Research , F''f92 
Development, r'f93 
Test , , 
Evaluat io n 
f"f92 5 . 675 5.675 
FY 93 3. 8~3 2 . 1B3 
M~~~~~~~ction ,Y92 F"i93 
rormer Soviet 2.540 
11.866 
PIlDJECT PESCRIPTION: Pursuant to the Agreemen t Between the Department of 
Defense 0:: the United States of America and the Mini stry of Atomic t.nergy of 
the Russian rederation Conce rning the Safe and Secure Transportation and 
Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through the P"ovi Sion of £me"gency Response 
Equipment and Related Training Signed on June 0 , 1992 , the Department of 
Defense is p r oviding emergency response equipment to be used for the pu.-pose 
of facilitating the safe and secure transpo.-tation and stora ge of nuc l ea.-
weapons in connection with their dest"uction. The Russ:ians .-equested 
additional equipment, and as a result an Amendment to this ag.-eement was 
s:igned on Ma rch 26, 19~3 raising the amount of assistance from SlO m:illl.on to 
up to SI~ m.:illion. ThiS additional fund:ing will cover requeSt ed 
COll1rm.lnications equipment , additional p.-otective clothing, survey 
instrumentat:ion, .-adiography equipment, v ideo and optical equipment, a ccess 
equipment , compute.- systems , a nd stabilization systems . An additional 
amendment was concluded on MarCh 23 , 1994 to meet the Russian .-equest fo" 
equipment to upgrade their training fac:il ity at Mytichi. TO date, ten sets of 
"Jaw:> of Li fe~ emergency access equipment, 820 protective suits , 200 
polyurethane foam kitS, 30 gallons of silicone rubber, l~}oHu> '1 
~ee~ __ a~Ht7ra~oT1"""O~, 4 fiberscopes , 3 packaging 
vehicles , and 4 portable integrated videO sys t emS have been p rovided . Three . 
computer net work systems and twenty r adiO communication systems have also bee~ 
de.livered . Training on this equip,~ent has been conducted in bOth the US a nd • 
Russia . Training on the mobi.le "adiography system, conduct;;ed in the United 
States , was completed in September 1994. Plans ace u.nderway to initiate the 
shipn,ent and delivery of this system. Target date for del:ivery is DeCember 
1994. Two high-precision liquid abrasive c utting systems are in the final 
phases of assembly. Plans are underway to conduct training in the United 
States in December 199 4 and to s hip and dellver th" systems ir. January 1995 . 
COOP!:RATIV!: TIlIU:AT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANtruAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(Api'll 1, 1994 - September JO, 1994) 
ON TH!: PROGRAM !:STABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(Ely Project) 
($ in Millions) 
EXPORT CONTROLS ASSl:STANCl': (RUSSIA) 
F\pproprjatigo 
Research, 
Development, 
Test, ~ 
Evaluation 
rY92 
FY93 
F¥92 
F'Y9J 
Milit:ary FY92 
Const:ruct:ion ,'Y9J 
Tot:al Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligat:ional Oblig ... tions 
~~~
2.26 
PBDIl:CT RESCRIPTION: Discussions have been underway to establish an 
l.JnplelL~ntin9 "'grel'lment between the United StateS Department of Defense and the 
appropriate miniStries of thO! Russian Federation to provide assistance to 
Russia for improving their expOrt con t rol syst.em to prevent proliferation of 
weapons of mass dest.ruction, specia1i1.ed equipment, ... nd/or technologies and 
expert.ise that COllld be used in the prOduction of suCh weapons. As the 
1.ni1:ia1 notification of p r oposed Obligations w ... s ma.de under t:he now e:tpired FY 
1992 t:ransfer ... "t:horit:y, t:fte 000 renot:ified Congress of t:he prOpOSed 
obligations on April 29 , 199 4. Russia has object:ed to the terms in the draft 
tey.t. and negotiat1.ons have concluded withOut: reachlng agreement . Limited 
consultative and t:echnical el:changes proposed in this area will be reviewed on 
a case-by-case basis. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMHAft'i 
(Apr:U 1 , 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(By Prc..ject) 
($ in Millions) 
MATEJUAL CONTROL AND ACCOUNTAlIIL:ITY (RUSSIA) 
Appropriati9P 
Research, 
D .. " .. l0I""'''''I;., 
TeSt, & 
r."aluation 
Military 
construction 
Fonner So"iet 
Union Threat 
Red.uction 
F"'in 
F"Y93 
F"Y92 
~'Y!.o3 
F"Y92 
f"Y93 
Total Proposed Current Actual 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~~
29 . 585 
PJIOJECT DESCRIPTl:QN: On September 2, 1993, the Agreement Between the united 
State:o; Department at: Defense and the HinistJ;CY of AtOmiC Energy of the Russian 
F'ecter3tion {MINATOM) Concerning the Control, Accounting and Physical 
~~~i:~~i~~a~n~u~~:r R~~~~i:!s t~i~~~te P~~;u:~~v~~t~~~s O!g~~~~~~a~~~n of ~ 
Department of Defense may provide up to S10 million i n material, goodS and ~ 
services assistance to RUSSia to pcomote the prevention of nuclear weapons 
prOliferation. The principal elements of this p r oject are the ~_.lIO 
model facility, where complete control syst.ems will be modeled, and a training-
center. ProcuremenT;S for r:he model 1'aci1ity are being developed. 
~t;'~:atiO~8~~O .. n amendment to thiS agreem"''.lt are continuing . for: up to $20 
7!~~E~~ ~~~~i~t~i~:~ll.fe~n of direct use 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SOU-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 199 4 ) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 109 
(By Project.) 
($ in Millions) 
~RED SLANl(!:TS (RUSSIA) 
Apprgprjatjon 
Research, 
Development, 
~~~~~a~iOn 
f'Y92 
f'Y93 
f'Y92 
FY93 
n92 
FY93 
Military FY92 
Consr;ruction FY93 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligational 0l:lli9ar;ions 
~&I..t..!:llll..~ 
PBQTtCT pr;SCBUITIQN : Pursuant to the Agreement Between the Department of 
Detense ot the United Seates of America and the Ministry of Aeornic En.:rgy ot 
the Russian f'ederation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation and 
Storage of Nuclear Weapons Through t.he Provision of Armored Blankets, Signed 
on June 17, 1992 , the Oepal:"tment of Defense is to provide armored blan'.e1:S to 
the Russi an Federation to augment the protective capability of contal-ne .... s and 
~:~;~;:~y c~~~~~~~ ~~~;:;~ ~:~i~7~i;~ . a~~ t~~~ ;:~!~!~~e~f a~~oo-/' 
existing United St3tes Army soft ar!\\Or t::>l.3nkets was completed. An additional 
2,500 armored blankets we re procured through cOInpetitive bidding . On August 
31 , 1992, over seventy Request tor Proposal packages were sent to interested 
contractor s by the Defense Nuclear Agency. On October 16, 1992 , 24 propos .. ls 
were received from 13 contractors. On December 4, 1992, a prOduction contraCt 
worth $2,591,394 wa s awarded to the Protective Materials Company of Miami 
Lakes , F lorida. This competition resulted in a savings o f $l~lion. 
Deliv...,... £ , 3066iJlkCts as c pi c d O"~. h .. ve been 
received tha t the Armored Blankets have been used in transferring wea. pons f r om 
Ukraine and Kazlc.hstan to RUSSl.a. ~
COOPE:RATIVE: THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SOH-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMl\RY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30 , 1994) 
ON THE: PROGRAM £STABLISHED UND£R P .L . 102-229 S£CTION 108 
(By Project) 
(S in Millions) 
Fl:SS:IU: MAT!:lUAL CONTA.un;:.as (RCSS:IA) 
floprQoriat !Qo 
f'Y92 
f'Y93 
Researct. , FY92 
Oev~lop,nent, FY93 
TeSt, & 
FY92 
FY93 
Military FY92 
Construction FY93 
Fonner Soviet 
Union Threat 
f<edLlction 
Total Proposed Current 
ObLigations Obligationai Obligations 
~~~
41.699 
PRQIEm PP;SCRIPTIOti: Pursuant to the Agreement Between the Department of 
Oeof." ," st! of tne United States of America and tne MinIStry of Atomic energy Or 
tnc R"ilSian Federation Concerning the Safe a nd Secure Transportation and 
Stvrage of Nuclear Weapons Through the Provision at Fissile Mat""riai 
Cont;:)l.ners signed on June 17 , 1992 , the Department a t Detense is to provide 
the R"ssians a nwnber ot fissile material containers to be used in providing 
safe and protective transport and storage of fissile material in connection 
... ith the expeditiOUS destruction of nuclear we3.pons . The agreement calls for 
the o..,partment of Defense to initially deliver up to 10,000 containers. DoD 
plilns to produce as many containers as possible within the $50 million fundin9 
limit. ~ National Laboratories (SNL) prOvided the design and prototype 
development . Additionally, SNL is providing compliance testing and t e chnical 
suppo rt. To date, SNL 1la.!I been funded at a level of $3. 35M. A $40H 
Pl:oduction contract for ovel: 32,000 containers was awarded September 14 , 1993 
to Scientific £cology Group Ioc Teo prototype containers were delivered to 
RusS.l. a on April 13, 1993. An additional 16 pre-prodUCtion units will be 
shipped in m.id-October 1994. Full-scale production i! scheduled to start in 
Novcrnber 1994. The target date for completing delivery of the first 10 ,000 
Containo::rs is December 31, 1995. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT ru:DUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL RePORT SUMMARY 
(April I, 19'H - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER I:'.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(By I:'roject) 
(S in Mil l ions) 
S TORAG!: FACILI'I."Y DESIGN FOR FISSILZ MAT!:RIALS 
( RUSSIA ) 
"'Dpreor; at ; no 
Resea"ch, 
Develop,nent, 
Test., ... 
Ev a luation 
Military 
Const.ruction 
?'In 
f"Y 93 
?'I n 
?Y9 3 
n 92 
?Y 93 
Tota l P>:oposed Current 
Ob l i gations Obligat. i onal Obligat i ons 
~~~
psoItcr PESCRIPTION: Pursuant to the "'",ceement between the Department of 
Deten,.e of tile United State!: of America and the Ministry of Acomic E:n<'!rgy of 
the Russian Feder3tion concerning Technical Assistance for Design of a Sate, 
Secure, "nct Ecologically Sound Stocage Facility ior Fissile Material derived 
f.-om the Destruction of Nue l e"r Weapons signed on OCl:ober 5, 1992, the 
Department of Defense is [,0 provide t: e chnical design assls t:ance to the 
Russian-led facility design "' ffort. Costs uodec this agreement are not to.---
exCe.,d S15 million. This agreement expressly provides that it shall not be 
construed as commitl:inq c he Depart.ment of Defense to p covide any assisl:ance 
with respect to the consel:uction of the facility. Initial RUSsian design 
requirementS were received on AugUSt 3, 1992. The Russian ?ederation Design 
Team visited the United States December 4-18, 1992, to receive Computer Aided 
Design (CAD) Training, Harden Structure 'training, partic i pate in technical 
discussions, and t o conduct a management review. A joint concept design was 
agreed to in March 1993. During a U.S./Russian management meeting in ~'eDrua"y 
1994 , the Russian design t"am 3.nnounced they had completed their preliminary 
design of a -generiC· f acility and were prepared to obt.ain t.he necessa"y 
permits required to begin const.ruct.ion of the facilit.y . The RUSSian t. eam 
asked for additional U.S. assistance in reviewing the generic design they had 
produced and in adapting the generic design to a sp",cific 10c ... tion. In March 
1994, the U.S. received ofhci.al notification the facility is to be located at 
the Mayak site in Cnelyabinsk . Thougn the RUSSians expeCted to begin 
~onstructi.on of the f ... Cilit.y in mid-to-late Sumner 1994, construction has been elayed due to the Rus sL •. ns' l.naDl.lity to fund tne construction eftort. Initl.a1 site preparatl.on activity, however, has becn observed in Mayak. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANIfUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994 ) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHE.D UNDE:R i?L. 102-229 SECTION lOa 
(By Project) 
($ in Millions) 
rrSSrLl: MATl'!R.J:AL STORAGE r~rLrTY £QUU'ME.N'I' 
(RUssrA) 
I\pprqpr iatiQO 
Research, !'Y92 
Developlnent, FY93 
'I'est, ~ 
Evaluation 
For,ne" Soviet 
Union Threat 
FY92 
FY93 
Total Proposed 
Obligations Obligat:'o"al Obligatl.on~ 
~~~
PROJECT PESCRIPTION: Pursuant to the Agreement Between the Department of 
1)etehse of Uk United States of America and the Minist"y of Acomic Energy of 
the Russian ,ederation Concerning The Provision of Material, Service", and 
T"aining Relating to the Const"uction ot a Safe, Secure, and Ecologically 
Sound Storage Facility fo" Fi>lsile Material De"ived f"om the Destruction of 
Nuclea" Weapons ~igned on Septembe" 2, 1993, the DOD will providt!: m.ate"ial, 
training, and se"vic:es "el .. t",d to the const"uctio;'l anO operation of tht!: 
( Russian Storage Facl.lity. T.he total cos. t to. the.u.s. shall . not exceed S75 
"--nullion. From Novelllbe" 1993 to March 1994, l.mplementatl.on of tht!: agreement 
was delayed due to lack of tunding and l.ntroductl.on of Sectl.on 1612 {the 
~rl<ey Amendment) to the F"[ 94 National Defense Authorization Act. In January 
1994 , the RusSl.an ,'ederation furnished the U.S. a list of equipment they 
\
rt!:quired to support construction of the facility. In Ma"ch 199~, the project 
waS funded and in Ap"il 1994, Section 1612 was " .. solvt!:d. The U.S. began 
equipment negotiations with the Russians in April . P"ocu"ement of 
cons."."ction eqUiP. TrII!:nt has begun; delivery of equipment is expeCted to begin 
.. nth demonst"ated Russian commitment to constructing the facility . At 
present, the Russl.an Gov"rnment has not £unded actual const ruction of the 
facl.ll.ty, although l.epresentatives have indicated it is funded in the 1995 
budget. 
t 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRw. 
SEMI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHeD UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 10e 
(ey Projec1:) 
($ in ~i11ions) 
SI:CUR.ITY !:NHANCEMENTS W-OR RUSSIAN RAIL CARS 
(RUSSU) 
Research, 
Development;, 
·test, .. 
FY92 
FY93 
FY92 
FY93 
FY92 
FY93 
Tot.al Proposed Cur rent 
Obligations Obligato .:.onal Obl>..gation,; 
~~~
3.0 0 0 3.000 
15.50 0 16.50 0 
PRQJEcr DESCRIPTION· Pursuant. t.o t.he Agreemer't Bet.ween t.he Depart.ment of 
Oeten:>e or t.he United States of ~eric« and the Minist.-y o~ Atomic ICne.-'lY of 
the Russian Fede.-ation Concerning the Safe and Secure '!'ransportation of 
Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Weapons MOtterial Through the ProviSion of Cargo 
and Guard Rail Car Conversion Kits signed on /l.ugust. 28, 1992 , the Departll'.e!!t 
of Defense is to provide the Russians cargo and guard rail car conve.csion kits 
for the purpos,,", of providing protectivQ transportation of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear weapons material in connection .. ith tne e:;,:peditious ae~truction of 
nuclear .. eapons. SpeCifically, the Department of Defense is to deliver up to 
100 cargo rail car conversion kits and 15 guard rail car conversion kits rlus 
fi.fteen percent. spare parts, using fundS available up t.o a l.illl.it of $20 
million. An amenament .. as signed on March 2.3, 1994 increasing this =o.:.nt by 
$1.5 mlllion to accommOdate l;,t.e design changes to the kits for a total of 
$21.5 m.i.ll i on. On December 7, 1992, a Rus~ian cargo rail car arrived at 
Sandia National Labora1:ory and .. as used in th6 developm.mt of the conve r"ion 
kits. Modification of the prototype is complete. The prototype and the f>..rst 
three moditication kits were delivered to tne Tver rail car modification 
facility in Noveu\ber 1993. An operational rail tes!:, conducted jointoly by 
both count"i e s, .. as successfully completed On 1:he Russian rail system >..n May 
1994. As of 30 September 1994, 74 Mini$try of Defense cargo Car modification 
kits and 16 guard car modification kits have b een delivered. Plans are 
unc.er .... ay to complete all deliveries by MarCh 19'1". 1t is estirn.:l.ted by toho<' 
Russ>..an modification plant, that. 70 cargo Cc.rS «nd 7 guard cars .. ill I}., 
completed by the end of December 1994. 
COOPERATIVE THR£AT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SOMMA.RY 
(April 1, 1994. - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION lOB 
(By Project) 
(S in Millions) 
CH£MICAL WEAl'ONS OI:STRUCTION (RUSSIA) 
Total Proposed Actual 
Obligations Obligational ObligationS 
I.Q..J:M~ ~ ~~
FY92 1. 575 1. 533 
FY93 .662.657 
ResearCh, ,Y92 
Development, FY93 
Tes t, ~ 
Military FY92 
Construction FY93 
Former Soviet 22.310 
Union ·rIlL-e;).t 
Reduction 
PROTECT DESCRIPTION, On July 30, 1992, the Agreement Between the Department 
ot: Det'-'n:>e ot the United St<ltes of America and the President's Committee on 
Conventional Problems ot Chemical <lnd Biological Weapons of the Russian 
Federation Concerning the Safe, Secure and Ecologically Sound Destruction of 
Chemical weapons was signed in Washington, D.C. It provides a feameworlt for 
chemical · ... eapons destruction asSi.stance to be provided by the Department of 
Defoense to tne Rus~ian Federation, to include teaining and services. All 
mateeial, training and services provided under the Ageeement are to be used 
exclusively for the purpose of facilitating the safe, secuee, ecologically 
sound, and e,~peditious destruction of chemical weapons. Specifically, the 
Agreement provides up to $2.5 million in aSSistance for; development with the 
Committee of a comprehensive plan foe Chemical Weapons (CW) destructio n; 
provision of detection, systems of analysis, and alacm systems for the 
transport ot" chemical weapons and/oe for safety and ·.,jarning purposes dt 
chem1cal weapons destruction sites: establishment of a familiarization program 
for Russian F.,deeation chem.i.cal .... eapons destruction experts and engineees at 
facilities in the United States selected by the Department of Defense; visits 
by Committee te.::hnica l repeesentatives to United States chemical weapons 
d"struction Llcilities; demonstration o t peotective equipment and provision ot 
other ~r3ining Or tutorials related to chemical weapons destruction; and other 
cooper;}.tJ.on related to Chemical Weapons Destruction as ageeed to by both 
parties. 
A Chemical Weapons Desteuction Support Office (CWDSO) was eStablished 
June 15, 1';93 in Moscow, and is staffed by the United States Army 
Chemical/Biological. Detense Command (C8OCOM), Coeps ot Engineers, On-Site 
Inspectior, Agency lOSIA), ilnd SAIC (.::onteactor) personnel. Exchange v is its 
have b""n maae to provide Russian officials .in formation on the U. S. Chemical 
Stocl<cpile Disposal Program. A RuSsian/US 1994 [,lan of '"ark ha:; been signed . 
Six interns from Russi<l completed o;;echnical and ,uanagetia l training in th'" US 
for the Il.ussian disposal program; and a U.S. contr<lctor, Bechtel Nationa l, 
Incorporated, was sel.ected in May 1994 to assisc. the Russian E"edera tion in 
prep<lri ng <I comprehensive CW Destruction Implementation Plan. 
'!.'he Bechtel team, "orking "s part of the CWDSO, "ill assist in 
developing process and faCllity d .. Slgn criteri", perfo,-m des:.ruction site 
charac1:erization stud.ies, and h elp prepare an eJnergency prepaL'edness p l an . An 
Advanced Pl<1nnlng Brieflng was cOrlducted, '..,ith Russia;] participation, on 23 _ 
24 June 1 994 to addre:;s concerns/issues related to pOSSible U. S. funding of 
the ct,:,sign ana construction of a CW aestruc1:i.on faci.li.1:y in Russia. In 
September 1 994 , th", Ministry of Defense of the Russ]."" Fed",ration proposed a 
si :<-phase joint developrntlnt program (U.S . (unded) ",hi.eh ",ould culminate in a 
destruction faci l ity fa. ehelnic .. l ilgent filled arti l lery projeet~les using a 
Russian t·..,o-step destruction ~rocess. The u. S. hag p.oposed JOlnt eva l uat ion 
of I:r.e Russian ctestructicn process to dec.ermine the feasibility of the RUSSian 
proposal. . 
COOPERATIVE t'HREAt' REDUCTION PROGAAM 
son-ANNUAL REPORt' SUMMARY 
(April 1 , 1994 - September 30, 199~) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P . L . 10 2 -229 SECTION 108 
(By ProjeCt) 
($ in Millions) 
STRATl:GIC OFrDlS I Vl: AJU(S ELIMINATION (SOA£) 
(RUSSIA ) 
Ijpproprja r j Qn 
Operaeions &. FY92 
Maintenance FY93 
Research , FY92 
Development , f"i9~ 
Test , & 
Evaluation 
Fyn 
FY!l3 
Military Fyn 
Construction FY!i) 
Former Soviet 
Total Proposed Current Actua l 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~~
2.160 2.301 
B1 . 460 
poon:CT PESCRIPTION: An Agreement between tile Department of Defense ot the 
United States of America and tile Comm..i.ttee f or De f ense Industry of the Russian 
Federation Concerning Cooperation in the El.imination of Strategi c Offensive 
Arms was signe d on August 26 , 1993 . Pursuant to this Agreeme nt, the 
Department of Defense will provide a SSistance to tohe RUSSian Federation to 
accelerate the dismant lement of Russian Strategic Offensive Arms (SOA) under 
the terms of the START Treaty . Funding supports the procurement of a wide 
variety of equipment items inCluding int ermodal containers , flatbed rail cars , 
emergency response equipment, cut t ing s hears fo r SLBM iaunchers and he<lvy 
bomber e1.imin<l tion <lnd an <lssortLnent Of other equipment necessary for speci f ic 
dismantlement efforts. AS of ~O September 1994, all but one p.rocurement (a 
supplemental request tor addl.tl.onal metal balers) had been a warded. 
Virtually , all tile small industrial tools and tne bulldoters 1><I"e been shipped 
t o RUSSia. The other equipment is being Shipped on a mu t ually agreed 
schedule . :-lost will be in place by April 1995. The U.S. will also provide 
the Russians wieh one year ot mainten<lnce materials and initial training 
related to the operation ot the equipment provided . 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCT!ON E'ROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994. - September 30 , 1994) 
ON TilE PROGRN-I ESTABLI SHED UNDER P.L . 10 2-229 SECT ION 10 8 
(8y Pro ject.) 
($ in Millions) 
l'ROJ£CT: INT!:RNAT:IONAL SCn:'NCE AND Tt:CHNOLOGY CENTER 
(rSTC) (RUSSIA) 
' pnrQpdjHjQn 
Operations & ~~~~ 
Re!Jearch, 
Development , 
~~~i~a ~ion 
Fonner Soviet 
Union Threa t 
Reduction 
FY92 
FY93 
Ji'Y92 
t'Y93 
FY92 
FY93 
Tota l l'roposed 
Obligations Obligat i onal Obligations 
~~
25. 0 
.150 
1.2$0 
PRDmM m;scBlpTIQN: On November 27, 1992, the United. Stat.es, a long with th/ 
Hu""ian Federat ion, the European Communl.ty, and Japa n, sl.gned an Agreement 
,",h i Ch escablishe s an InCernational. Science and. Te chnOl.ogy Center in t':oscow for 
cr.e purpose of aiding the t ra nsition a! Russian weapons ,;cieocists to p e ace(ul 
:>cieocific endeavo r s. Afcer Signacure, the Agreement was submitted to che 
Russ ian Parliament (or ratification. l'.acifici}cion lOas C1..;layed beca use ot the 
diSsOlution of the Russian Parliament in October 1993. A protocol was signed 
l:>y all part ies on Decembe r 27, 1993 that allowed the Center to beg in 
<lperations on a provisional basis pending ratificatio n tJy the neW Russian 
Parliament. Operations began on Harch 3 , 1994. At t ile preserlt time , the 
co tal potential obligation by the U.S. Government tor t~,e ISTC is .s25 million . 
In addi t ion to the initial parties, Finland, Sweden, and Geo~gia are now 
':~~~~~n~n~oB~!~~~! , m:'::~!~' Kazakhstan, and Cana da haVe e:<pressed their 
The Goverrling Boa.rd, which direct s the operat ion of the c ent er, met in 
March, June and again in September 1994 . At tnese meetings, t he board 
appro ved some seventy-six projec t s worth a total of $~ 0 . 8 ,nillion . The U .S. 
port ion at this obligation is abouc $22 mil lion . Of theSe approved projects , 
21 have led to formal, signed p roj ect agreemen t~, f o.r which the U.S. has 
transferred $5. 5 mi llion in advance payments to the ISTC . Since its * 
establishment. last March, the ISTC has made direct grant payments to 571 
sciencists involved i n Center projeCts. In total, these projects lOill sponsor 
7~r:e~~~~s 4 ~~~~v~~~:~~i~~~ ~~i~~;i~';Er:, the ,najorit y of ",hom Were involVed 
Many proje CC!! approved for funding i nvolve teams from a range of Russian 
Projects are located in institutes in MOscow and the Moscow 
region, St. Petersburg, Nmovosibirsk, Che lyabinsk- 70 , Ar%amas-16, Tomsk-7, and 
ill Georgia. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION ~ROGRAM 
SE.I'lI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - Septe.nbe.c 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-484 
(By P.coject) 
(S in Mi.llions) 
R.!:Sr.ARCH AND D,,-VELOPMENT P"OUNDATION (lUJSSIA) 
Ope rat ions. ,Y92 
Maincenance f"Y93 
Research, FY92 
Development, f",(93 
~~:~~a~iOn 
,"t92 
,'(93 
Total P.coposed Cu.c.cenc ;"ctual 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~. . ~a.t..i..Ytl 
rRQI}"cr m:scRTpTTON: On Septembee 6, 199"4, DOD notified Congeess of the 
proposed obligations of $10 million fo.c the eStaOlishment of a ResearCh and 
Development (Fl"D) Foundation in Flu.';sia. Funds for the R"D foundation ",e.ce to 
be de.cived !.com funds p"evio"sly ,:,"otil'ied f o.c Ind"sc.cial f'a"cnerships in 
Bela"us ~n ttle lOY 1993 Reprogeamnung .cequest. f"unds are to 0<1 tr«nsfe.c.ced to 
the Director 01' the National Science ,'oundation co p.covid .. assiscanc .. to 
.. eapons scienti~ts and engineers in the fanner So"!.,,t Union . 
COOPERATIVE THR£A:r REDUCTION PROGRAM. 
SEMI-ANNlJAL REPORT S\JMMARY 
(April 1 , 1994 - September 30, 199 4 ) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLI SHED UNDER P . L . 102-396 Sr.CTION 9110 (b) (l) 
(By ProjeCt) 
($inM.i11ions) 
ARC'l"IC Wc:L£AR WAST~ ASSESSMENT PROGR.AM (ANWA.1') 
Appropriation 
f"Y92 
FY93 
Research, F,(9~ 
Development, FY93 
Test, " 
Evaluation 
FY92 
FY93 
Military FY92 
Construction ~'Y93 
Total Proposed ACtual 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~ ~ (C" w' ! atiye! 
10.00 0 
2 0 . 0 20.000 
PBQ,JJ!;CT PESCRIPTION' The FY 1994 Department of Defe nse Appropriations Act, 
~ .L. 103- 139 , requires that $lOM shall be available f or the identification, 
stUdy, and assessment o f nuclear waste disposal lly ute f ormer Sovie t Unio n in 
~~~d~~c~~c F~ei;~~s by ;~!1l;~ ~e~~~~;~~:;i~~r:~~i~~~an~~~~ 
Rt!'!rea-rcto-(,ONR) has lleen designated as the implementing organization for this 
program. For FY 1993 ONR awarded appro>:imately 40 grants and contracts to 
various organiz;l.tions including the-Hava± Re!leJfCiI LJb611Eory as well as many 
other participants from academi" , p r ivate induStry, and the government. For 
FY 1994 a similar plan is being exc:cuted involving over 4S grants and 
contracts now in place . 
The program for 1993 involved roughly ten Arctic cruises, and obtained 
some 11, 000 samples from appro.:imately 600 different stations. Analysis of 
these data will continue thro "gh 1996 , but initial res"lts suggest that, 
except for very localized areas in Kara Sea fjords and bays , there are no 
(
"nus. ""'. ly high ra.diation 1.evel S in the Arct~c enVironmen. t Or Al.askan wa.,e.". ~er, preli.minary nwnerical analyses 1.ndicate that, even under worst-case r1.0S , the long-term l.mpact of the dumped nUClear wastes w1.11 be nu.nunal. 
, ort describlng these first-year results wa~ tN,nsm1.tted to Congress 
"' , I: 1;.1\1s year. 
The pl:ogram for 199 4,which is now underway, will provide illlproved 
theo r etical modeling to allow validation f or (or Changes to) the above 
conclusions. Additional sampling of the Arctic region;; will be conducted, and 
areas of the North Pacif:ic will be examined, specifically the dWllp sites that 
could affe ct Alaskan waters. The r"dionuclide burde r, un the Arctic region 
generated by RUSSia's north- f lOwing river systems will also be studied. 
Finally, recommenoations for cost effective improvements to the rel.evant 
Alaskan enviro""'nental monitoring systems wil.l be provided. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - Septeml:ler 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM E:STABLISHED UNOE:R P.L. 102-396 
(Sy Pl:oject) 
($ in Millions) 
OEroWS!'; CONV£RSION/lNOUSTIUAL PARTNERSHIP (RUSSIA.) 
,ll,ppropriatio o 
Reseal:ch, 
Development, 
Test, & 
Evaluation 
.yn 
f"Y93 
.Y92 
f"'i93 
Milital:Y F"Y92 
Constl:uction f"Y93 
Tota~ Proposed Actua~ 
Ob~igations Obligational Obligations 
~~
f"onnel: Soviet 20.000 
PROJECT DE$CR.%PTION: On Decembel: 16, 1993, the Department of Defense of the 
United States of /Utlel:ica and the Russian Ministries of Defense and E:conomy 
signed a PI:Otocol on Coopel:ation in the Implementation of Certain Defense 
Convel:sion Projects. An amendment to this Protocol was signeo March 16, 1994. 
'the Russians agreed to two Oefens<! converllion projects, with a third 
under development. The RUSSians proviOed five fOrnlel: Weapons of Mass 
Des!:l:uction (1or"MO) companies as candidates fOI: conversion into prefabricated 
housing industries. Tiley also provided four former WHO as candid.ates for 
convel:sion into what eve I: COJtlTlel:cial venture the RusSian-Amel:ican pal:tnel:s 
propose. Each prOject was committed at up to $20 million, and will be 
procured undel: competitive bid. Each cal~s tor cost shal:ing by the US 
pal:tnel:, whel:e tile USG pays for only pal:t of the costs fOI: stal:t-up Of the 
venture. contl:ib' t i.Wl.; .peet~~"_,"· ~"'-'''''='''''''''''~ 
~ The thil:d area under development is <1 list of 63 Russian companies 
which could tie availab~e fo r pal:tnering witn western fil:I1lS for any commercial 
~~~:':d._ !~:s last project was placed on hOI~ 
The Industry program involves four Russian companies fOl:T\Wl:ly involved 
i "'!llll.... 'they ar~ tne NPO Macllinostl:oyena (which designed sate~lit8S and space \ 
lau~ehicle. S), Loi!ninets (which designed missile guidance and I:adars) , IStol<: 
(whicn designed comm.and and control equipment), and Gosniias (which designed 
bombers and al.rcraft). Western cocnpanies were asked to partner wl.th parts of 
one or more of these companies, and accept a CO;SI: Sharing relationship were 
tile USG pays for only part of the venl:ure. The draft procurement docwnent was 
issued for publiC comment in January while del:ails were being finalized witn 
tne Russian Governmenl:. The actual request foc proposal (RFP) ... as issued on 
March S, with preproposal conferences in Washington on March 22, and ~oscow on 
April 21. Rep["esenta!:ives of the four Rus~L".n til:lttS remained in Washington 
for private meet].ngs. Proposals wer" subnutted on !oIay 10, 1'19<: 
~'ou[" industry awards were announced, involving each Russian company. A 
$1 . 94911 award was announced on June 21 for Internat].onal American ProdUCts 
(lAP) of Columbia, SC . -"AP will work with Lenine!:s of St. Petersburg to re 
~13nufacture dental chai:::-s and develop a product line of dental products. They 
will create a jo1.nt ventuee to ~ervice the needs of RUSSlan dent].st:> . A ~5.1M 
contract wa" announced on June 21 for Double Cola of Chattanooga, TN. Dou:Jle 
Cola 01].11 for:n a joint v"ntuee ·"itll NPO Mas:lino"troyen3 to open a soda 
:Jottling plant and di.stribu:;ion "ystem. A $5.4""1M a .. ard was announced on July 
29 for tleari.ng Aid.: lnterna!:ion .. l (HAI) of Somme["sworch, ~H. M! will form iI 
joint "ent.u"e ... ith Istolc to manufacture beh].nd-the-ea" h"""xing a].ds (currently 
i.mported ].nto RUSSi,,) ~or retail in Russia . A $~. l~ aw.;.rd was announced On 
July 2'1 to Rock. ... ell ot Richardson, TX . Rockwell, and partner Hughes, will 
fonn an associat.ion "nth Gosnii,,'; to develop !-,["oducers for an ai. crafiiC 
contro l syst.em for Russ i a. 
The prefabricat.ed housing project involves five Russian companies 
tonnerly involv"d in WMD. Th;;y are Soyuz (which made ["ocker pl·op"l l allt), N?O 
Kompozit. (whi ch designee. and lnade part~ tor roclce:; ",o:;or engines), NPO 
Machino~teoyena (wh~Ch de"igned s3t.ell~tes and s!-,3ce launch v",hi<;les), Tupolov 
(· .. hich desic;ned str'ltegic bombers), 'Ind Energomash (whi.ch desi.gned liquie. . 
roclcet engine,; for ballistic mis~1.1es). w"st. .. "n companiES woule. par!:ner '''ith 
pa.ts of these companLes co cr .. "t .. prefabricated housLng indusc["y . A first 
production order of about 500 unit" (to "stablish the company in the ma["ket 
and set up their supply system) would create housing fo,· demobi l ized milica"y 
persom1,,1 . The Min~stry o f Defense ... ould provide t"e land, infrast.ucture, 
and foundations to. the housi.ng a!: a site about 30 k~lo"'eLers SOuthwest ot the 
Moscow Ring Road at a tonner Air DefEnse training base. The draft p["ocu"emen:; 
docwllenc "as i.ssued for publiC conOllenc in Janua:oy while e.etails we["" being 
finalized with the Rus.:ians. The actual r"q.:"st. Eor propa"al (RF I' ) waS issued 
on May 2, 19')4. A !'reproposal conference was held 1.n Washi.ngton 01< !>'''''Y 10, 
and r"pres"ntativ"s f"om t:le f~ve Russi .. n finos r""'1l<l~ned in to .. " fo" a · .. e"k 
for private meetings ... ith t.he t..:nerican partners. Proposals were receiv"d 6n 
June 27, 1'1'1~. Orig i nally, the project waS to be fundee. us1.ng I'Y 93 funds, 
with 3ward scheduled fOJ: Septeruber 19'14. 
In December IS93, a 1ist of 8S Russian defense companies, most formerly 
engaged in WMD "'ork, ... as provided to the Russian Government. The intent was 
to undertake il p ro curement like the ind u Stry four above, but hav" a l"rge[" 
group for Americans to chaos" from . All 89 wou l d not be funde,"! part l,,~["ships. 
AmerLean companies ,",ho do not receive funding under ":.h~s m~ght choose to take 
on th"'ir own pJ:ivate l y funded busi.ness deals with their Russi .. n part"e:::-s. In 
o:::-de[" to give US industry an advance no t ice and to solicit industry corom"nts, 
the list was published on MarCh IS and June e in the Commerce BUSiness DaLl.y. 
The t:'inal list of 82 companies ,",as agreed to with r:,,~ RUSsians in early J u ly. 
liow""er, a procurement action is on hold pending the availability of FY95 
fundS ~or the project. 
Research, 
Devtolopment, 
TeSt, & 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISH£:) UNDER P.L . 103-139 
jBy Project.) 
FY92 
,Y93 
FY92 
FY93 
,Y92 
FY93 
($ in Millions ) 
Total Proposed 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~~
Military FY92 
Cons'::ruction FY93 
7.670 
PROJ}jCT DliSCBJPTION; The fund is e armarked tor ventures i nvolving Western 
).>art" .. rs and former weapons ot mass des truction production industries in 
«'\1SSi3, Kazakhstan, Be13rus, and Ukraine. The ventures would pursue 
commercial, privately owned endeaVors. Annual USG grants to the Fund would be 
~~~~:~~~~~l the loans 3nd equity shares provided substant;ive "et;u"ns on t;he 
The Fund was incorporated on MarCh e, 1994. Over t;he next three months, 
tb", Board was selected and approv .. d by t;he Whit;e House, and t;lie Cha"te" and 
terms ot the grant we"e negoti3ted. The grant was issued to the Fund on June 
23, 1994. The Fund expects to approve its i'irst ventures t.his Fall. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM 
SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April 1, 199~ - Sept:ember 30, 199'\) 
ON THE PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER P.L. 102-229 SECTION 106 
(By Project:) 
($ in Millions) 
OFFENSE AND MILITARY CONTACTS (RUSSIA, 6o.ARlJS, UKRAINE, KAZAKHSTAN) 
Approprjatjoo 
Operat:ions &. 
Maint:enance 
Research, 
Development:, 
Test:, .. 
Evaluat:ion 
."f92 
f""f93 
Military ."f92 
Const:ruct:ion F'1<:I3 
Tot:al Proposed Current: Act:ual 
Ob l igat:ions Obll.gat:ional Obligat:l.ons 
~~~
Former Soviet: 6.365 
PRQ,JJ;O PEsCRIPTION: Individual Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) and 
Cooperat:ion on Defense and Milit:ary relat:ions have been signed between t:he 
Unit:ed States Department of Defense and the Minl.series of Defense of Ru ssia, 
Belarus, KazakhStan and Ukraine. The MOU with Ukraine was signed July 27, 
1993, ttle HOU with Russi .. was signed September 8, 1993, t:he MOU with S<llarus 
was signed OCtober 26, 1~9), and the MOU with Kazakhstan was signed February 
14 , 1994 . These proje cts wi ll develop an active and positive defense and 
military relationShip with Former Soviet Union (FSU) states eo pave the way 
for cooperatiOn in dismant:lement: and demiLitarization efforts . Defense and 
military contacts are intended to encourage and aSSist the .SU military in lOne 
restrUCturing and downsizing of their defense establishment; address, as far 
as pOSSible, the milit.:.ry's COnCernS and encourage their support for 
denu.litarizatlon activities and demOCratic refo01ls: help t;he milit;ary t;o 
bet;t;er underStand civil-milit;ary relations; and increase US military 
understanding of t;he FSU. The primary goal ot t;his program is to establish a 
net:work of professional exchanges that; gives FSU defense and milit;ary 
establishlllent;s a stake in continued good relations. 
Over 116 different; event:s have been held. Pa"ticipants have inCluded U.S. 
mill.tary depart;ment;S, the Coast: Guard, the United St:ates European, Space, 
St:rat:egic and Pacific CommandS, t:oe Joint Staff, <lnd the Defense Intelligence 
Agency. A wide range of defense and military contacts were conducted during 
the period in eacn eligible FSU state. 
~: CINCSTRATCOM v iSit;:!d Russian Strategic Rocket; .orces and a follow - on 
working level e:o.changa ... .. s agreed: the CINC Of Russian Space .orces visited 
USSPACECOM in an import3nt st:ep in developing a continuing dialogue on space 
issues; Russian Strategic 80mber Forces pal.d a Sister Sase visit to Barksdale 
Af"B; t;he Coomander of Russian BOrder GuardS visited a wide range of USC 
agenCies which included discusslon of suCh issues as nonproliferatlon; the MOD 
Chief ot Conununications visited the US and a defense te~ephone ~ink was 
estab~ished between DoD and the Russian MOD; the second in a series of Joint 
Staff Talks was held in MOscow during which a wide range of security and 
military issues were discussed; CINC 'I'RANSCOM visited Russian transport 
aviation units in order to gain a better understanding of possible future 
cooperation with, for example, airlift to support joint peacekeeping 
operael.ons: the US conducted a ship visit and the fi"st USMC-Russian Naval 
Infantry ma"itime disaste" relief exercise in VladiVOStok, the USCG and the 
Russia!! Border Guards Mariti.me forces conducted a SearCh and Rescue exerCise 
off Alaska, the US hosted a delegation at over 25 senior Russian General 
Officers for a visit to the Naval War College and Washington. Finally, The 
Department condUCted a historic first joint US-Russian Peacekeeping exercise 
at "l'otskoye, Russia. In preparation tor this e"ercise several eXChanges were 
held On peacek""ping doctrin" that r"sulted in a joint document that was used 
du~· ing the exercise and provides the basis for future peacekeeping operations. 
~. DOD held a Bilater3l. Working Group m"eting in Washington during 
",hieh a wide range of d"fense and security iss"es were discussed: DoD hosted 
viSits to the US oy three Ukrainian Ground Fore" delegations to US Army 
Officer dev"lopm"nt, NCO training and Reserve and National Guard facilities; 
DoD comm"nication tecnn1.cians visit"d K1."v and established a defense telephone 
link; DoD and Ukrainian MOD conducted Joint Staff Talks in WaShington; the US 
Anny Recru1.ting Command visited Uk.:aine to e:·,plain t:he US all-volunteer force 
concept; DoD cOI'd"cted t"a1.n1.ng in US parachuting techniques in Ukra1.ne 
followed by a visit of a Ukrainian Airborne platoon to Fort Bragg. 
~: A Bil.ateral Working G"oup meeting was held in Washington, and a 
US Coast Guard Team viSited Kazakhstan to assess their Casp.i.an Sea border 
pat"ol fleet. 
~: A Bilateral Working Group meeing was held in Washington; Belarusian 
Gro"nd Force deleg3t.i.ons visited the US A~...,ny Recruiting Command to learn about 
the US all-volunteer force concept and National Guard and Reserve faCilities 
to learn about the US citizen soldi"r concept; DoD conducted numerous 
exchanges between US E.uropean Cornrn.and "nits and Belarusian units on military 
issues of mutual interest. 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRlIM 
SEMI -ANNUAL REPORT SUMMARY 
(April I, 1994 - September 30, 1994) 
ON TH!: PROGRAM !:STABLISH!:O UND!:R P.L. 102-229 SECTION 108 
(By Project) 
($ in Millions) 
OTHER ASSLSSMDIT/ADMJ:Nl:STRATION COSTS 
;;rp ronr j at jon 
Research, 
Development, 
1'esc, , 
o:valuacion 
FY92 
FY93 
F'f92 
f'Y93 
Total Proposed Current 
Obligations Obligational Obligations 
~~~
. 1 95 
1 . 732 
.625 
.850 
.134 
1.581 
.475 
.850 
PPQItCT m;scRTP1'IQN: As reporced to Congress on May 16, 1992, February 16, 
1994 and March 2, 1994., these funds were proposed to be obligated for che 
purpose of .lIssessing the feasibility o t other proposals and supporting the 
development of ~pecific programs authorized under Section 108 of P.L. 102-229, 
Title XIV Of P.L. 102-484, and Title XII of P.L. 103-160. Funds have been 
obl l-gil.ted for the developmental, adminl-strative and ~upport coscs of the 
overall effort and of each projecc in the inl-tl-al stages until specific 
re'1..lirements are identified and proposed obll-gations are ~'eported t:o Congress 
for the projects. During this reporting perl-od, t:hese funds have been used 
!or such activities as: CTR Delegation trowel expenses, CTR techllical team 
travel expenses, translato,,/int:erpreter support:, Depa:::anent of State travel 
e:~penses, Department of Transportation supporc, <orecaSt to ;I:ndustry 
Conference, and . contracted techni.cal and analytical "upport. Additionally, 
funds ",ere specl.tl.cally approved for designated efforts: Defense ConverSion 
Resident Advisor ProgrAl1l and the development: of the Defense Demilitari.zation 
;~~:~~~!~e Fund. Support is also t:o be provided from t:he N .. tional Academy of 
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APPENDIX E 
FEBRUARY 1995 eTR ANNUAL REPORT TO PRESIDENT 
This is William 1. Perry's annual report to Congress and the President. It is used 
here to illustrate the lack of effective nonproliferation policy currently being practiced in 
Russia and the NIS. 
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Annual Report 
to the 
President 
and the 
Congress 
William J. Perry 
Secretary of Defense 
February 1995 
P:II'1iV Ddenseinili:uives 
COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
Promise ofCTR made the Trilateral Statement in January 1994 possible; del ivery ofCTR assiStance 
led 10 funher progress. Once the necessary agreements had been signed. assistance began to flow, 
in the shape of security eq uipment. vehicles. cranes. fueL transport:llion .equipment. and similar 
items . In the course of efforts to Implement the Trilateral Statement. Ukr:unian offict:lls requested 
several specific items on an accelerated schedule. Within three weeks, a shipment was on its way 
In August 1994. L.:onid Kuc hma was. elected president. a~d requested CTR assistance in heJping 
meet Important domestIc and internatIOnal goals within h.ls first 100 days 10 office. Cooperaung 
closely with the Kuchma government. the CTR program Idenufied areas where speedy provlslOn 
of aid would have visible impacts. and ru~hed fuel, lubricants. emergency response suppOrt 
equIpment. .and. mdustrlal and computer equIpment to accelerate the deacl!vati~n of SS- 19 and 
S5·24 mISSI le sIlos. One outcome of this demonstrated WIllingness to help Ukralne hve up to liS 
commitments was the Ukrainian legislature's November 1994 vote 10 approve accession to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state. an outcome no one took for 
granted. Ukraine formally acceded 10 the NPT in December. The case of Ukrained~monstrates how 
effecllvely and qUIckly the CTR program can be Implemented. once the negolla1l0n process IS 
completed. 
CTR PROGRAM OBJECTIVES 
The objectives of the CTR program as established by Congress are' 
To assist the fomer Soviet stales to des troy nuclear. chemical. and other weapons of 
mass destruction. 
Transport. store. disable. and saieguard weapons in connection with their destruction. 
Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of such weapons 
Prevent diversion of weapons related scientific ellpenise. 
Facilitate demilitarization of defense· industries and conversion of military capabilities 
:lOd technologies. 
Ellpand defense and military contacts between the United States and the NIS. 
Th~se objective.s are ine~tric.abJy linked to ~ach other. as are t h~ corresponding CTR program 
aCllvities . Meetmg the objectIve of safeguardmg nuclear weapons In Russia. for Instance. WIll also 
help prevent proliferation, a growing concern in light of recent reportS of nuclear smuggling 
CTR program ac t i~ities generally fa.1l into fo ur categories in acco~dance with these objectives, First. 
Destruction ~d DIsmantlement actlvlt.les accelerate .th.e destruction and dismantling of weaPO.ns of 
mass destrucllon and their launchers 10 the four eligIble states where they rematn b~ prOVIding 
leverage to encourage these counmes to dismantle and by prOVIding the actual equIpment and 
tratnmg reqUIred to Implement dismantlement deCIsions. 
Second . through Chain of Custody activities, t~e CTR program decreases the dangers from the 
nuclear warheads and fisstle materials that remaJ.n in the.NIS and represent a potentIal threat to the 
Unned States. DUrIng the dIfficult penod of trans~tion 10 these states. the ~ontlOued seCUrIty and 
custody of nuclear weapons and matenals IS vitally Important to both the Untted States and the NIS. 
Third. CTR supportS Demilitariza.tion efforts which decrease the long.term threat by reducing the 
capacity and econotIUC pressures 10 the NIS to conunue to produce weapons of mass destruction. 
The industrial partnership projects in CTR are an effon to reduce the potential of a future nuclear 
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COOPER<\TIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
trueat at its source . Furth.ermore. the transtonnations created through th~ i.ndustrial partnership 
:J.rrangements prevent proliferatIOn by reducing both the supply ofWMD available for foreign sale 
or diversion and the incentives for relying on such sales for income. 
Lastly. the CTR program supports Other Programs and Suppon such as the expansIOn 01 defense 
and miiitary contacts with the.NIS. When the Soviet Union dissolved. the republics it contained 
were left with structures. forces. :md equipment that were nO! well suited to their new-found 
sovereigntv. The United States. through defense and military contacts. has been able to assist in the 
deve lopment of democratic and civilian control of military departments and the restructuring and 
downsizing of defense capabilities to bener reflect thesc new nations' current needs . For example. 
the CTR program sponsors regular e.,changes on. defense strategy and greater tr:msparency of 
budgets and progrJ.ITls. Thesecountr:es w!li remamlmponant players m world events and the Umted 
States benefits greatly from the dose contacts with its military and defense counterpans. These 
contacts arc part of U.S. efforrs across the board to expand the domain in which C.S. security 
concerns coincide . rather than conflict. with those of the NIS. Recognizing that differences will still 
occur. deveioping long-term institutional relationships contributes to improving substantive 
professional dialogue on imporrant defense and military issues. in addition to facilitating 
den:;cleanz:ation and nonproliferallon activities. 
Frf994-CTR"Program:Baseline Obligations 
~~~~ ~ -
A.llg s..p 
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PROGRESS IN CTR LVIPLEMENTATION 
Part IV Defense Initi~lives 
COOPERATfVE THREAT REDUCTION 
To meet CTR objectives. the program consists of numerous separate projects agreed to in the 
agreements and memoranda of understanding between the United States and Russia. Belarus 
Ukraine. and Kaz~stan .. T~e CTR program has grown impressively, panicul,ar,ly over the past 
year. with the base llOe obhgatlon rate Increasing over four~fold . to about 5434 rrul!Jon at th~ end or 
FY 1994 (see chan above). By that lime. 0 .00 had nOllfied Congress of proposed obhgallons 
totaling nearly 5969 rrullion from funds authonzedfor FY I 992 to FY 1994 for specIfic projects for 
the eligible states. More Importantly. the IOtal aSSistance comrrulted under agreements concluded 
with 000 and for which impJementallon is actually underway is now 5898 million. The following 
chart indicates CTR funding commitments by program area. -
O<lllruClio"."d 
OI.ma"Uem."l 
.. ~. 
(~I 
The CTR process from negotiation. to project formulation. to requirements definition. to final 
e)l.ecution, involves many steps In the respecllve state-to-state relationships as well as within the U.S. 
government. Congress has directed that American contractors be used forCiR suppOrt to the extent 
feasible . Accordingly, 000 conrracting for CfR goods and services is accomplished based on 
Federal Acquisition Regulations to ensure that U.S. busin~sses are treated fairly. [n the final 
analysis, CTR benefits the U.S. economy by providing addiuonal Jobs for American workers and 
expanded markets for U.S. corporalions. 
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APPENDIX F. 
NEWS RELEASE, ASST. SEC. OF DEFENSE 
Illustrated here are the narrow and short-sighted applications behind defense 
conversion policies. 
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Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Secretary of Defense William .J. Perry 
The National Press Club 
Washington, D.C 
January S, 1995 
At the peak of the Cold War, Andrei Sakharov. the great Russian physicist, said. 
"Reducing the risk of annihilating humanity in a nuclear war carries an absolute priority over all 
other considerations." At the rime Sakharov said that. both the United States and the Soviet 
Union believed that the danger of annihilating humanity with nuclear weapons was vel)' real 
Both developed a strategy, Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD. to prevent a nuclear 
catastrophe. A.od both developed awesome nuclear arsenals to carry out their strategy. 
11AD has been compared to twO men, Standing ten feet apm. each pointing a revolver at 
the other 's head_ The revolvers are loaded. each man has his finger on the trigger. and each is 
shouting insults at the other. This vivid metaphor captures the mutuw. terror that was at the base 
of our security policy during the Cold War. Today. with a democratic government in Russia, the 
Cold War is history and we would like to forget the nightmare that was Mutually Assured 
Destruction. We 're nOw pursuing a strategy of Mutually Assured Safety. which is based on 
cooperation and build-do9ID- of weapons. instead of competition and buildup. 
But we must not forget that, while MAD no longer exists. the tens of thousands of nuclear 
weapons spawned by 1v1AD still do exist. And we must recognize the fragility of democratic 
instirutions in Russia. As the ongoing tragedy in Checbnya makes all too clear, political stability is 
not assured in Russia. 
A reversal of reform cauld result in an authoritarian, militaristic regime hostile to the West 
-- and which still passesses 25,000 nuclear weapons, In short, a reversal of reform in Russia 
could return us to the MAD nighonare. As my friend and colleague Tony Lake said this weekend 
on Meet the Press, "We have a tremendous stake in a healthy and democratic Russia." 
In that connection, I can only reiterate our continuing concern aver the crisis in Chechnya. 
This is a terrible: tragedy for everyone involved. We deeply regret the violence that has left so 
many innocent civilians killed or wounded. We have repeatedly urged an end to this violence and 
called for a negotiated settlement. 
, 
or Iraq or Iran. Both Russia and the United States will have access to the results of their civilian 
work, which could lead to joint commercial projects or joint business ventures. 
However. these are the kind of Nunn-Lugar projects that suffer the most from 
misconceptions. When I talked with a group of freshmen House Republicans last month. 1 was 
asked, ''Why are we spending money on quality of life for former SOYlet troops when we should 
be worried about American troopsT' 
Let me answer .~~ ques_~on with a real-world example. As I related earlier, we~re}~.dping 
the Ukrainians shut d~~ .~eivomaysk: ind also their other ICBM laUDch facility at Khniefuitsky. 
Who's helping us close these bases? The same people who operated them: former officers of the 
Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. But this creates a problem. These people live on these bases. 
They have no other homes. And there are no other homes for them. since Ukraine has a severe 
housing shonage. By law in Ukraine. military officers cannot be decommissioned unless housing 
is pcoYlded. Like any nation, Ukraine doesn't reward military officers for a lifetime of service by 
putting them OUt onto the streets. But we want these officers to retire. We certainly don't want a 
corps of disgruntled nuclear weapons officers at loose ends. The only way to ensure Ukraine 's 
missile bases will be closed and the missile officers willlcave the service is to help Ukraine build 
housing for them. 
So this year, the Nunn-Lugarprogram helped to set up two partnerships between 
American and Ukrainian firms to build housing for demobilized missile officers at Pervomaysk and 
Khmelnitsky. The first partnership will conven a Ukrainian military shipbuilding factory into a 
prefab housing facility. The other will build four apanment complexes with materials produced in 
a factory in Kiev that once made Soviet missile silos. And when these projects are completed. 
these U.S.-Ukraine business partnerships can build housing at theseiactories for the commercial 
market. 
Therefore, my answer to that congressman's question wa.~. "We're. not helping to build 
ho~g fo~ Soviet missile officers wimprovetheirquality of life; we're doing it to improve our 
quality of life." "That housing is critical to eliminating nuclear weapons that could threaten us. 
And, at the same time, we're briDging U.S. businesses into a potential new market 
The same holds true for dealing with nuclear weapons factories. The Nunn-Lugar 
program puts up a little seed money to help U.S. businesses create joint ventures with former 
Soviet weapons industries. Together, they·U produce non-military products for commercial sale. 
Nunn-Lugar money leverages investmeD.ts by American businesses, which can then go on to 
establish a new market for their goods in expanding economies. 
For e~pli: f!lU!:~erican c01D~anies - Rockwell. Double Cola CoIIlpany, International 
American Products l~id~ ~Aids.liitciruitional- signed agreements this summer to-help 
conv_ert fol:!tRussian _fumKwc_ommercial produ!;!ion; . ~_ D!):naking nuclearweapnru;,;, 
compone~ts, thl:R.~ firms will make dental eq;;p;;i~t: ~g1uds'~and air-traffic cOntrol 
equipment. or bOttle cola. 
Our cities can't be destroyed by dental equipment or hearing aids. And these deals are 
small steps toward building the Russian economy and a Russian-American economic partnership. 
~ 5 
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TRWflR-\I)[ AGGREEMENTS 
This is a copy oflhe 2 September 1993 United States, Russian Space Trade 
agreement. It was this agreement the facilitated Lockheed-Martin (and TRW) arranging 
16 satellite launches over the next several years. This joint-venture will infuse 
approximately onc billion do!1ars into the Russian economy_ This thesis holds that it is 
investment on this magnitude that is what will fe-ignite the teetering Russian economy, 
and thus stabilizing the region, not Defense conversions 
289 
Odyssey~System Program 
OneS~Park, 
Redondo Beach, CA g0278 
310.814-5632 Facsim~e 
Facsimile Message 
Date: 611. ~ (99:> 
To:!} J""" Whalen 
D><k: /'Jsi.l>f> 
FAX Number: _ F 
S u bj ec t: IH. T>7;I.d.L ar.tuntnf vJ/~" 
From . & 
Co mm,n'" }fJfJLlHu<Jlolf>s. I£UL8LI/."""IF 
~oL (Mol'S,,,,,! . 
..... , . ~ £ 
~JtE'1"llZP 
'%'B:E Q¢VE!'.lI)[%t('!' or 2l[E 1nfn2l) ~ 07 Al'tElUCli. :.n 
'1'KE ~ 07 DE RttsS:ta.]a: :rz%)llll.a.TJ:OiO 
~DG J;lt'rlmN).'fIOKU. '1'R:All!! no C~
8l>JI,ef; LAlill"15" IU!.KnCES 
3ea=ihq in l:.i:::i t.tlZ.t tb.a !'!.u:o.dlln :sP&OO lc.;:nct:. 1!e~or is in 
th'" prO~e.56 ot' t:::"ansit.j.cm "l;c: QP~'::.icn be.se~ OIl. ni:.;;-);;e-:: 
p::-il:!c:i?!e.s. ~ 
~U"hlq t.o facliitatG ea.J:'ly lWsai8l'l. er.~ in=e> '=he 
enCQ1U'iiSqss nark.=t-Ct:l;i~...eA. ref'or!Il in ~e &u.ssiUl ",cO"==1, 
J.ncJ.udinq its &p.a~ill.lmQ sactcr; petJ;'mlts RuaSl.illln entit.ie~ to 
ot~~ oOlD.lllQ%'eial ~=e laUllch aervica$ ttl ~:::na.~icr.a.l cufrl:.oma=s 
.. t: fair a.nd. r_soJ1cble- p=i¢ell5. ccr.l61.s:t.ent. ",::.th Zll>::-::OiS't p::-.!..r.-......!.;;=l.=; 
ana (io.;;.s :oot d;.a.rttpt t:.he 1nt.ar~t.1¢r1B.l. ~'2.'; %c;: ==.!.~ 
~l.a.'I2.nCllS~.i.c:es. 
H<i.ve agreod. as. fc:U.C"'~~ 
o~erC'luly o~'tttlll.o. or prcvidad sarv!...c:eso. to laWlZh into spGi:! ... 
allY IiPl!Iee-~':. .or 5ata~1.!te" !.n:::~>:.:iL-:.;t l:f.l.t n.ot ~~itc:!! toe 
P'c=-...i~t:e:! ~:i ':he Gove..-:ze:nt. gf the. 1tu.s~~-; pe~do:orill~lc:", t~ ~;;--a .... .id.e 
=mm~:l.OlJ. opa.c;:e launch ae..,.-vl.::1ltl5 or thi; &:;l~u;;= launc:h vehicllltS tor 
c::;~ ~I"itity. Wb",,~er or not or9'l!niJ:e~ t= pe~"'ll=-.i 91;;1n, gr 
P:i."'At.aly or 9'ove;;-~".;ally tnmad or con;clle4; a=- e.ny 
~e::::7'4l'.ar.~ h.ody, ex.:lw!.ih~ the [;oVi1.~<!iIaDt of th,; UrJ.:a.d Sta~ 
or Al:.:Iri.:4 and -:::-- GQverIUltetlt 0::: the. Ru.s.s:ian Facieraticn; ar any 
inUttgcvL.-r.o=:ent,al or;;cni.~tion or c;uaiii~v~"''=.il.l ::;o:\Sorti1.llIi, 
.1.=lud.,ing ~t not ~it.~ to X),·Tr....sA!L'. !~'!' and. their 
rOBpeC:;i'lle laqal (;;'1.1~as~. th.6t i...::. tbe ult.i.lrl.a.te aomlll%" Of' 
ap~ 0:( a s~acee...-af't or s6tal.l.:l.~ or thAt 'Will GQ.ll~ t.ba 
"Contrilct" lr\I!:"~ {.i) to agrBe. or ca~t to thQ: 
provi:il;li", 0", ~:lrc1al G~C8 launoh ce...'""ViCBl: ItU~'" t."l.2.t i! l .. unch 
"~le c~c1iil &p.ii.ce .la\;n~ Bli<rVices" lIIeans 
;::';:j:::;:';erc!.&.1. ~ .. co l.~:ll')d:. ~·iC2.E; c-!::;c.r24 -:':0 lllU~ a Sp.acecrart 
i.r;.cl~i.ns". m:.t n:>t. Ib.!te~ to, intended o::b1t. risk l::.!!.:o'I.aqeme •• 't. . 
l:i!>a=1ng-. flott.e1.11.'t.e li.fliJt.i .. e Qr. Pl:"bit .na- ;i.nt.a;qratiQT. c.osts. 
6. "Ind~!!bent2" ee~..s .r.1'l;" .i..-.~!l";;:i1.·e :;;I!,re~e.;i 0::' ~~c>v:i~Qd to 
i.::U!"';.J;e..~e: the purc::hiii.S1il of co~r;:it!.l. 8p~<=<Il: ::'~\.l., ... c;.."l. .. _-vi~'@o15, 
~lal:l.8?ita~1on Qf Ii4f .... ""18~ IUItt na":.ional a;rccurity pol,l.e!sti sn= 
p:-oqrlUlLS. and dsvelopaar..t =si!Z~~ .. F1::: !.;::'!.~ ai'td proc;~. 
7. "tl'n::-ai: buaines£ praC--ice.s" inclu.c!_ the. ,-.aKin; of arty 
anyt.h.inq of value gr tD "l.l:thcri:z:e. 't.l:le pa.y:nsnt of ai':i.yth1ru;o oZ 
p~cr.; inc:~'l ~1n9 pa~ant t.a .. ~n 1o/t!.:::'e kD;I .... 1.~ ~':.z.t 
.. ~l. a::;, Co p=ti~"'\ of tha pa:YDiect v~ll be o~! .. e:i, .;ivet: c::-
a~ !a~ Orbi't .in a 2~-h=:!" ~~oe. ~Al:1.!.!lq 2. :fixed PQ=~ .. :.i:l!":. 
ralilt.ivlil to tbliO" Ea:::""..b. 
"GBosyn,*".:~r...::;-" t::a..~:,;e or~i':." :ceanG- ;Il. ~;"$p=--~ o:::""bi-:. 
~ ~ r .. po£;!~i';m II. spacec=at":. gr &ate:llit.e into .a 
l.w. "I.:JW e.a..-tllo =~!'t;." ~ .. an ~bit appruxi:o.at:aly 1.eo to 
~IO~O r-Auti~l :;:.ilas [18: te 1,ssa l"..i.l=et:US} .e.~ ~'1.e surfa::e, 
of tn~ Ea....-~. 
'l'bl.~ Io;=~t. applies ~~ ~c;.iOitl &pm.ce l..a.un:;..b S-=-v:iC8C 
~t:lr ::. ... -.nchGli tQ gco~nt:lUs ~...!;r. crbi~ or g.osync:hron.o-.s 
~ ... ~~o: orl::li"C_ tx::.pt fa::- th£. F1c.1.:1q ~uion set £o.. . .... .h in 
&~Cli; l.aum:l;::. sGrVi~ to. 1.&Unc:has to otlwr OZ'b:i.t.1iI' ane. ,,\Lbo:;-bital 
:l.z"l:r..c!J.itS. Not!:i!i~ itt 1±.is ~t 6.ppl.i.eA tQ lIi:unChIlil'5 of" 
i:!1vilian £J»8C:'l progra.& t:l:f e.1ther 'PArty, iI:lcl\;4illq prvqr .. as uuin9 
flp.a:::e=.:'t ~ sa~llt.Bl,; _us ~y z;...c p~!;,ri::'y fer -;be. use o~ 
T".:lft P~ie6 sku~ll end_vcr to &'rurur& tho. "ppli.:;.!!.tior> o£ 
'T.I~i::~~ princ!.plell to int.~""n3"'C!.onG.l CQC?Ct.!.!:i.on a.t:lgng provid«r& 0 : 
2.. lleitlla= ;;>L..., .. ty i:htl.l1 ~ ... r;.ge. in pxa'*ic:es t..."lat. c:i:;J~Qrt 
':~":i~i.:::~ ~:1.q prcvld.e:s of e!)=r.:e"-.l sP<lIce la'Un;:h silr-.... i=e.s:. 
ir.c.l.udi..n'1, but ngt. l.i:ai~ ~: 
a. t.be p:;-ovi.sior. o.z .,r .. n-:s 0: 8ubs.icleti. the~ !ist.crt 'the 
p~=ice: 1n il'1ta...-n. .. ~icnal. ~.ke~ reo:: eo'GilarGl:l l e o:-isk; 
do. ~ ;p--ovialc."1 0: qovernmen'i:;-IIUoli3panr;;c. ~inal"lt!in5' :;:1:" 
O=fiel:a.ll.Y-£UFP~-l!!d. Deport: c::red.i.t:.a." 
J. Ths P~iBa,. in::lad.1:cg thl:lir <lgBntr;;. a ... ')d 
p!:"~C":.i=:r. to. Jl8:~::::::::"fo. e:;r.tract.s to pO;-Qvil1e C<;>1IiWe;:"Ci..lI.: Bpll.O!!: l.\:;.>.>.nch 
~-Vice.B. 
e.:'ght. (a) prJ ...... =ipi5.1 payload.s (in additio" t.1:l t.he D'KAaMT J 
Da~Bllitel ~ ~~ST-l¢t"On:lU:l1 a.a:::"":!1 ==hlt:.. or qeo ... ynch:onauIO 
tra......"'l!!ttU:' O~b!~. ex=e.p:. 'that tl!.1;, ll.uElsia.""l a.pace. lau...~ch Ji;L-viC€' 
~::.-::tVi..:!I!'=E· l!li!Jy n=ot. ~~~ _r~ than t'\o.~ (2) a.,c~ 1&.1.a:I;:;b.e1! iT. an:~'-
1;wQJ,ve-mcnt:tl. ~icO_ 'l'he. R~ilI.n Fed~l:!.tian wi.l1 eruoqre a 
.,:::-cportianate. e~~i.butio.t> ~ CQntra~ by l<u4sil:!.n &?o:>e llllu.nch 
s=vlea provic1=.: wi~ litR}O two-year p~::.-1pQ. 
t:;I "eO tour !..eUrlenes g.f ~i..m=i.:;;>iIIl pqyloa~ ';..w 
9~syne!'".rQ:-.cm.s ~h =~'t. or s:;<>.SOynchr~ ttaJv;.t"er or~it. :!fillY 
The. Par"t:i.aiI c.ball joint.ly IIY~h:latc _ch 1!!I'1ld'l lZl'QJ1c:h Q.!l eo Cag~ .. by .. 
CAlI8 .b.aS:ls and, ~ into aC¢a1.lnt the cu=e.nt 5iittL:!.-:'ion in the 
!ntlil=~tion!:l ~-c.1e..!. 1Op~ce 1l:U;::;:h ~~et, m«:f deci-de by 
:a:n4:'u;:J, :a~e.e:m&n.t to' b:'~&t tt-oat l.aun<;:h as. a c.:i.ng:~$ p:::m:::i.:<>~l 
;:Iayloa~ for the ;r.l-~e. at' ~elll 'XV, ~graph 1 . 
~. o-oi::'~ 2E t.el:'= of ~hi# A~~nnt, RusslG.n space. laun.cli 
1Ie:v!.C@; p:':;V1~e..~ I=.!:~' ccr.t:"a.::t ~ p~ ... i5.ra c;:.~l.il spa:::.e laun= 
c::,~.it ~;::.:- ":he ::::il1:1.wr. cysobuB. 
4. Il'l tbe courae o!" Q;>neult.a-:::lorlli \In:::i:w; J....-tiele. 'n:!, 
space l.a.un.cll se..-vice providers rOT =cia l suborbit:al laUhl;h .... ,. 
o!U"~ "d.d..it.ior.al eo::zmar~l.:.:i 14unehe" to c::'bit E other tbatl 
Fice, of e=zaroilll 5pace ~auncb ~iC4!s a:::te.z;¥d. or prov.Lded by 
RWs8.i.!lr. tipll.~ ll1u.nch &erl.rice providers to intL""national CU$t~rs 
~c:: p;:.=-..lss .a..~l.1 ;\QS01::.Ut.C 4 .... !;;~lud.e prior '\:0 Baeh liilunc.l:l eo 
Ga:~!.sfDet.cry 'I;.=.=n:t:.l:>;;y safw;tuards <1gT$SlISnt ~or e:.II:;h pey:io.!ld 
1 • .1$ and rQ~ti.:ms. Nc:I~inq in thu J.qreomant ahall be 
c=r-..ru.ed to JIe4" thilt the united su~ is constraine.d trcp 
~'":g a;~;".i~~ 31±ig;; -:"!.'!b raa?ee':. t.c ~r.y Unit-a<: Sbttet> 
~ort:. l!~~". ":-1:1= IDli~d ~u.t<!!:!l Tori:'l >l,EI e it..;: bsst er:::: .. rtc to 
authorization anci cl:XDp.l.e.ticn of te~h.noloqy tt'am;.f9~:S ~Ilbjl!!l= t~ 
t.D.iij ~_8nt_ 
oont--:a::t = tlo:;T-~!ns -.:Qntract is !.. . C.:lrw.;:.K~t:. Ioli't..'l ti..e tarmB ai 
t!L!s AqrI!l6iilo3I:i~. 
ric;!:I.t to take a.,y l!Io::t.io..-: ~~tt.fId under its nAtional la~.c aM 
:::,eg-"GA'!J.Qna. 
thi!lll =:ti:;,:Lp3.ted z...~ lr 9a:!:o ~_-t:y iG: .... t::.i .. !.iQCj witb tie o~ 
Pa..-ty~~. c::;.;::cpl.iar'-,=e 'j(i~ t~~ c! th.1.s l.;;re~.t. ':.h.E qaota£ 6€1: 
~c:i.'£\"l.: 
~CI»l!ZOEUGI; 
AgraEUlem: alltl: ec.rry oui: rfl91Jla~ .!oM Qp<'ci2.1 cOns\.llec.~.tonll . Su=h 
in!'~..",a,Uon shall /:IQ. Z'--v';.lided prolllP,:l.y. i.. • .:u;,y ca.soa no l;r,t;Qr ';han 
3!l days .a~::c r::!~p:. :;>f a r-equ$S~ !ly '.~ o~a:r ?g~ 'for ~uch 
ir..£o:r;mt.i.r;;lu. e~~ that such.. 1n£~t:.o:: !la~ 1'.0'!. ~G. p>roV'ide..!! 
~1.c:; 'to nidE r=.:: ~OIllSllQ..""Cial 6pi!i'=& loIunctl: cervieoiUO. 
2. P.a;:-!:ie£ s~l.l tIl:'otac1:. tbe cotd-'ident1all':y or !.!11'onr.a tion 
'.:'h:!.£. AqrCi~r.'t shAll G.<'I';C= into for= upon a:ignature and 
~ ... .!.n in :!orca ~~ ~ 31. 200G. 
z. 't'be :i>utiea sha.J.l revie .... the i.plameatation of this 
Aq:""'~ z.~te 'l:...-=-ea yaar& !roGl it!; ur.t.ry in't.c !cr::::e. Following 
"'1,;.;4 .,."",.:i-....... , the. P~r-::'e..os Cl:y. by- ~!.l~ue.l .r.r::i t-:;.er; ~qo;e=ellI9llt, 
~:.aUi ::..h.ia :.w~t. 
r-~es£ i%r. the. ~1!l=t':1= Co.'!:" ~s1a's ~ce- J,aun::h :!>~t:ox to a 
w..rket t:a_1B. 
4Il.p.Uo;.~te in the E:rll;!:!.ilil.h and RllSs.i:u'. lang'.laglU, bo'Ul -=~'.:.J;;; be..i:n1J 
e.qI:ally Authentic. 
F()R~G:>~OF 
'!'!":!: mt:::.~ S"!'.~..!'!:S or 1'_'!I:t'..IC1..: 
~OR "in'; C::;:OV~,"ZN'!: OF 
TZiil RU:;S:LJUI 'f~:o;R).1':!:oJoi, 
302 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adams, James Ring and Douglas Frantz., A Full Service Bank How BCCI Stole Billions 
Around the World (New York, Pocket Books, 1992) 
Afimasyev, Yuri N., "Seems Like Old Times? Russia's Place in the World," ~ 
tp.lliLl)': 93, no. 585 (October 1994) 
AL, Initialed Report, "Weapons Grade Plutonium Impounded in Weichs," WELT AM 
SONTAG, JPRS-1ND-94-016, 7 August 1994 
Bacon, Edwin, "Russian AmlS Exports-A Triumph for Marketing?" Jane's Intelligence 
Review 6, no. 6 (June 1994). 
"BKA Warns of 'Dramatic Increase· in Nuclear Crime," DPA, fIBS-WEU-94-166-A, 17 
August 1994 
Blacker, Coit D. and Gloria Duffy, The Stanford Arms Control Group~ International Arms 
Control Issues and A"reements (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1984) 
"Border Troop~ Chief Views Russia-Turkmenistan Military," NE7AVASIMAYA CAZETA, 
JPRS-UMA-95-003, 13 January 1995. 
Brenner, Michael 1., Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
Bukharin, Oleg, "US-Russian Cooperation in the Area of Nuclear Safeguards," 
Nonproliferation Re, ... iew (Fall 1994) 
Burrows, William E. and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass (New York, Simon & Schuster, 
1994) 
Clausewitz, Carl Von, On War (New York, Penguin Books, originally published 1832 by 
Vom Krieg) 
Cochran, Thomas B, "US Assistance to Improve Physical Security and Accounting of 
Fj~sile Materials in Russia," (The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Conference, 31 January 1995) 
Cooper, Julian, "Transformation of the Russian Defense Industry," Jane's Intelligence 
Review 6, no. 10 (October 1994). 
303 
"Cooperative Threat Reduction in Bdarus: A Shilllling Example," point paper issued by 
Office of Secretary of Defense, 21 March 1995 
Corwin, Julic and Douglas Stranglin, "The Looting of Russia," U.S News and \Vorld 
R.roQr1116, no. 9, 7 March 1994. 
"Counterintelligence Chief Heads Nuclear Monitoring Body," Moscow Ostallkino 
Television, JPRS-TAC-94-001-L, 23 August 1994. 
"Counterintelligence Chief Denies Leak of Nudear Components," IT.4R-TASS, 
FBIS-SOV-94-120, 22 June 1994 
Cowell, Alan, "Questions Raised on Russian Plutonium Deal," l'.'ew York Times, 17 May 
1995) 
"Criminal Organizations in Russia," The Current Dioest of the Post Soviet Pres;; (10 
March 1993 
Davis, Jay C and David A Kay, "Iraq's Secret Nuclear Weapons Program," Physics Today 
(July, 1992) 
"Defense Conversion in the Former Soviet Republics : Win-Win-Win for Both Teams," 
point paper issued by Office of Secretary of Defense 21 March 1995 
Diller, Daniel C, Russia and The rndependent States (Washington, D .C., Congressional 
Quarterly, 1993) 
Editorial, "Russian Technology For Sale," Chicago Tribune 7 October 1993 
Editorial, "To Ban Thc Bomb,"~, v. 2, August 1994 
"Expert Warns of Powerful Plutonium Buyers," DIE WOCHE, FBIS-SOV-94-162, 18 
August 1994 
Galdi, Theodor, "The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program for Soviet 
Weapons Dismantlement: Background and Implementation," Congressional Research 
Service, 29 December 1993 
___ ~ "CRS Report for The President and Congress," February 1995 . 
Gallant, Steven, "The Failure of Russia's Defense Conversion," Jane's Intelligence Review 
6, no. 7 (July 1994) 
304 
Gati, Charles, The Block That Failed (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University 
Press, 1990) 
"German Media Exposes Plutonium Trafficking," DIE lIET, JPRS-T"-TI-94-00o-L, 29 
July 1994 
Gleick, James, Chaos (New York, Penguin Books, 1987) 
Goodsir, Danin, "Customs to Maintain Trade in Nuclear, Stategic Commodities," South 
China Morning Post, JPRS-TND-94-0J 6, 8 August 1994. 
Gordon, "Michael R. and Mathew L Wald, "Russia Controls on Bomb Material Are 
Leaky," New Yor.k...Iim£s, 18 August J 994 
Greenhouse, Steven, "U.S. Gives Russia Data on Iran's Atom Plans," ~ork Times, J 
April 1995 
"Growing European Concern Over Nuclear Smuggling Issue,"' the Europeall, 
FBS-SOY-94-053, 18 March 1994 
Gutsalov, A.T., "Regulating Nuclear and Radiation Safety in Russia Where do we Stand 
and What are the Issues?" translated by Catherine Boyle (Paper presented at the 
symposium on Nuclear Safety in the [\;lS, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 
12-13 April 1994) 
Heller, Mikhail and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York, Touchstone 
Books, 1992) 
Hearst, David, "Ukraine Facing Damning Report on Nuclear Safcty," The Guardian, 
FBIS-SOY-94-088, 21 April 1994 
Hersh, Seymour, "The Wild East," Atlantic Monthly (June, 1994) 
"IAEA 'Alarmed" Over .0:uclear Smuggling Incidents," AFP, JPRS-Tt\TD-94-0IG, 15 
August 1994 
Initialed Report, "Nuclear Flea Market," DIE lIE?; FBIS-SOV-194-G2, 29 July 1994 
Kerry, Senator John F., "Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and 
International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations," (Washington, U.S 
Govenunent Printing Office, 1992): This is a five volume record of testimony begilUling 
on I August 1991 and concluding on 14 May 1992 
Kessler, Ronald, The FBI (New York, Pocket Books, 1993) 
305 
Khripunov, "Conventional Arms Control Initiatives : Russia as a Spccial Cas!!," ~ 
C-.9.ntrol Today 24, no. 10 (December 1994) 
Kort, Michael, Tn!! Soviet Colosus The Risa and Fall afthe J JSSR (Armonk, New York, 
M.E. Sharp, 1993) 
LaPierre, Wayne, Guns Crime and Freedom (Washington, Regne!)' Publishing, Inc., 
1994) 
Lenorovit7., Jeffcry M., "U.S .-Russia Teams Gct Pentagon Funds," AY.ill.t~ 
Space Technology 141, no. 6, 8 August 1994. 
Liu, Melinda, "The FBI vs. Russia's Mafia," Newsweek 25 July J 994 
Lowy, David M. , "Understanding Organized Crime Groups in Russia," (Department of 
National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1994) 
Mendelsohn, Jack and Dunbar Lockwood, "U.S. Security Assistanc!! to the Former Soviet 
Union," Arms Con~ 23, no. 5 (April 1995). 
Misharin, Vladislav N. "Disintegration of the USSR and Nuclear Non-Prolifcration" 
(Paper presented at the Monterey Institute for International Studies, August 1994) 
Morris, Jim, "Loose Cannon On Target," Soldier Of Fort un!! (:vfarch, 1995) 
_ _ ~"Spiking A Loose Cannon," Soldier Of Fort un!! (April, 1995). 
Nelan, Bruce W., "Formula For Tcrror," Iims;, 29 August 1994. 
"Nuclear Agency Chief Views Safety Issues, Uranium Thefts," DIE WOCHE, 
JPRS-TND-94-007, 24 February 1994 
"I'ucl!!ar Expert Describes Security Measures as 'Outdated', " DER SPJEGAEL, 
FBIS-SOV-94- 162, 22 August 1994 
Nunn, Senator Sam, "Reducing the Soviet "Military Threat" (The Senate Floor, February 7, 
1992). 
Ostrovsky, Victor, ~er Side OfDecepti_on (New York, Harper Collins, 1994) 
"Overview of the Cooperative Threat Rcduction Program," point paper issued by Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, 23 February 1995 
"Paper Analyzes Drug Smuggling Routes," DAGENS NYHE7ER, JPRS-TDD-95-003 -L, 
26 November 1994 
306 
Pelling, Heruy, Modern Britain (New York, W.W. Nonon & Company, Inc., 1960) 
Perry, William, "Second FY 1994 Semi-Annual Report on Program Activities to Facilitate 
Weapons DestruCtiOn and Nonproliferation in the Former Soviet Union," (30 October 
1994) 
"Perry Outlines Plan~ to Aid Russia Defense Conversion," Aviation Week & Space 
~ 140, no. 13,28 March 1994 
Potter, William C, and Emily Ewell and Elizabeth Skinner, "Nuclear Security in 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine: Interview with Vladimir Shkolnik and Nicolai Steinberg," 
Nonproliferation Review 2, no. 1 (Fall 1994) 
Potter, William C and Eve Cohen and Edward V Kayukov, "Nuclear Profiles of the 
Soviet Successor States," mono. I (Monterey, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies) 
Potter, William C. and Leonard Spector, Nuclear Successor States of the Soviet Union 
Nuclear Weapons and Sensitive Export Status Report (Washington D.C, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, May 1994) 
Potter, William c., "Nuclear Insecurity in the Post-Soviet States," Nonproliferation 
~:Le"'Y I, no. 3 (Spring-Summer 1994) 
Potts, Mark and Nicholas Koehn and Robert Whittington, Dirty Money BCeI· Tht:;.!D.&!k: 
StOD' of the Worlds Dirtiest Bank (Washington D.C. , National Press Book, 1992) 
"Report Views Weapons Grade Plutonium Find," DERSPIEGAL, FBIS-WEU-94- J39, 18 
July J 994 
Rice, Berkeley, Traffickino (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989) 
"Russian Physicist Interviewed on Plutonium Theft," DIE WOCHE, FBIS-WEU-94-1IS, 
16 June 1994 
"Safety of Moscow Nuclear Sites Assessed," IZVES17YA, JPRS-TEN-94-019, 13 July 
1994 
Sakwa, Richard, Gorbachev and His Reforms (New York, Prentice Hall, 1990) 
Scherer, Peter, "J11egal Dealings in Nuclear Material Soaring," DIE WELT, 
JPRS-TND-94-006-L, 20 April 1994 
307 
Schmidt-Haeuer, Christian, "Isotopes From the Preserving Jar," DIE ZIET, 
JPRS-TND-94-008-L, 29 July 1994. 
Schroder, Dieter, "BND Official Denies Existence of Nuclear Mafia," SUEDDEUTSCHE 
ZErrUNG, FBIS-WEU-94-163, 21 August 1994 
___ ~ "The Situation is Not Yet Dramatic Enough," SUE])DEUTSCHE 
ZEJTUNG, }-BIS-WEU-94-164 22 August 1994. 
Selin, Ivan, "Symposium on Nuclear Safety in the Former Soviet Union," (Paper presented 
at the Symposium on Nuclear Safety in the NIS, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, 12-13 April 1994) 
SIPRI monograph, (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), ~~ 
Aeainst Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1975) 
Specter, Michael, "Opium finds Its Silk Road In Chaos of Central Asia," New York 
Ii..!n§.. 2 May 1995 
ocM-,,-'ch-"CC99"'S-' "Bleak Times Where Sputniks Once Soared," New York Times, 21 
"State of f\uclea r, Radiation Safety 'Unsatisfactory,' from INTERFAX, 
lPRS-TI\"'D-994-002-L, 8 february 1994. 
Stumph, Waldo, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," unpublished manuscript, no 
date, provided by Professor Peter Lavoy, Naval Postgraduate School (NS4280) 
"Support for Nunn-Lugar Affirmed by Secretary Christopher: Non-Proliferation Agenda 
'Ambitious'," Post Soviet Nuclear & Defense Monitor, 'V; 31 January 1995 
Thompson, Mark, "Saphire's Hot Glow," TIme., 5 December 1994. 
Tw, Sun, The Art Of War (London, Oxford University Press, 1963). Translated by 
Samuel E. Griffith 
de Villiers, lW. and Roger Fardine and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave up the 
Bomb," Foreign Affair~ 72, no. 5 (Nov/Dec, 1993) . 
Wald, Mathew L and Michael R Gordon, "Russia Treasures Plutonium, But U.s. Wants 
to Destroy II," New York Times 19 August 1994 
Webster's Colleoe PictjQillIY. (New York, Random House, 1991) 
While, Stephen, After Gorbachev (Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
308 
Whitney, Craig, "Germans Suspect Russian Milllary In Plutonium Sale," New York 
Times, 16 AuguSl 1994 
Zimmennan, Peter, "Technical Barriers to Nuclear Proliferation," in Zachery S_ Davis and 
Benjamin Frankel eds_. The proliferation pllzzle : Why Nuclear W~:g! and What 
Results (Frank Cass, 1993) 
309 
'" 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
N 524 
Chief of Naval Operations 
Pentagon Room 4£483 
Washington, D. C 20350-2000 
Defense Technical Information Center 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, VA 22304-6 145 
Dr. Thomas C Bruneau 
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NSiBn) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5100 
Library, Code 52 
~aval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-S101 
Thomas L Whalen 
10444 Ritts Mill Rd 
ShingletowTl, CA 96088 
Leonard Uhl 
P,O, Box 538 
Burney, CA 93943 
Peter R, Lavoy 
Dept. National Security Affairs (NS/La) 
Monterey, CA 93943-5100 
Dr. Cynthia Levy 
Dept. National Security Affairs (NSILy) 
Monterey, CA 93943 -5100 
LT Thomas D. Whalen, lJSNR 
10444 Ritts Mill Rd 
Shingletown, CA 960t!t! 
J I I 
No. Copies 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTiON LIST 
10 LT AndrewR Williams, USN 
Amphibious Group One 
Unit 25063 
FPO AP 96601-6006 
II Rodman E. Williams 
1766 Rte. J4A 
Penn Yan, NY 14527 
12 CDR Joseph A. Tenaglia, USN 
Office of Naval Intelligence 
Naval Mari time Intelligence Center 
4251 Suitlamd Rd 
Washington, D. C. 20395 -5 720 
13 Dr. John Arquilla 
Dept National Security Affairs (NS/Aq) 
Monterey, CA 93943-5100 
14 Dr. William Potier 
Monterey Institute for International Studies 
CSI Nonproliferation Project 
425 Van Burren St 
Monterey, CA 93940 
312 
No. Copies 
DUDLEY KNOX UBRARY 
NAVAL pOSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
MONTEREY CA 93943-5101 
(--------~ \ 

